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Abstract
The development of autonomous mobile robots is a major topic of current research. As
those robots must be able to react to changing environments and avoid collisions also with
moving obstacles, the fulfilment of safety requirements is an important aspect. Behaviour-
based systems (bbs) have proven to meet several of the properties required for these kinds
of robots, such as reactivity, extensibility and re-usability of individual components. bbs
consist of a number of behavioural components that individually realise simple tasks. Their
interconnection allows to achieve complex robot behaviour, which implies that correct
connections are crucial. The resulting networks can get very large making them difficult
to verify. This dissertation presents a novel concept for the analysis and verification of
complex autonomous robot systems controlled by behaviour-based software architectures
with special focus on the integration of environmental aspects into the processes.
Several analysis techniques have been investigated and adapted to the special requirements
of bbs. These include a structural analysis, which is used to find constraint violations and
faults in the network layout. Fault tree analysis is applied to identify root causes of hazards
and the relationship of system events. For this, a technique to map the behaviour-based
control network to the structure of a fault tree has been developed. Testing and data
analysis are used for the detection of failures and their root causes. Here, a new concept
that identifies patterns in data recorded during test runs has been introduced.
All of these methods cannot guarantee failure-free and safe robot behaviour and can never
prove the absence of failures. Therefore, model checking as formal verification technique
that proves a property to be correct for the given system, has been chosen to complement
the set of analysis techniques. A novel concept for the integration of environmental
influences into the model checking process is proposed. Environmental situations and the
sensor processing chain are represented as synchronised automata similar to the modelling
of the behavioural network. Tools supporting the whole verification process including the
creation of formal queries in its environment have been developed.
During the verification of large behavioural networks, the scalability of the model checking
approach appears as a big problem. Several approaches that deal with this problem have
been investigated and the selection of slicing and abstraction methods has been justified.
A concept for the application of these methods is provided, that reduces the behavioural
network to the relevant parts before the actual verification process.
All techniques have been applied to the behaviour-based control system of the autonomous
outdoor robot RAVON. Its complex network with more than 400 components allows for
demonstrating the soundness of the presented concepts. The set of different techniques
provides a fundamental basis for a comprehensive analysis and verification of bbs acting
in changing environments.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, robotic systems are an inherent part of industrial work and the market is still
growing. According to the International Federation of Robotics, since 2010 the demand
for industrial robots has grown rapidly (17% per year) and reached a new sales record in
2015 [IFR 15]. The most important customer in this context is the automotive industry,
followed by the electrical/electronics industry. In the context of Industry 4.0, flexible and
automated solutions are state-of-the art and the collaboration between humans and robots
is a challenging topic.
Service robots are said to conquer the market in the near future. They are already
established as household helpers such as floor cleaning robots or in the medical context,
e.g. as mobile assistance systems or as assistance in surgery tasks in hospitals. Self-
driving vehicles are also a big topic of current research where great successes have already
been achieved recently [Lari 15]. Autonomous mobile robots are often deployed to solve
dangerous tasks such as the search for humans in disaster areas or the identification of
weapons of mass destruction.
1.1 Motivation
The growing number of robotic systems in our daily life, especially in such critical areas
as medical engineering or car assistance systems, intensifies the need for reliable and safe
systems. Several examples for failing robot behaviours are given in literature, among
these are industrial robot arms that injured or killed workers or software errors in medical
systems that lead to physical injuries or death [Dhillon 15, Alemzadeh 15, 0sha06 06,
Backström 95]. Accidents like these substantiate the call for methods and standards that
prove the safety and reliability of systems. This is especially needed for robotic systems
that act autonomously in unstructured environments and/or interact with humans.
Autonomous mobile systems have special demands in contrast to stationary systems acting
in a structured and well-defined environment. Such systems must be equipped with several
sensors that capture the environmental conditions and a control software which is able to
react in situations that were never defined explicitly. Behaviour-based architectures have
been implemented successfully on robotic systems to meet those requirements [Arkin 98].
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They are based on the subsumption architecture introduced by Rodney Brooks [Brooks 91].
Behaviour-based systems consist of a number of simple components where each is respon-
sible for a basic task. In order to fulfil more complex tasks, the simple components are
connected via their inputs and outputs to build a network. For example, a behaviour
responsible for turning the robot to the left and a behaviour responsible for driving ahead
are combined to enable the robot to turn a left curve. In contrast to the traditional
“sense-plan-act” approach, these systems are able to react in unknown situations. Addi-
tionally, the distribution of functionality allows parallel software developing, early testing,
re-usability of single components and good extensibility.
The downside of this modular approach is the complexity of the interconnections, which
increases with the function volume. The lack of automated methods which link basic
components and the absence of guidelines particularly for special tasks hold a high error
potential. Due to the modular and distributed structure, the identification and elimination
of faults can be difficult, as they might not only be rooted in components of the system,
but based in the network structure. Furthermore, a misbehaviour of the robot is usually
not based on a single point, which complicates the identification of its origin. The fact that
not all failures are detected during testing, e.g. due to the usually implemented redundancy,
presents an additional level of difficulty. Redundancy might be integrated using additional
sensor systems or components with the same goal but different realisations, for example
obstacle avoidance behaviours, that realise an evasive manoeuvre to the left or to the right,
respectively.
The above mentioned problems focus on the software, but, for embedded systems as robots,
the hardware component cannot be neglected. Hardware can also be the source of robot
failure, e.g. broken sensors, which naturally have an effect on the software calculated robot
control commands. Last but not least, special environmental conditions can cause the
robot to miss its goals.
This raises the need for analysis techniques for the special demands of behaviour-based
robotic systems, which allow to detect failures and their origins, as well as techniques that
verify the correct execution.
1.2 Objectives
The scientific contribution of this work is the definition of a comprehensive set of techniques
that allow to analyse and formally verify large-scale behaviour-based robot systems. Of
special emphasis is the integration of hardware components and environmental conditions
into the analysis processes.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the covered aspects. In the centre is the behaviour-based software
control system together with its possible executable platforms embedded in the environment,
which is surrounded by the different parts of the concept: Analysis methods and formal
verification techniques.
The term Analysis handles a broad spectrum of purposes, and correspondingly a large
number of techniques are available. In the context of this thesis, the goals of analysis are
• determining the characteristics of the behaviour-based network
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• detecting faults in the network structure
• determining sources of robot failure
• determining violations of requirements
• identifying “key components” in the network structure
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Figure 1.1: The concept of this thesis. The behaviour-based network together with its execution
platforms (simulated or real robot) embedded in its environment is verified and examined using
several analysis techniques. For formal verification a formal model is created. The results of the
model checker can be used as reference point for analysis or vice versa analysis methods can be
used to correct faults detected in the formal verification process.
The remaining two boxes in Fig. 1.1 handle the topic of formal verification. In contrast
to testing, which can only show the presence of failures, formal verification can prove
a system to be correct, and is thus an useful additional verification technique. Formal
verification in the context of this thesis is based on a formal model of the system to be
verified. Therefore, the modelling of the behaviour-based system is a central aspect with a
focus on the integration of sensor hardware and environmental conditions. The verification
process aims at checking a defined property to be correct for the model. Here again, the
verification of properties that are related to the environment in which the robot acts are a
major topic.
Large networks and the additional components naturally result in large formal models,
which leads to long computation times and problems with the size of the available memory.
The handling of these problems is also a major topic of this thesis. The basic idea is to
utilise results of the analysis to focus the verification process on the relevant system parts.
As the manual application of analysis techniques and the interpretation of the results is
difficult and error-prone for large behaviour networks, automated methods and graphical
support are also topics of this work.
4 1. Introduction
The objectives of this thesis can be summarised in two aspects.
Analysis techniques: The common goal of the analysis techniques is to earn knowledge
about the system in order to be able to identify faults. The methods shall support
the developer to identify faults faster and with less effort. The investigation of the
structure of the behaviour-based control network and the interfaces to hardware
components, as well as the identification of special key components, shall serve as
basis for further analysis and verification methods.
Formal verification: The purpose of developing a method to formally verify behaviour-
based systems that take into account hardware components and environmental
aspects is to assist the developer during the verification of system requirements that
are dependent on these factors. Additionally, the technique shall be applicable to
the large behaviour-based networks of robots realising complex tasks.
Both approaches shall support the developer of behaviour-based systems to create safe
and reliable software.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 starts with the definition of important
terms, followed by an introduction to the fundamentals of the concepts presented later in
this thesis. These include the behaviour-based architecture and the robot platform ravon,
which have been used to test the developed methods and techniques and to illustrate them
throughout this work. As a special focus is set on the integration of the environment into
the analysis process, the sensor processing of ravon is also described. Furthermore, the
visualisation tools which are the basis for the developed graphical user assistance system
are introduced.
An overview of techniques targeting the analysis and formal verification of safety and
reliability properties, which are widely used in the development of software and embedded
systems is provided in Chap. 3. The general concepts of several hazard analysis techniques,
testing, and formal verification methods are described. Example applications are presented
which prove their applicability to robotic systems. The current state of the art of analysis
methods in particular for behaviour-based systems is examined as well. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the applicability and expandability of the methods to
behaviour-based systems.
Chapter 4 targets techniques to analyse behaviour-based systems. Starting from a structural
analysis, providing automated methods to gather basic knowledge about the network
structure and detecting faults in the interconnection of components, an approach to
detected relevant system parts is presented. As a further statical analysis method, fault
tree modelling is introduced, which provides a method to discover correlations in the
system leading to a robot failure. The third section focuses on the analysis of data flowing
in the network structure with the goal to determine the origins of faulty robot behaviour.
The formal modelling of behaviour-based systems as networks of timed automata is
described in Chap. 5. In addition to a short introduction into model checking and the
modelling of standard behavioural components, the integration of sensor hardware and
1.3. Outline 5
environmental conditions is presented in detail. The generation of formal queries and
the usage of the model checker are exemplified through the example of the autonomous
robot ravon using the developed assistance tools. An evaluation of time and memory
consumption during the formal verification process and a discussion complete this chapter.
The results of the evaluation in Chap. 5 lead to the topic of Chap. 6 which focuses on
possible methods to face the scalability problem of the model checking approach. Based on
a brief overview of different approaches to this problem, the adaptation of the techniques
slicing and abstraction to the needs of behaviour-based systems is explained in detail. The
improvements achieved by using these techniques are shown on an application example.
Additionally, the transferability of the methods to support other analysis processes is
discussed.
Finally, Chap. 7 summarises the work of this thesis. The major results are specified and
evaluated and options for future work are given.
6 1. Introduction
2. Fundamentals
The work at hand deals with the analysis and verification of behaviour-based systems. To
motivate and demonstrate the proposed methods several examples are given throughout this
work. In this chapter, the fundamental structure of the used behaviour-based architecture,
the integrated Behaviour-Based Control (Sec. 2.2), and its implementation for the control of
the autonomous outdoor robot ravon is described (Sec. 2.3). Besides, a short introduction
into the software framework and the corresponding visualisation tool is given as the latter
is consequently extended in the work at hand (Sec. 2.4). An introduction to the most
relevant terms in the context of safety analysis and behaviour-based systems is given in
Sec. 2.1.
2.1 Terms and Definitions
Throughout this work, several terms were used, either in the context of analysis and
verification or in the context of behaviour-based systems, that have several meanings or
no exact definitions. This section introduces the main terms as used in this thesis.
In the context of behaviour-based systems, talking about a behaviour is ambiguous,
as it can mean the behaviour of the robot or the basic component inside the software
structure. To distinguish both subjects, the latter are always called with an addition, e.g.
behavioural component or fusion behaviour . A network of behavioural components
is called behavioural network or just network.
During the analysis process, several special terms are used to distinguish between a visible
misbehaviour (failure) of the system, the corresponding trigger (fault, defect) and its
source (error). In literature, there exist slightly different definitions of these terms. In
this thesis, they will be defined according to [Liggesmeyer 09].
Definition 2.1: Failure
A malfunction or failure is an inconsistent behaviour with respect to the specified
(desired) behaviour (IEC61508− 4). A failure occurs during the execution of the
system. A failure is the result of a fault (in software).
8 2. Fundamentals
Definition 2.2: Fault or Defect
A software fault or defect is the cause of a failure. A software fault means a fault in
the program code, hardware faults can be e.g. construction faults.
Definition 2.3: Error
An error is the cause of a fault. This can be a mistake of the programmer or a
simple typing error.
These terms are defined generally for (software) analysis methods. In the context of safety
analysis, the term safety needs to be defined. According to the standard IEC 61508 safety
and functional safety are defined as follows:
Definition 2.4: Safety and Functional Safety
A safe system is a system where unacceptable risks like injury or harm to the health
of humans are absent. Safety describes a state where the danger of personal or
property damage is reduced to an acceptable level.
Functional Safety is part of the overall safety that depends on a system or equipment
operating correctly in response to its inputs.
Safety requirements are usually defined in the Safety Requirements Specification (SRS).
An example for a safety requirement of an autonomous mobile robot would be that the
robot must not drive into a person.
Safety requirements are derived from a so-called hazard analysis. The term hazard is
defined as
Definition 2.5: Hazard
A hazard is any potential source of harm (IEC61508− 4).
Hazards can be classified according to their criticality using categories like acceptable or
unacceptable. Hazard analysis deals with the identification of hazards.
2.2 Integrated Behaviour-Based Control
The behaviour-based architecture integrated Behaviour-Based Control (iB2C) is has been
developed and is continuously improved at the RRLAB1. It has been implemented in the
robotic frameworks mca2-kl and finroc (see Sec. 2.4).
The basic component of the iB2C is depicted in Fig. 2.1. Its standardised interface has
three input possibilities:
Stimulation s: The stimulation input is used to gradually enable a behavioural compo-
nent.
1Robotics Research Lab, University of Kaiserslautern
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Figure 2.2: iB2C fusion behaviour realising
the maximum fusion for nc = 2 competing
behavioural components
Inhibition Vector ~i: The inhibition input is used to gradually disable a behavioural
component. A behavioural component can be inhibited by several other components,
where i is calculated by i = ‖~ı‖∞.
Control Vector ~e : The control vector ~e ∈ Rm can transfer arbitrary data between the
behavioural components.
The inputs are usually connected with the outputs of other components in the network.
The three output possibilities are as follows:
Activity a: The activity describes the influence of a behavioural component in the
network. A behavioural component can use only a part of its activity to influence
other behavioural components by using so-called derived activities a0, a1, . . . , aq−1
with ai ≤ a, ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. Together with a, they build the activity vector
~a = (a,~a)T .
Target Rating r: The target rating describes the satisfaction of a behavioural component,
where 0 means maximal satisfaction. A component is satisfied when its goal is
achieved.
Control Vector ~u: The control vector ~u ∈ Rn can t ansfer arbitrary dat between
behavioural components.
s, i, a and r together with the internal activation value ι = s · (1− i) are called behavioural
signals. Their value range is limited to [0,1], whereas the control values of ~e and ~u are not
limited. For activity and activation, a ≤ ι must hold. A behavioural component is called
activated, when its activation is greater than 0, it is called active, when additionally its
activity is greater than 0. A behavioural component is formally defined as B =
(
~fa, fr, ~F
)
with ~fa : Rm × [0, 1]→ [0, 1]× [0, 1]q and ~fa(~e, ι) = ~a being the activity function, fr with
fr : Rm → [0, 1] and fr(~e) = r being the target rating function and the transfer function
~F with ~F : Rm × [0, 1] → Rn and ~F (~e, ι) = ~u, that calculates the output vector ~u from
the input vector ~e and the activation. The transfer function can be arbitrarily complex,
depending on the needed functionality.
10 2. Fundamentals
Fusion Behaviour
B2
B1
B0
Figure 2.3: Example of an iB2C network. B0 stimulates B1 with its activity. B2 inhibits B1.
The outputs of B1 and B2 are combined by a maximum fusion behaviour. The filled triangle at
the stimulation input of B2 symbolises a constant full stimulation.
Behavioural components are combined with each other by connecting the activity output
of one component with the stimulating or inhibiting input of another. Besides from
that simple combination method, there exist several special components, that allow more
sophisticated combinations. The most frequently used special behavioural component is
the fusion behaviour (fb). It can coordinate the outputs of nc competing behavioural
components (BInputd with d = 0, ..., nc − 1) to one output according to one of the three
fusion methods: maximum, weighted sum and weighted average. For the work at hand,
only the maximum fusion is of relevance and will be described in the following (see Fig. 2.2
for the graphical representation). Further fusion methods as well as the design and
development of behaviour-based systems are described in [Proetzsch 10a, Armbrust 14a].
BFmax = (~fa_Fmax , fr_Fmax , ~FFmax) (2.1)
~fa_Fmax(~eFmax , ιFmax) = max
d
(aInputd) · ιFmax (2.2)
fr_Fmax(~eFmax) = rInputgwith g = argmaxd (aInputd) (2.3)
~Ffmax(~efmax) = ~uInputgwith g = argmaxd (aInputd) (2.4)
Figure 2.3 shows an example of the mentioned connection possibilities. The fusion
behaviour fuses the control values of B1 and B2. As long as B2 is not active and the
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stimulation of B1 is greater than 0, the control values of B1 have precedence over those of
B2. With increasing activity of B2 the activity of B1 decreases as it is inhibited from B2.
As behaviour networks can be very large, the need to structure them leads to the introduc-
tion of behavioural groups. These groups have the same interface as a standard behavioural
component. They can contain an unlimited number of behavioural components as well
as other groups. The usage of groups leads to a hierarchical composition of behavioural
components.
2.3 Application System: The Autonomous Off-Road
Robot RAVON
The autonomous off-road robot ravon (see Fig. 2.4) serves as test bed for localization,
navigation and motion control in rough and vegetated terrain. ravon shall fulfil high-level
navigation tasks together with the requirement to operate safely and reliable in a complex
environment.
Figure 2.4: The autonomous off-road vehicle ravon in the Palatinate Forest
Its basic platform is the robot platform robuCAR TT by Robosoft, which is extended by
several components to meet the given requirements. Two independently steered axles allow
the execution of advanced driving manoeuvres. It is equipped with a planar laser range
finder, a panning laser scanner, a stereo camera and a spring-mounted bumper bar on its
front as well as a planar laser scanner and a bumper bar on its rear. The bumper bars
realise a double-stage detection of contacts. In a first level, two infrared sensors measure
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the stroke and draw conclusion to the force. These information is processed by the control
software. The second level initiates an emergency stop in the case of high forces. For this,
a safety shutdown board is connected to the safety chain of the robot. When the safety
chain is interrupted, the robot stops. Four industrial Linux-PCs that run the control
software complete the main components. The whole vehicle measures 2.4 by 1.4 by 1.8m
(length x width x height) and weights about 750 kg. Figure 2.5 depicts the hardware parts
mounted on ravon and their connections.
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Figure 2.5: The hardware parts of the autonomous robot ravon
2.3.1 Control Software
The control software of ravon is divided into three navigation layers. The highest layer
called long-range navigation or navigator plans the robots path to goals in a distance
of 10m up to several km. The navigator works on a topological map, which focuses on
single waypoints that are relevant for the navigation. This map type reduces memory
and computational demands by abstracting from local aspects, which are followed by the
lower layers. The second navigation layer, the mid-range navigation, is needed to detect
environmental situations like dead-ends, narrows or indentations.
The lowest level is called safety layer, responsible for short-range navigation, meaning
collision-free operation in the local environment. Its tasks are e.g. to trigger an emergency
stop or to avoid crashes with obstacles by driving around them. In order to do this, this
layer can (partly) overwrite drive commands from higher layers by inhibiting them and
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providing corrective data. Its decisions are based on sensor data. In order to provide an
abstract view for all types of sensor data and an arbitrary number of sensors, a virtual
sensor layer is used [Schäfer 11].
The safety layer distinguishes three so-called drive-modi for fast, moderate and slow robot
motion. Depending on the robots driving velocity different sensor data is needed. Fast
driving requires long-range obstacle detection. When driving through vegetation, sensor
data that allows to evaluate the traversability of the path is required (moderate drive).
The slowest mode, called tactile creep, is needed in dense vegetation, where for example,
the laser scanners can not evaluate if the obstacle can be passed or not. Here, the robot
relies on data provided by the safety bumper. The behavioural groups implementing this
concept are instances of the same class, each provided with the required sensor information.
The switching between the modi is implemented in corresponding drive mode behaviours.
Figure 2.6 shows the network responsible for safety control during fast driving, called Full
Speed Safety Control. It can be divided into three parts responsible for safe driving in
respect to the three steering possibilities, sidewards motion (yellow background), rotation
(light grey background), and straight-ahead motion (green background). All parts contain
groups calculating the respective control data for the different sides of the robot and fusion
behaviours to fuse the outputs with the pre-set motion command from a higher layer. Each
group includes again several groups that encapsulate the calculation of the safe motion
with respect to several sensor data evaluation methods. Figure 2.7 depicts exemplarily
the group (G) Fast Front Slow Down from the network of components responsible for
straight-ahead motion. The name of the group is a combination of the driving mode, Fast,
the direction of the sensors, Front, and the action, Slow Down. The prefix (G) indicates
the component as a group. The example group contains four subgroups that react to
obstacles in the front of the robot. In the case of a front obstacle, the behavioural groups
will get active and calculate a velocity value in dependence of the desired velocity and the
distance to the obstacle. This value is fused and transferred to the groups output. In the
surrounding group (Fig. 2.6) this value is fused and combined with other motion commands
such as rotation and sidewards motion in order to initiate an evasion manoeuvre.
More detailed information about the concepts applied to this robot can be found in
[Armbrust 10].
2.3.2 Sensor Processing
The task of sensor processing is to combine the data from different sensors and make them
available for further use in the control software. The data needed for different navigation
tasks shall be provided in an appropriate manner. For this, the data from the diverse
sensors have to be composed and put into an abstract view for further access. For ravon
an approach using a control-driven sensor processing chain as presented in [Armbrust 10] is
implemented. The approach uses abstract views called sector maps to provide information
corresponding to special properties and a certain area around the robot.
The data from a sensor is firstly stored in a grid map which provides fast access to define
areas and properties. Examples for properties are for example positive/negative obstacle,
ground, and overhang. Properties are used to divide the covered region into several sectors.
A sector map stores a property together with the distance from the sector’s origin to the
most relevant representative. Figure 2.8 shows a grid map monitored by the sensors of
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Figure 2.6: Network of ravon’s safety control for the fast driving mode. Grey boxes represent
behavioural groups, light blue boxes standard behavioural components and dark blue boxes
fusion behaviours. The coloured backgrounds mark groups of components that belong to the
same steering mode respectively. Triangles are symbols for the group borders. They bundle
incoming and outgoing sensor values (SI and SO) and control values (CI and CO).
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Figure 2.7: ravon network responsible for slowing down the robot in order to keep safety
restrictions ((G) Fast Front Slow Down). The behavioural groups (grey boxes) encapsulate
several behavioural components that calculate the robots motion in respect to the different
sensors and the different evaluation methods.
(a) Grid map (b) Sector maps
Figure 2.8: Grid map and sector maps monitoring the area around ravon (source:
[Armbrust 10])
ravon and several sector maps covering the front and back of the robot. The information
stored in sector maps can be combined in a virtual sensor, where each virtual sensor is
responsible for a certain area and property related objects in this area.
With the help of these virtual sensors, it is possible to get task-relevant information from
areas around the robot where no sensor could be mounted. For that, the area around the
robot is divided into several subareas. Figure 2.9 depicts the subareas around ravon. The
information from a virtual sensor is provided to a corresponding behavioural component
in the control network. Those react according to the given information.
Virtual sensors do not only correspond to a special area but also to different processing
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Figure 2.9: Some of the virtual sensors around ravon
algorithms like raw laser scanner data evaluation, water detection, and voxel penetration
methods. This can lead to an arbitrary number of virtual sensors per real sensor.
A network that processes data from virtual sensors is given in Fig. 2.10. It shows the
insights of three of the behavioural groups of the network given in Fig. 2.7. The components
in the groups are arranged according to their real sensor type (3D laser or 2D laser) and the
filter method (unfiltered or water detection). Every group contains three safety behaviours
(grey octagons), one for each front sector of the robot (right, left, centre). Every safety
behaviour processes its specific data exclusively and calculates its activity and a velocity
control value. The fusion behaviours combine the results for further usage.
It can be seen that safety behaviours are a central point in behaviour networks as they
include environmental information in the overall control system. Their correct integration
into the complete network structure is important in order to achieve suitable robot
behaviour.
2.4 Visualisation Tool
The application examples presented in this thesis have been implemented using the software
framework mca2-kl2. mca2-kl is a branch of the C++-based software framework mca2
originally developed at the Research Center for Information Technology (FZI) in Karlsruhe
(see [Scholl 01] for an early version of mca2). Since 2003, mca2-kl has been developed
at the Robotics Research Lab (RRLab) of the Departement of Computer Science at the
University of Kaiserslautern.
finroc, also developed at the RRLab, is the successor of mca2-kl. It is downward
compatible to mca2. Details about this framework can be found in [Reichardt 13]. finroc
features two graphical tools, fingui and finstruct. The fingui is mainly used to control
a robot during its application. It can be configured for the use of different types of robots
and provides several screens to supervise the robot in its real/simulated environment,
visualise sensor data and type in control data. finstruct provides a visualisation of the
network, the modules, groups and their interconnections. It offers the possibility to follow
2mca2-kl: Modular Controller Architecture Version 2 - Kaiserslautern Branch (see http://rrlib.
cs.uni-kl.de/mca-kl/)
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Figure 2.10: Part of the group (G) Fast Front Slow Down (Fig. 2.7) of the safety control of
ravon. Every group contains three safety behaviours (grey octagons), one for each sector that
reacts to front obstacles (right, centre, left) and a fusion behaviour (blue octagons). Green arrows
indicate a stimulation transfer, grey arrows depict miscellaneous data.
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data flowing through the network during a robots action as well as to manipulate data.
This tool is especially very useful for the manual inspection of the correct connections of
behavioural components.
For the work at hand, the finstruct tool is used together with examples of behaviour-
based control networks running under mca2-kl. As the tool is extended in the scope of
this work to support the proposed verification methods, it is described in more detail in
the following.
Figure 2.11: The standard graph view in finstruct. The main window in the middle shows
the graph with incoming and outgoing ports (yellow and red boxes) of the surrounding group.
The network consists of four groups, coloured in dark blue, where the left most one is expanded
to see the contained components. The left bar shows a navigation tree including the ports
associated to the selected module/group. The right bar lists the parameters and input/output
ports of the selected module/group and offers the possibility to change the values.
Figure 2.11 shows a screenshot of the standard view of the tool. The main window shows
the network consisting of the components and their connections. The left column provides
a navigation tree additionally displaying the signals a component sends or receives via its
ports. The view also enables to graphically add further components and connections in
the main window. The right column gives information about the data running through
the ports and the parameters of a component. It is possible to manipulate the data to see
the influence of changes inside the network.
The tool features several views which enable e.g. the representation of behaviour-based
networks. The basic view for the visualisation is the IB2CView. The difference in contrast
to standard networks is the visualisation of behavioural components, in particular the
picturing of the behavioural signals as bars indicating the level of activation, activity
and target rating. Basic behavioural components are depicted as grey octagons, fusion
behaviours with octagons in three different types of blue (depending on the type of fusion)
and non-behaviour modules as white ellipses. Behavioural groups are visualised as grey
octagons with a double line as boundary. Edges between behavioural components are
coloured according to the type of connection. Green edges visualise a stimulation transfer,
red edges an inhibition transfer and blue edges the transfer of activity.
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Figure 2.12: Screenshot of the VerificationView of finstruct. The network is the same as
pictured in Fig. 2.11. Behavioural components are depicted with a special style, where the
bars indicate the level of activation (yellow), activity (green), and target rating (red). Fusion
behaviours are filled blue. Standard behavioural components are represented as ellipses.
Derived from the IB2CView is the VerificationView (see Fig. 2.12). It offers functionality
for the analysis and verification of behaviour networks. On the one hand, automated
processes that support the network verification can be initiated from within this view. As
example, the creation of the formal model out of the network is supported as well as the
graphical input of properties for the model checker (Query Development User Interface
[Ropertz 12]). On the other hand, it allows for temporary changes to the network which
lead to a clearer arrangement of the network. For example, the masking of behavioural
components or the abstraction of the content of behavioural groups reduces the number of
displayed components.
The component StructureAnalysis, which is found in almost all screenshots in this work is
an auxiliary module, which enables the creation of different representations of the networks
outside the tool, e.g. in the dot language3 or as a Uppaal model (see Sec. 5.1.1) with
the possibility to control the creation via several parameters. In the diploma thesis of the
author of this work [Wilhelm 08], the basics of this functionality is explained.
Another view derived from the VerificationView is the TraceView developed by [Rohr 12]
as part of his master’s project work. It offers the possibility to visualise traces given by
Uppaal’s verifier by showing the activation, activity and target rating of all behaviours
in the displayed network for every step of the trace. This view is very helpful for the
application of model checking, as it automatically maps a given trace, which is based on
the formal model of the system back to the original network structure.
Both views have been developed in the beginning of the work on this thesis in collaboration
with students and other group members. They have been consequently extended later on
to enable the use of the newly presented concepts in a user-friendly environment.
3dot-language: http://www.graphviz.org/content/dot-language
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3. Analysis and Verification of
Complex Systems
Robotic systems interact with their environment which implicates potential risks for the
environment, humans or the robot itself. According to [Dhillon 15] a study reported 12%
to 17% of the accidents in industries were concerned with automated production equipment.
The need for methods that verify the systems to be safe and reliable is obvious. There
exist a great number of methods to analyse either safety or reliability issues, or both.
Examples for the latter are Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (fmea) and Fault Tree
Analysis (fta). An additional classification can be made for methods analysing reliability
and safety for hardware or for software, where it can be said, that several methods have
been adapted from the field of hardware analysis to software analysis. As robotic systems,
like all embedded systems in general, heavily depend on the combination of hardware
and software, combinations of these methods are needed that are able to analyse the
complete system. At the current point in time, there exist numerous approaches, that
adapt existing techniques to special robotic problems. There is no mandatory direction
which techniques should be used and how the result should look like, but in dependence
on several standards and directives from other domains arises a general work flow and a
number of useful analysis techniques to transfer to the autonomous robot domain. An
example is the approach of [Zeller 14], who developed a concept for a cross-domain safety
analysis process, which is based on the requirements of safety standards of different domains
(e.g. automotive, nuclear power plants, railway). The process starts with a hazard analysis
and ends with a certification about the safety state of the system.
Safety and reliability requirements heavily rely on each other. As example an autonomous
driving robot is considered which shall avoid collisions with obstacles (safety). If the
sensors of the robot do not work reliable, possibly, the safety requirement cannot be met.
Another example can be taken from the area of elderly care. A non-reliable robot may
cause serious harm to the aged people, e.g. if it does not remind the person to take his
medicine. In the context of this thesis, the focus is on safety analysis, but, as can be seen
from the examples, reliability issues are inevitable taken into account.
Safety analysis has two aspects. One is the definition of safety requirements in early
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development phases. Based on the consequences of a determined safety hazard, the
potential danger is determined and the importance of the corresponding safety requirement
is derived. This process is called hazard analysis. The second aspect is the verification
whether the implemented system meets the previously defined requirements. Techniques
like fmea and fta can be used for both, where in the latter case, the analysis can be
based on the actual implementation details. Here, a further task is to detect the sources
of requirement violations and eliminate them.
Several research is done for the identification and specification of safety requirements
which can be used for the development of behaviour-based systems as well [Allenby 01,
Bush 05, Firesmith 07, de Assis 16]. The work at hand concentrates on the analysis in late
development phases, as the final behaviour-based system differs to traditional monolithic
approaches and therefore needs special handling for analysis and verification tasks.
A well-known method to detect failures in an implemented system is testing. Testing
is a dynamic analysis technique where the system is executed under certain conditions.
Test cases can show violations of the previously defined requirements. There exist a big
number of test techniques that aim at the generation of representative, little redundant
and economical test cases. A commonly used distinction of testing techniques are black
box tests and white box test. The latter is based on the program structure, while black box
testing neglects the implementation details. Testing is an important verification method as
dynamic aspects of the system are considered additionally. The data generated during the
execution of test cases provide valuable information about the system. Hazard analysis
methods and testing have in common, that they can show the existence of failures but
not their absence. The benefit of these analysis techniques is highly dependable on the
involved people and their expert knowledge.
In contrast to that formal verification proves a system to be correct for a given formal
specification. To achieve this, formal mathematical methods are used. According to
[Liggesmeyer 09], formal verification is not very popular in contrast to testing or reviewing
techniques. This might be rooted in the needed expert knowledge and the effort to
transform the system into a verifiable model. Formal verification is often based on an
abstract system model and a formal system specification. The creation of the abstract
model depends on the specific formal verification method and it can be difficult to meet
the required properties while leaving all relevant system information in the model. The
results refer to the abstract model, which points out the importance of a correct model.
In the case of a negative outcome, meaning the property is not fulfilled for the model,
another difficulty appears. The result must be interpreted on the real system in order to
eliminate the problem.
It is obvious that every method has their own strengths and weaknesses and it appears
to be useful to combine several different analysis methods in order to get a meaningful
result. Summing up, the topic of this thesis is on the verification of safety requirements
on robotic systems using a behaviour-based control, which is not extensively discussed in
literature up to now. The special network structure of behaviour-based control systems
allows the combination of function-based analysis techniques with software (code) analysis
techniques, which make it a fascinating research area. Due to the different approaches
of the mentioned techniques, several methods will be examined for their applicability to
behaviour-based systems.
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The following sections give an overview of the main techniques in the areas of hazard
analysis, dynamic analysis techniques and formal verification. Section 3.1 presents three
different hazard analysis methods. Dynamic analysis methods like testing are discussed
in Sec. 3.2. Section 3.3 presents two formal verification techniques and their application
to robotic systems. Most of the techniques are widely spread in the area of software and
hardware analysis, respectively. Their application on robotic systems is not frequently
published, but the examples show that the methods are definitely useful in this area.
Section 3.4 investigates research activities in the special field of behaviour-based robotic
systems dealing with analysis and verification tasks. The presented methods are summed
up in Section 3.5 together with a discussion of their capabilities in the scope of this thesis.
3.1 Hazard Analysis
The investigation of possible hazards is necessary to learn about the situations the system
could face and to determine the risk level of a system. Hazard analysis usually includes
three steps, namely the identification of hazards, the determination of the criticality
level and the resultant safety requirements. Hazard analysis is often applied in the early
development stages, in order to avoid hazards from the beginning, for example by adding
redundancy or surveillance modules. But also in later development phases, the analysis
is useful to identify hazards on the basis of a more detailed functional description of the
system. Before a hazard analysis can take place, the system requirements and functionality
must be described. This includes the definition of intended use, the tasks that the system
should fulfil and how they are fulfilled, and all physical and functional characteristics.
Several analysis techniques exist that are widely used in industry:
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis fmea
• Hazard and Operability studies hazop
• Fault Tree Analysis fta
• Event Tree Analysis eta
They have in common, that they are usually realised in several team meetings, where people
with different backgrounds (analysis experts, system developers, hardware developers) try
to identify preferably all hazards with the help of suitable guidelines. For each identified
hazard its effect(s) on the system and the environment are determined and its risk level is
established. The risk is first estimated in terms of severity and probability of occurrence
and then evaluated whether it is acceptable or not. In the latter case, the risk must be
reduced and the process starts again. Otherwise, a safety requirement is devised. Figure 3.1
depicts the process recommended in [ISO/IEC-Guide51 99] and adapted by [Hoang 12].
The above mentioned analysis techniques are standard procedures in the safety requirements
specification procedure for several industrial processes and machines. They were also
applied to industrial manipulator robot arms that work in a structured environment.
A problem in this process is the transfer of the methods previously used in system
engineering to the field of safety engineering. [Denger 08] state, that the techniques are
often not customised to the special characteristics of software and therefore miss conceptual
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Figure 3.1: Safety analysis process
software faults. Another big problem is encountered considering the application of these
techniques to autonomously working robots or robots with human/environment interaction.
A complete description of the robots functionality and behaviour is not possible, as it
is infeasible to describe all situations the robot can face. Current research deals with
the adaptation of the method to the autonomous mobile robotic domain. The following
subsections give a short introduction into the functionality of hazop, fmea, and fta and
some examples for their successful application to robotic systems.
3.1.1 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
The Hazard and operability (hazop) study aims at identifying risk to personnel or equip-
ment, or operability problems using a systematic and structured approach. The hazop
study is executed by a team including a hazop specialist, system designers and users.
This goes back to the idea that several experts with different background identify more
problems when working together instead of working separately. As mentioned before, a
precondition for successful hazard analysis is the proper definition of the system and the
intention, how the system is expected to work. Then, possible deviations and their causes
and consequences can be analysed. To structure this process a list of guide words is used
which is adapted according to the specific system (see Tab. 3.1 for some example guide
words).
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Table 3.1: Example for guide words in hazop analysis (source: [hazop01 01], adapted)
Guide Word Meaning
NO No part of the intention is achieved
MORE A quantitative increase
LESS A quantitative decrease
AS WELL AS Impurities present
... ...
BEFORE Something happens too early in a sequence
AFTER Something happens too late in a sequence
The hazop study was originally developed for chemical process systems and later ex-
tended to analyse complex operations in industry e.g. in nuclear power plants. In 1994,
[McDermid 94] introduced a method for software safety analysis based on the hazop
technique and discovered a wide-spread application including other hazop-based software
analysis approaches, one year later [McDermid 95]. In recent years, several research is
done using the method for the identification of hazards in robotic systems. Especially
for autonomous robotic systems, the original approach needs to be extended to cover
non-deterministic behaviour, e.g. robot interaction with humans or environment.
Figure 3.2: Example sequence diagram for the standing up operation of a patient using a
robotic strolling assistant (source: [Hoang 12])
[Martin-Guillerez 10, Hoang 12, Guiochet 13] developed a method that uses uml diagrams
to describe a system, its actions, and interactions with the environment. An example
diagram is given in Fig. 3.2, which describes the use case where the robotic strolling
assistant miras should assist a patient in standing up by lifting its handgrips. The patient
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catches the handles of the robot and starts standing up. The robot detects this action and
activates the standing up mode. The action is monitored until the patient stands, then the
robot switches to strolling mode. In order to use the hazop analysis for the detection of
possible problems and the determination of new safety requirements, the authors adapted
and extended the list of standard keywords to express states in the diagrams.
An excerpt of an hazop table is shown in Fig. 3.3. Here, the necessary precondition for
the standing up operation, sufficient battery power, is analysed. The authors found two
deviations. One is a too low battery charge which can lead to a fall of the patient. They
classify this event as serious, declare the possible causes and derive a new safety requirement,
which must be integrated in the implementation process. The second deviation uses the
key word other than, which implies that not the expected action is triggered. The authors
classify this event as negligible as in the worst case the patient would be confused about
the robots action. No new safety requirement is derived for this case.
With their approach, the authors present a method to analyse the behaviour of a robot
with the support of the graphical representation of diagrams and keywords corresponding
to these diagrams. But, a common problem of hazop analysis that exists for all similar
hazard analysis techniques is not addressed: The problem of a full coverage of robot
actions. [Böhm 10] present a systematic approach for guaranteeing a good coverage of
actions that occur during robots task execution. Their concept is based on a division of
the hazop analysis into two parts, a components view and a operations view. The first
refers to the block structure of system hardware, whereas the second is related with the
task scenarios. The decomposition allows a more specific analysis of the different system
parts, but it fails to integrate environmental conditions and interactions.
Both methods are suitable for the derivation of safety requirements for behaviour-based
robotic systems as well. The concrete software structure of the control system is out of
the scope of hazop analysis. It will therefore not be further treated in this thesis.
3.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault Tree Analysis (fta) was developed in the early 1960s at the Bell Telephone Labora-
tories for performing reliability analysis in aeronautics. It was then applied to the planning
process of nuclear power plants and later used in the automotive industry. 1981, [Vesely 81]
summarised a set of undocumented methods of fault tree creation and evaluation in a
handbook. Over the years, sophisticated evaluation algorithms as well as tools for the
construction of fault trees and their evaluation are developed. Today, fault tree analysis is
widely used to perform reliability and safety analysis in mechanical systems.
Fault tree analysis is a top-down approach starting with an undesirable event, called
the top event. In the analysis process, fault events that can lead to the top event are
determined recursively and connected by logic operators such as OR and AND. The process
stops when a fault event can not be developed any further. These elements are called basic
events. The tree structure can be used for a qualitative analysis, determining the sets of
basic events that together trigger the top event. This information can be used to improve
the systems reliability by eliminating (at least) one of the causes. If it is possible to assign
fault probabilities to the basic event, a quantitative analysis can be executed, calculating
the probability of the occurrence of the top-event. This information allows the developer
to focus on the most problematic parts of the system.
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Figure 3.3: hazop table example based on UML models for the robotic strolling assistant
miras (source: [Hoang 12])
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20 years ago, fta was mainly used for industrial robotic systems such as manipulators,
which act in a structured and predefined environment [Walker 96, Khodabandehloo 96].
Software faults were not considered in the standard fault tree analysis, which is essential
when talking about embedded systems as software faults can cause hardware to crash or
cause accidents. Therefore, several research has been done that attempts to solve the open
problems while benefiting from the advantages of fta.
[Leveson 83] describe software fault tree analysis as a complement of the classic fta
method. The classic fta is executed and failure events that are produced by software are
marked as basic events. Those basic events are subsequently analysed with the so-called
software fta, which backtracks the program code from the output to the input. Hereby,
the values of variables are analysed, in order to find out the program inputs that lead to
the failure. In the scope of this thesis, software analysis is a central aspect. It has to be
figured out how the concepts of software fta work for the special software structure of
behaviour-based systems.
[Thums 04] introduces a concept called formal fta. This approach integrates the classical
fta into formal methods from software engineering. Formal methods are used to analyse
the functional correctness of the software system whereas the fta is used to analyse the
failure rate of the technical system. With this approach, the strength of both analysis
techniques is used to prove a whole system. The approach is based on a precise formal
model of the complete system including hardware and software components. The derivation
of such a model is not further discussed in the work.
As embedded systems are often built up as a combination of (technical) components,
[Kaiser 03] introduced the concept of Component Fault Trees (CFT). Here, every archi-
tectural component is mapped as CFT component, which can encapsulate further CFT’s.
Failures may be transferred between CFT components using in- and output ports. The
advantages of this method are, that several analysts can work on different parts of the
same CFT at the same time. The division into CFT components is intuitively as they
correspond to real-world components. Furthermore, due to the fact, that every component
is modelled only once, duplicate (or repeated) events are modelled using an instance of the
component. This prevents failures by copying parts of the tree and minimises the resulting
CFT. This concept is also useful for the analysis of robotic systems. Especially hardware
like sensor systems, power supply or the computers are components that would appear
repeatedly in a fault tree. The concept of component based fault tree creation seems to be
universal. The network structure of behaviour-based systems with its division into groups
seems to provide a structure that can be mapped to CFT components.
[Seward 00] uses fault tree analysis for the determination of safety requirements for the
autonomous excavator lucie. The excavator’s task will be to autonomously dig foundation
trenches on a building site. The unstructured environment was identified by the authors
as a major problem when creating the fault tree, as the physical interaction properties
could not be described as basic events. Therefore, they suggest a preliminary analysis of
the physical dynamics and a definition of excavator and environment interaction in more
formal terms before the actual analysis process can start. Unfortunately, the formalisation
is not described.
While the authors of [Seward 00] focus on a special use case, [Denger 08] present a
customizable framework concept. It enables the developer to define and implement a
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project-specific hazard identification approach using standard techniques like fmea, fta
and hazop. They want to overcome the problem that analysis results are often not
repeatable because of the manual and expert-dependent nature of these methods. The
authors of [Guo 10] identified a further safety critical problem for embedded systems.
Security attacks can have safety consequences and should therefore be considered during a
safety analysis. The authors present an approach that provides one identical model derived
by safety analysis techniques that can be used to derive security-safety requirements. The
approach is applied to the autonomous outdoor robot ravon, where the effects of safety
failures and security attacks on its bumper system are determined. This approach uses
a behaviour-based control system as application example, but the authors only describe
the procedure to combine a safety fault tree and a security attack tree. They neglect the
process of deriving the two trees.
Fault tree analysis is often combined with Event Tree Analysis (eta). eta is a bottom-up
technique aiming at the opposite direction as fta. It starts with an failure event and
identifies all events that are caused by that initial event. The resulting tree can be used for
assessing probabilities of the outcomes. eta is used for example to analyse the correctness
of safety monitoring systems.
3.1.3 Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
The Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (fmeca) is an extension of the Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (fmea) including a criticality analysis. fmeca is used to
identify failure modes that may seriously affect the product quality. Failure modes describe
the way a component fails. The effects of failure modes are defined and classified with
regard to their criticality, where criticality is a combination of the probability of a failure
mode and the severity of the consequences. In contrast to fta, fmeca is a forward
analysis, starting from failures in basic components and determining the effects on the
whole system.
The first step of fmeca is the definition of the system, which requires detailed expert
knowledge. The system is usually represented as block diagrams for the functional structure
and as automata for the description of system dynamics. In a further step, possible failure
modes are identified. The effects of the failure modes are analysed and a description
how the failure can be detected and (if possible) eliminated is added. Additionally, the
criticality of the failure mode is calculated.
An example for an fmeca table is given in Tab. 3.2. It describes two failure modes of
an artificial muscle. The criticality or risk estimation is divided into three parts. The
occurrence of the failure mode is rated on a scale with five levels from I (improbable) to F
(frequent). The severity value correlates with the fact that the failure effect can have a
high level (1) or a low level (3), where a high level implies serious harm or even death, a
low level implies no harm. The risk is noted as the product of the two values. Following
actions include the ranking of the identified failure modes and the assignment of corrective
actions in connection with a re-calculation of the criticality factor.
fmeca is a widely spread technique, which is comprehensible and applicable to many
different systems and purposes. It was originally developed by the U.S. military and later
modified by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Today, the
method is commonly used in the automotive industry, for the analysis of medical devices
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Table 3.2: FMECA table for a mechanical unit (source: [Guiochet 02], adapted)
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outer cover
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B. patient
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I 1 I1 A. length sensor
B. protection devise
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emergency stop
and robotic systems, among others [Chen 12, Onofrio 15, Kazanzides 08, Guiochet 02].
Despite of the advantages of the method, there exist some limitations that are topic of
current research. These are for example, the combination of failures, the inclusion of
software parts and the integration of human interaction or, more generally, environmental
factors. [Guiochet 02] cope with the problem of human interaction and present an approach
to analyse the risk of human errors in the context of a medical robot. They propose
UML-diagrams for the description of human-machine-interaction, which serve as basis for
the failure mode analysis. They also discuss the problem of transferring the method to
software. They claim that it is not possible to decide about the risk of a software error and
identify two approaches to handle this problem, namely to either consider the software as
a component and just analyse its inputs and outputs, or to identify failure modes based
on class and sequence diagrams.
fmeca and fta are used to determine hazards in a system, whereby they are based on
completely different approaches. fmeca is applicable to systems with well-known behaviour
like hardware components, where a certain risk level can be determined. fta is able to
handle the relation of failures and can also be applied to software. A combination of both
methods is useful to overcome the shortcomings and maximise the output [Bluvband 05].
3.2 Dynamic Analysis of Safety Requirements
The term dynamic analysis is broadly used but not exactly defined in literature. In
the scope of this work, dynamic analysis is defined, in contrast to static analysis, as an
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analysis process executed during run-time of the system. It is an important part of the
system validation process as dynamic actions can not completely be covered by static
analyses. Especially environmental aspects like unknown and changing environments or
human-interaction can not be captured by system models in detail. They can only be
considered during execution.
Two different approaches are presented in the following sections. A well-known technique
to prove the systems correctness is testing. Here, the system is executed under different
conditions and the systems behaviour is evaluated in correspondence to some expected
behaviour. The special requirements on this method for the use with robotic systems is
discussed on the example of current literature in Sec. 3.2.1.
Section 3.2.2 deals with several possibilities to implement safety requirements in the system,
which shall enable the robot to act safely in all situations. This approach is different to the
others presented in this chapter, as it is not applied to the system during the development
process in order to find failures and eliminate them but rather is a part of the final control
system. The system must be validated itself. Nevertheless, the approach is discussed
here, as the iB2C architecture used in this work has a similar safety driven structure, and
techniques to validate and verify it are proposed.
3.2.1 Testing
Testing is a commonly used technique to verify and validate a system, applied in different
stages of the development. In dependence on the development phase and previous tests,
various test methods are distinguished. Unit testing validates the single components of a
system in respect to their functionality, whereas system integration testing validates their
interconnection. The validation of system requirements is done in the system validation
test [Woodman 13]. The special conditions of embedded systems (e.g. hardware-software
combination, mixture of physical components, interaction with humans and environment)
must be addressed with tailored test methods (e.g. [Saini 12, Tatar 14]). In early stages of
development not all components may be available to test. For this, component-in-the-loop
testing, where parts of the system are simulated, is a useful technique.
One major weakness of testing is the fact, that it is almost never possible to cover the
whole set of possible scenarios the system could face. This would be either to time- and
cost-expensive or just impossible, e.g. for robotic systems working in dynamic environments
or interacting with humans. Several standards exist that formalise the testing approach
in order to define guidelines for manufacturers which they have to follow before they are
allowed to bring their product to the market. For example, the IEEE standard 829 describes
how the documentation of software tests should be done. However, robotic applications
have special requirements regarding sufficient testing. A suite of test methods for remotely
controlled robots is standardised through the ASTM International Standards Committee
on Homeland Security Applications; Operations Equipment; Robots (E54.08.01)1. Up to
now, there are no special standards that define test criteria for autonomous mobile robots
or human-robot-interaction.
1Guide for Evaluating, Purchasing, and Training with Response Robots using DHS-NIST-ASTM In-
ternational Standard Test Methods http://www.nist.gov/el/isd/ms/upload/DHS_NIST_ASTM_Robot_
Test_Methods-2.pdf
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Figure 3.4: Five test levels to test mobile autonomous robots (source: [Laval 13])
Several research is done in the last years to illuminate this topic under several aspects.
All have in common that they see a great need for efficient robot testing methods as
robotic systems enter the mass market and the topic is not sufficiently investigated at all.
[Laval 13] argue that mobile autonomous robots built for the mass market need to be tested
exhaustively, whereby tests should be repeatable and automated as much as possible. They
present a methodology to test the robot control software on the final robot platform under
several conditions. In their approach, they distinguish three test dimensions: operations
(sensing vs. sensing and acting), human knowledge of the environment (precise vs. little)
and the environment (static vs. dynamic). From these different dimensions, they derive a
set of 5 test levels shown in Fig. 3.4. Test series should be done starting in level 1 and
proceeding down to level 5 in order to assure the safety requirements. For example, the
acting of a robot is usually based on perception data, therefore the correct functioning
of sensing should be tested first. In the next steps, sensing and acting can be tested in
combination whereby the complexity increases from static known environment to dynamic
unknown environment. With their approach they introduce a structuring of the testing
process of autonomous mobile robots, which helps to cover the most relevant test cases.
[Arnold 13] focus on the problem of generating concrete test scenarios to test control
algorithms. They claim that test situations defined by the developers often neglect those
scenarios that would reveal failures in the implementation. Therefore, they adapted
an existing approach to automatically generate situations called Procedural Content
Generation (PCG) to the needs of autonomous robot systems. Their resulting tool is
able to generate situations, execute them, and prioritise the results to ease the evaluation
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process for the developer. In the paper, the scope of tested algorithms is limited to the
question, how dangerous situations can the evoked by combinations of sensing, sensor
processing, and driving algorithms, but is said to be expandable. The generated situations
cover a set of different environments including rocky deserts and cave systems together
with several types of (moving) obstacles. Additionally, the route the robot should take
through the scenario is randomly generated. The approach offers great potential as the
manual definition of test scenarios is very time-consuming and a coverage of unexpected
situations is hard to achieve. The random automatic generation offers the possibility to
explore also failures that would not be discovered using manually defined test scenarios.
Nevertheless, the method cannot guarantee that the generated tests include all important
scenarios that a human developer would have defined.
As mentioned by Arnold, the evaluation process is mostly manually done, expecting
detailed system knowledge. Graphical support and (partly) automated processes can be
identified as an important research topic in order to make the techniques available for
many users.
3.2.2 Including Safety Requirements into the System
One approach to ensure the safety of a system is to implement mechanisms that detect
safety problems during robot operation. Monitoring components determine the current
situation and compare them with a set of given safety requirements. In the case of a
deviation, counteractions are initiated.
Several researchers propose this approach using additional components that observe data
flowing in the system during task execution and calculate the so-called health status of
the system. [Forouher 14] provide statistics about the data flow between nodes inside the
Robot Operating System (ros) and check the data for anomalies. Detected problems are
reported to the developer. Directly changing the robot control in accordance to the health
status is utilised by [Schäfer 11] for the iB2C architecture. Here, the data flow is observed
to check sensor data for their correctness. Monitoring components determine whether
an obstacle detection facility is sane or not using thresholds. In case of a failure, they
are able to reduce the maximal system velocity. A similar approach is implemented by
[Maas 14] for the Organic Robot Control Architecture (orca). The observing modules
are able to take over or change the robot control in a way that the best possible execution
is achieved. Here, the authors focus on reliability but the concept seems to be adaptable
to safety issues as well.
More complex approaches are often based on layered system architectures where safety
requirements are proved by an additional intermediate layer. The laas-architecture
[Ingrand 02] is build up with three layers, a decision layer which commands the next
robot actions, a functional layer which controls the actuators and an execution layer in
between. The execution layer compares the control commands from the decision layer with
predefined rules and correct system states and decides on this basis if the command is
passed to the functional layer. The correct system states are formally defined and verified
using model checking techniques. In [Bensalem 09], the authors add a further validation
techniques to the functional layer. This layer encapsulates each basic functionality of the
robot in a module. More complex functions are achieved by a combination of several
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Figure 3.5: Development methodology for a safety-driven control system (source:
[Woodman 12])
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modules. The authors use the bip2 framework to model controllers on the functional level
“correct by construction”, which enforce the modelled interactions during execution.
[Woodman 12] call this layered system structure where task execution is dependent on
safety rules that are defined in the early development process and tightly integrated into the
implementation process safety-driven design. Their goal is to integrate safety constraints
into the implementation from the beginning instead of adding them afterwards. To achieve
this, they consider a development methodology as pictured in Fig 3.5. The development
process starts with a task analysis which is required for the following hazard analysis
(see Sec. 3.1). For hazard analysis they use hazop in conjunction with a hazard check
list which includes several aspects to unforeseen environments operations among others.
Based on the hazard consequences which are classified with a risk, they define safety
requirements, which again are used to form safety policies. Safety policies are independent
rules which use perception data to decide about the system state an to impose restrictions
on actuators. An example policy for the requirement, that the speed of the robots end
effector is limited to 250mm/s while operating at reduced speed is:
IF robot_state.speed_mode = reduced_speed_control
AND end_effector_speed <= 250 mm/s
AND confidence_level >= 0.6
THEN allow actuators
ELSE restrict actuators
FINALLY return safety_rating based on confidence_level
Figure 3.6: High-level diagram of the safety-driven control system (source: [Woodman 12])
The policies are directly implemented in the robot control software. Figure 3.6 shows
the resulting safety-driven control system. This approach comprises the complete process
from task analysis via system implementation up to online control. It benefits from the
comprehensive and well-established methods used for hazard analysis and completes this
technique with the derivation of easily understandable safety policies which are then
implemented as a safety-protection system.
2bip (Behaviour, Interaction, Priority) Component Framework
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The behaviour-based architecture used in this thesis also contains a safety layer that is
able to restrict or suppress commands coming from the control layer on the basis of sensor
perception data. In contrast to the presented approaches, the implementation of the layer
is not based on formal rules but on orally formulated requirements, which raises the need
for verification and validation techniques that can be applied to the implementation.
3.3 Formal Verification
Formal verification uses mathematical methods to ensures that a required property holds
on a system. In contrast to testing, which can only show the presence of failures, formal
verification covers the complete system and is able to proof the absence of failures
corresponding to a requirement. Formal verification is often said to be the technique that
bridges the gap that testing leaves when verifying systems acting in unknown environmental
conditions. The major reasons, why formal verification is not widely used in robotic research
is that it requires expert knowledge for the formalization procedure and the fact that it is
(currently) not possible to formally verify large complex systems. Nevertheless, several
research is done in that topic as the need for having safe and correct acting robots increases.
Here, the latter problem is often encountered by verifying only the safety-relevant parts
of the system, while the former is solved by providing tools that automate parts of the
verification procedure.
Two techniques exist for formal software verification.
Theorem proving takes a logical formula that represent the system and the required
property. The formula is verified using mathematical proofs.
Model checking are algorithmic techniques used to verify the system modelled formally,
e.g. as finite state automata (FSM) against its property, written in temporal logic, e.g.
linear temporal logic (LTL) or computational tree logic (CTL). A formal definition
of model checking is given in Sec. 5.1.
Within the context of this work model checking is chosen as formal verification technique,
as it offers some advantages over other verification techniques. For example, no correctness
proof has to be constructed. The checking of a given property is done automatically.
Furthermore, model checking returns a counterexample in the case the specification is not
fulfilled, which shows the reason for the problem. The following sections focus on related
research using model checking methods.
When talking about formal verification in the development process of robotic systems,
it can be distinguished between the use of formal techniques in the design process and
after the development process. The first results in a “correct-by-construction” control
program, which is synthesised from the previously verified model. This technique is often
applied to the development of basic controllers. The advantage of this approach is that
the verification process after the development phase can be shortened, because only the
interaction of the components need to be verified. Examples, that successfully applied this
approach to robotic systems are presented in Sec. 3.3.1.
As the behaviour-based system used in the context of the work at hand, serves as basis
implementation for several different research problems, it is very important to have
3.3. Formal Verification 37
techniques to verify already implemented systems. Sec. 3.3.2 shows the most important
examples of related work, that additionally illustrate the spectrum of different tasks and
difficulties when verifying complex robotic systems.
3.3.1 Correct-By-Construction Synthesis
Synthesis of correct-by-construction controllers experiences growing interest in the robotics
domain [Ames 15, Fu 15, Ulusoy 13, Espiau 95a]. At the moment, there seems to be no
uniform method that defines how the system and its requirements are given and which
form the result will have. The following illustrates this on two very different examples.
The authors of [Kim 05] present a case study on an home service robot which is developed
and verified in an integrated framework. The controllers of the robot are implemented
in Esterel [Berry 00] and verified using the Esterel Toolset. Once the program is correct
against its requirements it can be automatically transferred to C Code, which can be
executed on the robot.
The Esterel compiler automatically generates finite state machines from the code, which
can be used by the model checker. Input for the model checker is a set of input variables
and the desired output signal. For example, in order to prove the property
P1: If a user does not give a command to the robot, the robot must not move.
the developer has to feed the model checking tool with the input set {Come_Command
= always absent and STOP_Command =always absent}, and the desired output that the
GO_Command is never emitted. More complex properties can be verified by using observers,
which can be implemented in the Esterel language as well. The approach faces some of the
problems mentioned in the introduction. The toolset abstracts from the formal model and
properties written in a formal language by allowing to formulate requirements as sets of
variables and their desired states. However, to use this approach, developers have to learn
the Esterel language. Furthermore, the synthesised program is in C code which might not
be a problem for basic controllers, but may not be sufficient for higher level robot tasks.
The problem of synthesizing high-level robot control is addressed by [Kress-Gazit 11].
The authors take also the problem of dynamic environments into account and consider
an approach that results in a robot control that satisfies a given specification for all
valid environment behaviours. Robotic tasks are defined in linear temporal logic (ltl)
as combination of propositions. The authors define three types of propositions: Sensor
propositions abstract the environment (robot sensor perception), location propositions
abstract the position of the robot in the workspace, and action propositions abstract robot
actions. Examples for a sensor proposition are RoadBlocked or RedLight. Stop would be
an action proposition which causes the robot to stop. A LTL formula representing the
requirement that the robot should stop at red light would be:
 ( dRedLight ⇒ dStop).
The synthesis process uses this formula to generate an automaton such that for every
infinite run of the automaton, its behaviour satisfies the formula. As sensor propositions
cannot be controlled by the robot, the synthesis process must take into account all possible
values of a proposition. The synthesised automata are then implemented as a hybrid
controller for the robot, which includes actual motion commands and feedback from sensor
perception to initiate the next step. In order to simplify the application of their approach,
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Figure 3.7: Application example for the approach presented in (source: [Kress-Gazit 11])
the authors provide a toolkit, described in [Finucane 10], which allows the specification
of robot tasks in structured English and the automated synthesis of LTL formulas, a
graphical user interface for drawing the region/environment boundaries of interest and
simulation window. The approach is applied to an autonomous vehicle acting in an
urban-like environment (see Fig. 3.7). The picture shows different abstraction levels for the
vehicle motion. (a) shows the overview of the roads and intersections, whereas (b) defines
the possible robot movements on a two-lane road. Cells C1,i define the right lane, C3,i
the left lane, and C2,i cover the center road (i = [1, .., L]). Already in this small scenario,
the authors face the problem of state explosion, which they solve by reducing the overall
plan for the robot mission to a more local plan of the nearer future in dependence on the
current robot position, that will be recalculated iteratively for a new position. An open
question is the scalability of more complex control systems.
3.3.2 Verification of Existing Robot Control Systems
The model checking of already developed systems is usually done by (manually) creating a
formal model, formulating properties in a temporal logic and feed a model checker with
model and properties. Several problems and questions can instantly be identified in this
procedure:
1. Manually creating a formal model requires expert knowledge, is time-consuming,
and needs to be done again for every change in the implementation.
2. A manually created model may contain errors.
3. The formulation of properties in temporal logic needs expert knowledge.
4. How can physical and environmental conditions be represented in the formal model?
5. How to proceed with a negative result of the model checker? How to get back from
the model to the actual source code?
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6. How to deal with large, complex systems?
The following approaches aim at one or more of the mentioned problems, trying to solve
them for their respective application. The use of formal verification techniques can often
be found in industrial robot systems, as their tasks can be completely defined and their
work space is usually limited. Anyway, the need for a correct working robot is essential as
errors can have extremely expensive consequences. [Weißmann 11] present a case study
where they applied formal verification to a car-body welding station to verify the absence
of collisions and deadlocks. In order to do this, they automatically transform the industrial
robot program into promela which is the input language for the model checker spin
[Holzmann 97] (Problem 1, 2). Properties are written in linear temporal logic (LTL)
where the authors provide patterns to simplify the formulation (Problem 3). Error-traces
given by the model checker are mapped back to the original code to help the programmer
understand the result (Problem 5). The authors focus on an automatic and easy to use
verification process to enable system engineers without special knowledge to apply it to
(new) systems.
Another industrial example is given by [Griesmayer 05] who verified a robotic handling
system with Java Path Finder [Visser 03]. Their original control software is written in
DACS (developed by FESTO), and properties are directly formulated in this source code.
The DACS code is automatically translated to JAVA (Problem 1, 2). The application
of model checking to the control software of a simple line-following robot is presented
by [Scherer 05]. The software is written in JAVA which enables the direct input into
Java Path Finder. The authors focus on the problem that developers of autonomous
systems always face: the interaction of software with its physical system. To encounter
this problem, they construct a simulation model from the physical system using differential
equations, which is verified in conjunction with the software (Problem 4). As the special
format of the physical system model has to be integrated in the checking algorithm, the
authors needed to implement it on their own.
3.4 Evaluation of Behaviour-Based Systems
The concept of behaviour-based systems goes back to Brooks [Brooks 91] and has been
developed since then by many research groups. Researching tasks comprise among others
the design and modelling of the software structure, the realisation of low-level, real-time
tasks as well as complex high level tasks, the analysis of the system, and the verification of
single components as well as the complete system. Approaches for the design and analysis
of behaviour-based robots are given in [Matarić 92, Zhang 09, Proetzsch 10a].
Analysis and verification considering behaviour-based robotics are not very frequently
addressed in current research. But there exist quite a number of papers, published also in
the last few years, that deal with various problems of this topic. This section discusses the
most important examples of current research in the field of analysis and verification of
behaviour-based systems, which goes beyond the evaluation by testing.
3.4.1 Formal Verification of BBS
The need to guarantee a certain robot behaviour leads to the investigation of formal verifi-
cation techniques also in the area of behaviour-based robotics research. Several methods
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Figure 3.8: The MissionLab/VIPARS System Architecture. The mission program as well
as models for robot, sensor systems, environment and mission performance criteria are imple-
mented in MissionLab. The mission is translated to the formal input language PARS. VIPARS
(Verification in PARS) returns a probabilistic distribution whether the mission will achieve its
performance criteria under the given circumstances. (source: [Lyons 15a])
described in Sec. 3.3 have been adapted to the special properties of bbs. [Lamine 02]
implement formal verification techniques to analyse the behaviour of robots using the
saphira architecture. Their goal is to find errors in execution sequences, for example an
oscillation between the goal-oriented behaviour and the obstacle-avoidance behaviour. The
authors propose tools that prove the satisfaction of LTL statements to monitor and plan
robot behaviour (Problem 3). [Proetzsch 07] propose an approach using model checking
techniques to verify a part of the robots control system. They model every behavioural
component in the synchronous language Quartz [Schneider 09] and verify them using the
Averest framework [Schneider 05]. With their approach they were able to verify a number
of specifications for the given part of the network. Nevertheless, the large number of states
indicates that the approach does not scale well, and need therefore further investigation
for the application to larger systems.
With this problem in mind, the authors of [Lyons 15b] base their verification on an
approach that completely avoid state-space combinatorics. They use a process-algebra
representation, where the program is mapped to a set of equations over the program
variables. The specification (performance criteria) and environmental models can also be
described using the process algebra. The result of the verification process is a probability
landscape describing the systems performance. Figure 3.8 represents the developed system
architecture. The authors state that their method should be transferable to other behaviour-
based architectures with small effort but not to other robot control systems as it is strongly
dependent on the modular and concurrent structure of bbs. In [Lyons 15a] the approach
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is extended to verify the behaviour of multiple robots acting in an environment which can
include obstacles.
The described approaches show the complex demands on the developer when using formal
verification techniques. Not only the software system, but also the robot equipment (e.g.
sensors) and the environment (path, obstacles) as well as the requirements on the robots
action have to be defined and modelled in a formal way. Nevertheless, the results show
that it is possible and the topic is worth to be further investigated.
3.4.2 Requirements Analysis
The authors of [Zhang 09] propose an approach for the modelling and analysis of the
obstacle avoidance behaviour of a robot using object oriented techniques. They lay special
interest on the representation of robots interaction with its environment and propose to use
Use-Case-Models (UML) for requirements analysis. Figure 3.9 shows an example use-case
model for a behaviour-based robot. The three boxes (objects) in the bottom represent
the three behavioural tasks of the robot (detecting, finding path, avoiding obstacles). The
environment is modelled as actor which provides information to the robot and thereby
influences the behaviours. Analysis in this concept targets only requirements analysis in
order to have a sound requirements definition as basis for the following development steps.
Unfortunately, the authors say nothing about the process to identify the requirements and
the use-case-model in the example is not complete in a way. The authors just state that
the environmental influences on the individual objects needs to be modelled as well, but
give no example.
Figure 3.9: Use case model for requirements analysis (source: [Zhang 09])
[Guo 10] present an approach using fault trees to derive safety and security requirements
for behaviour-based systems. Their main goal is to show how the effects of security hazards
can influence the safety of a system. To reach that they use several standard safety analysis
techniques like fmea to define the hazards and integrate the events of the security fault
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tree into the safety fault tree. With their approach they show the applicability of standard
techniques to behaviour-based systems, although the given example is quite small.
3.4.3 Safety/Security Analysis
[Steiner 12] deal with the topic of analysing the safety and reliability of complex embedded
systems in dependence on their software. The main idea is to model the behaviour based
network as State Event Fault Trees (SEFT), which are a combination of deterministic
state machines, Markov chains and Fault Trees. In these state event fault trees, undesired
events are selected and the SEFT is translated to a Deterministic and Stochastic Petri
Net (DSPN) for a quantitative analysis. With the analysis results the reliability of the
system can be measured for the chosen event. The authors provide translation rules for
the functional description of the bbs to a state event fault tree. The application is shown
on a small network example. They make no assumptions about the scalability of the
approach and the application to different problems. The quantitative analysis of this
approach is based on probability values assigned to basic events. The determination of
these probabilities is not further discussed in the paper. Nevertheless, the approach to use
a kind of fault tree to model behaviour-based networks in order to reason about safety
and reliability issues seems to be a promising approach.
3.5 Discussion
The goal of this chapter was to investigate current analysis techniques in the field of
safety analysis. Well-known and established methods were described and their possible
application to robotic systems are documented with examples. The big number of examples
from the autonomous mobile robot domain document the importance of safety aspects in
that area. This could also be shown for the field of behaviour-based systems in Sec. 3.4.
Although, the verification of bbs has not been exhaustively discussed till now, some of
the well-known standard techniques have already been applied to such systems before, for
example fault tree analysis and model checking.
Section 3.1 has dealt with hazard analysis techniques, which were primarily used in system
engineering and are well-established in software engineering by now. The ability to analyse
a system in order to find the trigger points of failures is of great importance. fmeca and
hazop are table-based methods using key-words to identify possible hazards in order to
determine safety requirements. The methods need a representation of the possible actions
(e.g. Use-Cases) the system can trigger. They can be applied to behaviour-based systems
as well, as they usually abstract from the actual software implementation structure.
Fault tree analysis has the same target but uses a different representation of the analysis
result. The tree structure allows to illustrate the relationship of system components, which
supports the developer in the analysis process. Additionally, it is possible to determine the
root causes of failures as well as the correlation of events that cause a failure, and to assign
a probability to a hazardous event. The latter can be automated which is a great benefit
of this method. The method allows the developer to improve his understanding of the
software and the relation between software and hardware events, which is an important
factor when developing safe mobile robots. The examples have shown the possibility to
transfer fta to robotic systems. The versatility of the method and the good tool support
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are reasons to examine the applicability to behaviour-based systems. Fault tree analysis
will be used to gain understanding about the causes of hazards and the relationship
between the corresponding components. Several problems have been mentioned that have
to be investigated further in the context of this thesis: These are the adaptation of the
method to the special software structure of bbs, the handling of large scale systems and
their corresponding fault trees, the combination of hardware and software in the analysis
process and the automation or at least tool support for the analysis process of bbs.
Dynamic analysis methods have been the topic of Sec. 3.2. Definitely, every system is
tested in one way or the other, therefore, a lot of research is done in that field in order to
reach the best possible test coverage, efficient test case generation, reliable results, and so
on. The definition of test cases for behaviour-based robots does not differ from that of
other robot implementations. However, the special component based software structure
fosters the development of special analysis techniques to detect the causes of faulty robot
behaviour. Therefore, the focus of this thesis will be on the identification of useful data
that can be recorded online during test runs and the corresponding oﬄine data analysis
afterwards. Additionally, it must be proven how the resulting analysis methods can be
applied to the system in order to improve the systems performance at run-time.
Formal verification methods have been presented in Sec. 3.3. Although they enable
the complete verification of a system they are not as frequently used as the previously
mentioned methods. Since testing can never cover the full scope of operation of complex
robot systems, a lot of researchers currently deal with the topic of formally verifying robotic
systems. As mentioned in Sec. 3.3, model checking will be chosen as formal verification
technique and the methods shall be applicable to already existing control systems. In this
context, several problems have been identified during literature research. The creation
of a formal model is often done for a special system or a certain programming language
(such as Java), the same serves for the mapping of the resulting trace to the original
system. The formulation of properties usually needs expert knowledge to express them in
terms of a temporal logic. Furthermore, the verification process is often limited to parts
of the complete system in order to handle the scalability problem of the technique. The
integration of the environment is a central point in the verification of robot systems as
safety requirements usually include environmental interaction. However, the integration
is complex. On the one hand, the robot can face an unlimited number of situations
including among others hardware failures and human interaction. On the other hand,
those situations need to be modelled formally in order to check them in combination with
the software part of the system.
This leads to the following research topics of this thesis: Environmental conditions shall
be integrated into the formal model of the robot system. It should be possible to check
the resulting model without the need of adapting the model checker. The process of the
creation of formal properties shall be tool supported and intuitively usable for robot system
developers. Tool support shall also be given for the interpretation of counterexamples. As
behaviour-based networks tend to get very huge for complex robot systems, the scalability
problem of the approach shall be further investigated in the special context of bbs.
Formal verification techniques like model checking are often used in combination with other
analysis techniques. For example, [Nazier 12] integrate the results of fault tree analysis
into a formal system behaviour model. Test cases are generated out of this model by
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using model checking. The combination of the different analysis techniques shall also be
discussed in the context of behaviour-based systems in this thesis.
All the presented application examples in this section have in common that they are
based on a deep knowledge of the system to be analysed. It is therefore necessary to have
automated techniques and visualisation methods that provide information about the inner
system structure and support the developer during the analysis process. This is especially
important for complex systems and non-system experts that shall execute verification
tasks.
4. Analysis of Behaviour-Based
Systems
Analysis, generally defined, is the process of breaking down a something into its parts
to learn what they do and how they relate to each another. Several types of analysis for
different specific tasks and numerous analysis methods are discussed in literature. Some of
the most important techniques for safety analysis of complex systems has been presented
in Chap. 3.
The special issue of behaviour-based robotic control systems is their modular software
structure. This allows for new approaches in the analysis of the overall system, as it offers
the possibility to investigate the software structure as well as their connections to hardware
components while abstracting from the concrete implementation of the robots behaviour.
The goal of this chapter is to determine techniques that are suitable for the analysis of
behaviour-based systems. The following sub goals shall be achieved
• Analysis of the system structure to gain knowledge about it
• Analysis of the system structure to find failures and faults
• Analysis of the system to determine violations of requirements
• Clear representation of analysis results
The creation of behaviour-based networks to control robots is (or should be) a process
guided by architectural principles and rules that help the developer to transfer the
requirements from the requirements document into a working system. Nevertheless,
implementation faults, unforeseen environmental conditions or subsequently integrated
components can lead to failures. It is therefore necessary to validate the system after
the implementation phase. The methods discussed in Sec. 3.1 are primarily developed to
analyse systems in early development phases, but they can also be applied to the complete
system.
The following sections deal with the adaptation of well-known analysis methods to
behaviour-based robotic systems.
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Section 4.1 examines static analysis methods considering the network structure of the bbs
and fundamental checking methods. The results are useful for a deeper understanding
of the system structure and the avoidance of errors. They serve as a basis for the more
sophisticated methods described in subsequent sections. In Sec. 4.2 the application of
fault tree analysis in order to learn about the relationship of system events and to identify
potential sources of hazards is discussed. Sec. 4.3 deals with data analysis applied to
data sets monitored during test runs. Here, techniques to structure and represent data
with the goal to bring out critical system components and causes of failures are presented.
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the analysis problems and the corresponding analysis
techniques. In the end of this chapter, the presented methods and their benefits to the
analysis of behaviour-based networks are discussed (see Sec. 4.4).
Dependencies
Relationship of
System Events Source(s) of Failures System Failures
Structural Analysis
Fault Tree
Analysis
Data Analysis
Testing
Figure 4.1: Overview of analysis tasks (grey boxes) and the corresponding techniques (white
boxes). Some techniques need input/support from others, which is marked with dotted lines.
4.1 Structural Analysis
The fundamental structure of behaviour-based systems facilitates the application of
automated basic checks. All components are built up with the same interface, where the
input and output data is often restricted due to architectural conditions. For example,
the limitation of data values to a certain range or the definition of values in dependence
on other values. The violation of these requirements can be automatically checked with
little programming effort (see [Proetzsch 10a] for the application of this method on the
iB2C or [Forouher 14] for the application in ros). The indication of a violation can be
made visible to the developer and/or used to automatically correct the value in order to
preserve system safety.
Another task is given by the network structure of a bbs. The combination of components
follows rules, that must also be checked. For the iB2C for example, a component can only
be stimulated or inhibited with the activity of one other component. This problem can be
checked prior to program execution and thereby prevent system failures.
The analysis of the network structure serves two purposes, on the one hand it allows to
gain a deeper understanding of the system and, on the other hand, detect faults. Two
main subjects can be identified that shall be answered in this section. One is the definition
of system properties that can be automatically analysed. The second is the representation
of the network and the analysis results in a way to support the developer.
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Behaviour-based networks can be represented by graph structures, where the components
are the vertices and the data connections are the edges. The tool finstruct, described
in Sec. 2.4 provides such a view. Furthermore, the graph visualization software Graphviz
[Gansner 00, Ellson 03] is used in this thesis for special views of graphs, as it offers a great
number of possibilities for design and style. Figure 4.2 depicts an example network. It
serves no special purpose but shall be used to demonstrate some of the analysis methods
presented in the following. Behaviour A stimulates behaviour B. Behaviours A and D
are coordinated by a fusion behaviour. Its output is transferred to E and F . Several
stimulation edges transfer the influence within the network.
A
B
Fusion
C
D
EF
0 Groups
6 Behaviours
1 Fusion behaviour
8 Behavioural edges
5 Data edges
Legend:
behavior
fusion behavior
stimulation
activity transfer
data transfer
Figure 4.2: Example network for illustrating the presented analysis methods together with
fundamental information like number and types of components
Fundamental information about the network is given by a collection of basic information
about number and type of the components (e.g. standard behaviours, fusion behaviours,
groups) and their dependencies. More sophisticated analysis techniques help to find
problems in the structure. In the following a number of automated methods for the
analysis of behaviour-based systems are presented. The major goal of these methods is to
gain a deeper understanding of the system, but can also be used in combination with the
methods introduced in Sec. 4.2 and 4.3 to find the root causes of failures of the overall
system.
Number of components A very basic but nevertheless very important information.
The number of standard behavioural components, fusion behaviours, behavioural
groups and their connections (also called edges) are an indicator of the complexity
of a system.
Pattern Recognition The implementation of behaviour-based networks follows rules in
order to achieve a correct system. Similar to design patterns used in object-oriented
programming that support the developer in structuring the code, behaviour-based
networks can also be constructed according to structural patterns. For the iB2C
these are called behaviour network patterns [Proetzsch 10a]. The recognition of
patterns in the network allows the system analyst on the one hand to prove the
correctness of an application. On the other hand, it enables to identify network parts
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that can not be assigned to a pattern which might indicate a wrong implementation.
Cycles Cycles can produce an undesired behaviour of the system. For the iB2C cycles
of stimulation and inhibition are explicitly forbidden according to [Proetzsch 10a].
He proposes the use of strongly connected components to find cycles in the network
structure.
Dependencies The analysis of the interdependencies of components provides valuable
information about the system for the developer or analyst and is crucial for several
analysis tasks. Here, not only direct connections are of interest, but also the flow of
control data inside the network. This kind of information is known as control flow
analysis and will be discussed in Sec. 4.1.1.
Critical Components With the analysis of the interdependencies it is also possible to
find out components with special properties. These can e.g. be sources and sinks
of activity or behaviours without stimulation. The components are called critical
components, as they show a non-standardised behaviour and need further analysis
in order to verify their correctness.
A
B
Fusion
C
D
EF
(a) Stimulation cycle
A
B
Fusion
C
D
EF
(b) Source of activity
A
B
Fusion
C
D
EF
(c) Critical components
Figure 4.3: Results of network structure analyses
Figure 4.3 shows the application of the approaches mentioned above on the example
network. Cycle detection revealed a stimulation cycle between the components A, B, E
and Fusion (Fig. 4.3a). In Fig. 4.3b node D is highlighted as a source of activity. This
representation offers the developer the possibility to easily check the correctness of the
stimulation mode of behaviours. The result of the critical components analysis is presented
in Fig. 4.3c where all components with non-standard behaviour are highlighted. In addition
to the node D as activity source, node C is marked, because it is not stimulated and does
not transfer activity. It therefore has no influence in the network and should be checked
for correctness.
It becomes clear from the examples, the analysis of the interdependencies in the network
is crucial. As networks can become very large and relevant information, for example
the tracing of the data flow, cannot be done manually, the next section deals with the
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extraction and representation of those parts of the networks that include the relevant
information. Furthermore, it presents a technique to identify a special kind of critical
components.
4.1.1 Data Flow Analysis and Relevance of Components
The network structure of behaviour-based systems can be seen as equivalent to a program
dependence graph (pdg). In a pdg, program statements and expressions represent the
nodes of a graph, edges define the dependencies between them. For behaviour-based systems
this definition is adapted so that nodes represent the state of a behaviour component
and edges the connection between components. A state of a component is defined via
its stimulation, activity, inhibition, target rating and activation (see Sec. 2.2). The new
structure will be called behaviour dependence graph (bdg) in the following.
Definition 4.1: Behaviour Dependence Graph
A behaviour dependence graph GBD = (N,E) is a directed graph, where N is a set of
behaviour nodes and E a set of edges. A behaviour node ni is defined via its incoming
and outgoing behavioural signals sb = (s, a, i, r), with s being its stimulation, a its
activity, i its inhibition, and r its target rating. An edge e = (nj, nk) describes the
dependence from node nk on node nj.
The understanding of how signals are propagated in the network supports the comprehen-
sion of behaviour functionality. Therefore, it is of interest to create different behaviour
dependence graphs according to certain signals. For example, a stimulation graph shall
only contain those components that are connected via a stimulation transfer. In order to
do this, the definition of the bdg is extended to
Definition 4.2: Typed Behaviour Dependence Graph
A typed behaviour dependence graph (tbdg) is a bdg with an additional type
property t ∈ {s, i, d}, with s indicating stimulation, i inhibition and d data transfer.
The tbdg GTBD(t) = (V,E(t)) contains those nodes n ∈ V ⊆ N that are connected
via edges that transfer signals of type t.
Figure 4.4 shows two typed behaviour dependence graphs. The comparison with the
example graph given in Fig. 4.2 reveals that behaviour C is not contained in GTBD(s)
(Fig. 4.4a) as it does not stimulate another behaviour. The activity transfer edges from
behaviours A and D to the fusion behaviour are included as they are relevant for the
stimulation output of the fusion behaviour. For the data transfer graph (Fig. 4.4b),
behaviour B is not contained, as it does not transfer its data to any other behaviour.
The comparison of bdg’s of different types can also reveal failures in the network structure
of the graph. Figure 4.4c highlights the differences in the graphs GTBD(s) and GTBD(d).
Node B transfers only its activity and not its data vector to the fusion node. This
transition is correct, as B stimulates the fusion node with its activity. In turn, node
C transfers its data vector without a corresponding activity vector. This is a fault and
must be corrected. A corrected version of the example graph is given in Fig. 4.5a, where
all previously detected faults are eliminated. Here, the missing stimulation of behaviour
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Figure 4.4: Examples for typed behaviour dependence graphs
C is fixed by adding a self-stimulating edge. Additionally, the component transfers its
activity to stimulate behaviour D. The stimulation cycle A→ B → Fusion→ E → A is
disrupted by removing the edge E → A.
Another usage of behaviour dependence graphs is the influence graph. This is a sub-graph
of the bdg that contains only those nodes that influence a specific one. This is especially
useful in large networks to reduce the size and focus on the relevant parts. An influence
graph is defined as follows
Definition 4.3: Typed Behaviour Influence Graph
A typed behaviour influence graph (tbig) GTBI(t, ninitial) is a tbdg containing the
maximal set of nodes V ⊆ N such that for all n ∈ V there is a path from n to
ninitial using edges e ∈ E(t).
Figure 4.5b depicts such a graph for the start node E tracing the control data input.
These kind of influence graphs can also be used to make statements about the relevance of
components. The assumption is, that a component that influences many others is more
relevant than a component that influences only a few. Certainly, all components in a
behaviour-based control network should be relevant to make the system work as required,
but, when analysing a system in order to find the causes of failures it might save time to
start analysing those behaviours, that influence many others. Alg. 4.1 shows the algorithm
to determine the relevance of nodes. For the determination of the number of nodes that
are influenced by a special one, firstly, the tbigs for every node are created. Afterwards,
the occurrence of the special node is counted over all influence graphs.
Figure 4.5c shows graphically the results of the algorithm for every node in the example
graph according to the flow of control data. The colour gradient from red to yellow
indicates the frequency of the individual nodes. The control data from node C influences
four other nodes, namely D, Fusion, E, and F . Nodes D and A influence three nodes,
respectively and the fusion node the two nodes E and F . Finally, the nodes B, E and F
do not influence any other node with their control data.
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Figure 4.5: Examples for an influence graph and a graph depicting the relevance of behaviours
using different fill colours
Algorithm 4.1: Determination of frequency of occurrence of nodes
Input: graph, type, node
1 forall the n ∈ N do
2 gn := CreateInfluenceGraph(type, n);
3 Push(gn, influence_graphs);
4 end
5 count:= 0;
6 forall the gn in influence_graphs do
7 if node ∈ gn then
8 count++;
9 end
10 end
Result: count
The automated analysis together with the multiple visualisation possibilities allow the
developer a quick overview over the system. The different views facilitate the detection of
faults and the verification of structural requirements.
4.2 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault tree analysis is a hazard identification technique widely used in industry as shown in
Sec. 3.1.2. A fault tree can be described as a graphical model of the chain representing
the relation between an undesired event (system level hazard) and the failures that cause
it. (Compare Fig. 4.1 for the classification of this method in the concepts of this chapter.)
The generation of fault trees is a deductive method. The undesired event, the so-called
top event, is broken down to the failures of components that lead to it, connected via
logical and and or gates, until the lowest component that cannot be developed further is
reached. These components are called basic events. Basic events can occur individually or
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(a) and gate
≥
(b) or gate (c) Transfer symbol
(d) Basic Event (e) Intermediate or top-level
event
Figure 4.6: Basic symbols used in fault tree analysis. a and b show two variants of the gate
symbols, respectively.
in combination with others. The basic symbols used in the construction of fault trees are
shown in Fig. 4.6. The fault tree in Fig. 4.7 provides an example of a washing machine
that overflows [Lyu 96]. The overflow is the top event, which can be caused by either the
shut-off valve being stuck open or the machine staying in fill mode for too long. The first
is a basic event as it can not be evaluated further, the latter event can occur when the
time-out control failed and the sensor that controls the filling level failed at the same time.
Overflow of
washing machine
Shutoff valve
stuck open
Staying in filling
mode too long
Time-out
control failed
Full sensor
failed
Figure 4.7: Example for a simple fault tree (redraw from [Lyu 96])
Fault tree analysis is used to gain understanding about the types of failures and their
causes, the functional relationships of system failures and the identification of critical areas
with potential for improvements [Vesely 81, Dhillon 15]. It can be distinguished between
two types of analysis. The qualitative analysis identifies weak points in the system. The
quantitative analysis calculates the probability of occurrence of the hazard.
For a qualitative evaluation the fault tree must be complete. A statement about the
reliability of the system can be made via the graphical structure. Possible evaluation
approaches are, among others, the analysis of minimal cut sets and critical paths. A
minimal cut set contains all basic events that together trigger the top event. For the
example given in Fig. 4.6 two minimal cut sets can be generated, namely {shut-off valve
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stuck open} and {time-out control failed, full sensor failed}. Cut sets with only one element
imply a single point of failure for the system.
Information about the relation of events is provided by the critical path, which leads from
the top event to a causative event. The qualitative fta allows to gain a deep understanding
of the system and to discover yet unknown causes of failures. However, this method is
time expensive and needs expert knowledge to identify all components of the tree.
The goal of the quantitative fta is to give a prediction of the reliability of complex
systems. The calculation is based on the probability of occurrence of the basic events.
These can be failure rates or the reliability of electrical components which are known from
the manufacturer information, gained in tests or estimated via probability calculations.
The probability of failure of the whole system can be calculated iteratively starting from
the basic events. For the simplest case of two independent events A and B, the and gate
connects its inputs P (A) and P (B) to
P (A) ∩ P (B) = P (A) · P (B) (4.1)
The or gate correlates with
P (A) ∪ P (B) = P (A) + P (B)− P (A) · P (B) (4.2)
This method is useful to verify reliability requirements and to compare different systems.
But, in many cases it can be problematic to determine the failure rates of all possible
basic events. The failure rates of hardware are not always known, and the probabilities of
software faults cannot be measured accurately. Nevertheless, there exist several approaches
that use the lines of code or the number of faults corrected in the past as probability
measure.
The general process of fault tree analysis comprises four steps.
1. Preparation including the determination of the topic, goal and scope of the analysis
as well the needed system information.
2. Fault tree modelling
3. Analysis
4. Interpretation of the results
A major advantage of fault tree analysis is its wide-spread application and the high degree
of popularity. This makes it also interesting for the analysis of behaviour-based systems.
The possibility to easily connect software and hardware components to learn about their
relationship is a very useful property for robotic systems. The main effort using fta is in
the construction of the fault tree. The goal of this section is to provide guidelines on how
to built fault trees of behaviour-based systems.
For the analysis of fault trees, several tools exist that calculate the probabilities of top-
events, the number and composition of (minimal) cut sets, and so on. Examples are among
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others FaultTree+1, BlockSim2, and RiskSpectrum3. For the work at hand the Embedded
Systems Safety & Reliability Analyser (ESSaRel) [Kaiser 03]4 is used.
The following section introduces a concept to model the behaviour-based system structure
as fault tree. In Sec. 4.2.2 the method is applied to the example of the autonomous
ravon robot, where the focus lies on the creation of the fault tree and not on the analysis
procedure.
4.2.1 Fault Tree Modelling for Behaviour-Based Systems
The use of fault tree analysis to robotic systems offers some advantages. A failure event
can be caused from many different components, e.g. sensors, actuators, data connections,
hardware that executes software and certainly the software itself. Fault tree analysis
helps to understand the potential errors and the relationship of failure events and thereby
facilitates system improvements.
Robot does not
act correctly
Faulty
actuators
No/wrong command
from software
Software
fault
Faulty input data from
sensor → Sensor fault
Figure 4.8: Abstract example of a fault tree including hardware, here, actuators and sensors
(grey boxes) and software (blue boxes) for a robotic problem
In literature, often hardware and software parts of a system are analysed individually. But
exactly this correlation is interesting. Figure 4.8 depicts exemplarily the different faulty
components that can cause a failure of the whole system.
Software fault tree analysis has been topic to research since the number of embedded
systems grows. A problem here is the complexity of the resulting trees when several
variables in the software need to be respected. The special structure of behaviour-based
systems offers the possibility to analyse the software while abstracting from the actual
implementation of functionality. Therewith, fault tree creation can be based on the network
structure where events reflects faults in the structure. The inner implementation of the
behavioural components can be verified in a separate step.
Since all behavioural components have the same interface, this approach proposes the
application of a standard fault tree modelling process for a single component together
1FaultTree+: www.isograph.com/software/reliability-workbench/fault-tree-analysis/
2BlockSim: www.reliasoft.com/BlockSim/
3RiskSpectrum: www.riskspectrum.com/en/risk/Meny_2/RiskSpectrum_FTA/
4ESSaRel: http://essarel.de/
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with guidelines to integrate single trees into the main tree. This procedure also facilitates
the automation of fault tree creation which is essential for such complex systems as robot
systems are.
Faulty data
signal output
Faulty data
value
Faulty
calculation (1)
Faulty input
data (3)
Faulty activity
value
Wrong activa-
tion value(5)
Faulty activity
calculation(4)
Structural
fault (2)
Trace input data Trace stimulation/
inhibition
Figure 4.9: Fault tree of a standard iB2C component which outputs faulty control data
The following paragraph introduces the modelling of a behavioural component. The
fundamental assumption is that a wrong software command coming from one (or several)
components caused a problem. Therefore, the top event for the software sub fault tree is
defined as faulty data signal output.
For standard behavioural components, there are two possible reasons for a faulty data
signal output, namely, faulty data value and faulty activity value. The first relates to
all possibilities that lead to faulty data. These are (1) a faulty calculation inside the
behavioural component, (2) a structural fault in the network or (3) faulty input data. The
latter implies a fault in another component of the behaviour-based network. This is the
link to map the network structure in the fault tree. The needed information about the
components that provide date to the component in question can be taken from the tbig
(see Sec. 4.1).
A faulty calculation corresponds with a component internal implementation problem. It
is handled as basic event in this modelling approach and can be further analysed using
software analysis techniques. The aspect structural fault, targets faults in the network
structure related to the behavioural component in question. These include wrong or
missing connections to other components. It is also handled as basic event.
Similar causes are found for the event of a faulty activity value. The activity value is
significantly relevant for the transfer of control data as it decides about the importance of
the control data. In a maximum fusion for example, only the control data of the behaviour
with the maximum activity value are passed. Therefore, a faulty calculation of an activity
value can lead to problems in the overall robot behaviour. The activity-related part of the
fault tree is build with a basic event considering a faulty calculation of the activity output
value (4) and an event considering a wrong activation value (5) (Remember, the activation
value limits the activity see Chap. 2.2). The latter is based on stimulation and inhibition
inputs to the behavioural component and needs therefore further processing. Additionally,
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Figure 4.10: Fault tree of an iB2C fusion behaviour which outputs faulty control data. The
red marked or gate may be replaced by an and gate in some cases
a structural fault as mentioned for the faulty data signal can also be a problem for the
activity calculation (2). Both structural faults are combined in one basic event, as their
verification is done simultaneously. Figure 4.9 shows the fault tree of a standard iB2C
behaviour.
iB2C fusion behaviours are modelled in a similar way (see Fig. 4.10). In contrast to
standard behavioural components the calculation of the outputs (data and activity) is
a standard calculation that should be verified to be correct. These events are therefore
neglected in the fault tree. The event Faulty input data (3) is split into several branches
according to the number of input behaviours. They are connected via an or gate in the
figure. This is only a very general model of the fusion behaviour component. It suffices
to give information about the interconnections of the behavioural components, but for
an exact modelling of the fusion function special system knowledge is needed in order
to connect the data outputs correctly. The gate must therefore be chosen according to
the special task. In order to reduce the size of the fault tree, behavioural groups can be
handled as normal standard behaviours. Their internal structure can be modelled in an
individual fault tree, which is only analysed if necessary.
Using these standardised sub fault trees, a complete fault tree for the control software of
the system can be modelled. It can be integrated in a combined fault tree containing also
hardware parts as shown in Fig. 4.8. The application of fault-tree analysis to a robotic
system with a behaviour-based control will be presented in the following section using the
4.2. Fault Tree Analysis 57
robot ravon as example.
4.2.2 Application Example
This section will describe the application of fault-tree analysis to the ravon robot. Due
to readability reasons, several steps in the procedure are shortened or described only in
general. In the introduction of this chapter, the four steps of fault tree analysis have been
presented: preparation, fault tree modelling, analysis of the fault tree and interpretation of
the results. The preparation phase includes several aspects that will be further explained
and answered specific to the ravon example in the following:
1. Determine the subject of analysis
2. Understand the system
3. Define the top-level event(s)
4. Define the scope of the analysis
5. Define the depth and resolution of the analysis
6. Determine basic rules for e.g. the naming of events, the modelling of recurring
structures, . . .
In the example presented here, the subject of the analysis are safety aspects of the
autonomous driving robot ravon. In more detail, the evasion and slow-down behaviour
during forward motion in the case of obstacles to the front of the robot shall be proved.
In that case, the hardware parts of the robot that execute a motion are considered as just
as the sensor systems that monitor the environment. Furthermore, the software parts that
process the sensor data and control the robots motion are to be analysed.
The understanding of the system is needed in order to build the fault-tree. It includes
an understanding of the systems structure and its components, the functions of the
individual components, environmental conditions,. . . . Information about the software
parts of the system is gained using the methods presented in Sec. 4.1. For information
about the hardware components the failure mode and effects analysis (fmea) [Carlson 12]
can be used.
For the determination of the top-level event a fmea or hazop analysis can be applied.
In this example, the event is defined as ravon collides with an obstacle. The scope of
analysis defines the components that are included and the ones that are not included.
Here, among others the main hardware components as motors and sensors and the control
software will be considered, but not cable connections, power supply, manual interventions
by the operator and environmental conditions such as bad visibility. With respect to the
control software only the slowing down behaviour of the robot shall be considered, the
evasion behaviour will be neglected in this case.
The depth and resolution of the analysis describe the level of detail in which the
fault tree will be split. For hardware, a basic event can describe the state of a complete
component bought by the manufacturer, for example a sensor system including the sensor
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Figure 4.11: First level of the fault tree analysing the top-event ravon collides with an obstacle
and a preprocessing unit. For a more detailed analysis of handmade components, they
can be divided down to their cable joints or small electrical components. As many of the
hardware components of ravon are handmade, they are analysed in detail down to their
electrical components. For the software parts, the lowest level of detail is a behavioural
component which is modelled in a fault tree as presented in the previous section. The
inner implementation of the individual components is represented as basic events. The
sensor data preprocessing steps that are fulfilled before the data is used in a behavioural
software component are neglected.
The determination of basic rules is important for reusing the results and to work
jointly with others. Here, only two rules used in the following application are described
exemplarily.
Naming of behavioural components A behavioural component is named by the name
of its surrounding group and an addition that describes its function. The groups
name is shorted with the initial letters in this example. For example Fast Front Slow
Down is shortened to FFSD.
Structuring of the software fault tree Data signals are traced up/down to group
borders. The fault tree for the group is build up as a separate tree. This facilitates
the re-use.
Subsequent to the preparation phase the modelling of the fault tree can start. Figure 4.11
shows the top-event ravon collides with an obstacle and the first level of the fault tree.
The top-event can occur when the robot is not stopped by software control and the safety
chain of the robot is not interrupted by the bumper (see Sec. 2.3 for a detailed description
of the bumper system). For the former, two possible reasons exist: There can either be a
wrong motion (velocity, angle) command from software or the actuators do not act on
order. All three events need further analysis. Exemplarily for hardware fault trees, the
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Figure 4.12: Fault tree examining the possible reasons for a not-correct working bumper
fault tree for the event Bumper does not work is depicted in Fig. 4.12. The fault tree for
the event Actuators do not act on order can be build up in a similar way.
For the third event Wrong command from software, the source of the velocity command
need to be analysed. This is done as described above, using the influence graph starting
from that component that generates an actuator command. As the complete fault tree
cannot be depicted due to the limitations of the format of this thesis, the path of the
control commands is shortly described and fault tree creation is exemplary described for a
small part of the network.
Starting from that point where the velocity control command from software is transferred
to hardware control, the command can be followed back to a component that fuses the
commands of two groups. One is the safety control group that is responsible for safe robot
navigation, the other is the drive control group responsible for reaching a goal (compare
Sec. 2.3). The fusion behaviour marks the first fork, where the fault tree need to be build
in two directions. In the example here, only the path of the velocity command coming
from the safety control is followed further. Figure 4.13 sketches the main components of
the path used in this example.
(F) Velocity Control gets a velocity command as well as the corresponding activity value
from the safety control group. Both values need to be traced. The creation of the data
transfer graphs reveal that the groups velocity and activity output stem from different
fusion behaviours inside the group. See Fig. 4.14 and Fig. 4.15 for the data and activity
transfer graphs. Here, the path of the velocity command coming from Velocity control
output is further analysed. With the help of the graphs showing the interdependencies of
the behaviours in respect to the given data signal, the software fault tree can be build up
including every connection that transfers velocity as well as the corresponding activity. For
the example here, the command coming from the group (G) Fast Front Slow Down Laser
2d ((G) FFSD Laser 2d), which is an inner group of (G) Full Speed Safety Control and (G)
Fast Front Slow Down (see Fig. 2.6 for the containing network) is followed. The complete
fault tree cannot be pictured here, therefore, only the fault tree of the behavioural group
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Figure 4.13: Overview of the main components (groups and fusion behaviours) that transfer
the velocity on the example path used in the application example. The transfer starts in group
(G) FFSD Laser 2D and ends in the fusion behaviour (F) Velocity Control.
(G) FFSD Laser 2d is modelled. The behavioural network of the group (G) FFSD Laser
2d is depicted in Fig. 4.16. As data dependence graph and activity dependence graph
include the same components in this group, they are depicted in the same figure.
The network consists of three behavioural components that individually calculate a safe
velocity value in dependence on the data from the 2D laser scanner for the three sides of
the robot that influence the robots forward motion, whereby left and right mean the left
and right part of the robots front respectively. The three components are continuously
stimulated. Their activity value and velocity control commands are merged by a maximum
fusion behaviour. The result is transferred to the group’s output.
The fault tree for this group starts with the event Faulty data signal output. As the
signal is directly transferred from the fusion behaviour to the group’s output the fault
tree modelling begins with the analysis of the fusion behaviour. Figure 4.17 depicts the
fault tree. As explained earlier in this chapter, a wrong data output can be caused either
by a faulty data value or a faulty activation value. The faulty activation value correlates
with stimulating (and inhibiting) inputs of the fusion behaviour, which are not further
analysed in this example. The faulty data value is analysed further proving all behavioural
components connected to the fusion behaviour. As the three input behaviours all observe
the same area of the robot (its front), all of them must compute wrong data in order to
let the robot crash into an obstacle. The three components are therefore connected via
an and gate. Additionally, a structural fault event that includes all missing or redundant
connections to the fusion behaviour is pictured. It belongs to both parts of the fault tree,
as both stimulating/inhibiting connections and data inputs can be faulty.
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Figure 4.14: Data transfer graph of ravon’s safety control group to follow the flow of velocity
control data from the groups output to its origin
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Figure 4.15: Activity transfer graph of ravon’s safety control group to follow the flow of
activity from the groups output to its origin
Figure 4.18 shows the fault tree for the event of a faulty data signal coming from one of
the three connected behaviours, in this case FFSD Laser 2D Centre. It is mainly the
same as the standard fault tree (see Fig. 4.9) with the difference that the event wrong
activation value is marked as basic event. This is due to the fact, that the component is
continuously stimulated and has no inhibition inputs. Therefore, the only event that needs
further analysis is faulty input data. In this special case, the data used for calculating
the output stems not only from the connected components but also from sensors, that
provide their data for safety requirements. Thus, the next step is to further analyse the
software on the one hand and analyse the sensor hardware on the other hand. Due to
space constraints, the software fault tree is not depicted. For the sensor fault tree, the
data processing chain and hardware internal problems are neglected, so that the causes of
wrong sensor data are either wrong data or no data. Equal fault trees are created for the
other two behavioural components FFSD Laser 2D Left and FFSD Laser 2D Right
After the creation of the complete fault tree, the analysis procedure is applied. Here, a
qualitative analysis is chosen as the main interest is on the relationship of system events.
As the analysis procedure and the representation of the results is subject to many other
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Figure 4.16: Network of the group FFSD Laser 2D realising a slowing down action in dependence
on input data of the 2D laser scanner
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Figure 4.17: Fault tree for the fusion behaviour of the behavioural group FFSD Laser 2D
research projects, here only the aspects belonging to the presented approach are discussed.
The example illustrates the combination of hardware related parts and software related
parts in the same fault tree based on the embedded system ravon. The influence of
hardware parts (sensors) on certain software components and vice versa can be seen very
well in the tree. It therefore provides the developer a detailed insight into their relationship.
Cut set analysis reveals those basic events that together trigger the top event. As mentioned
before, events that are frequently contained in cut sets or even in several minimal cut sets
should get special attention. In this example, one of the events that causes a failing bumper
bar is contained in every cut set. Additionally, the different sensor systems also frequently
appear in the cut sets. This is as expected and reflects the fact, that the perception of the
environment is an essential part when building safe autonomous driving robots.
Another fact that can be noticed when analysing the cut sets is that some behavioural
components from the control software appear more frequently than others. This is due to
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Figure 4.18: Fault tree for the behavioural component Fast Front Slow Down Centre
the fact, that the data output of a behavioural component can be transferred to several
others. In reverse, that implies that those components providing their data to several
others are more important to further analyse than others. Besides, the event structural
fault is often contained in the cut sets. This shows the relevance of correct connections in
the behaviour-based control network.
The last step of fault tree analysis is to control the identified hazards. That means, the
events that lead to the occurrence of the top event need to be improved in order to decrease
the probability of their occurrence. In the case of hardware, this can be realised using
more reliable hardware components or using additionally redundant systems. Similar
possibilities can be applied to software components, where a higher reliability in that case,
means to verify them in order to minimise the risk of programming errors. This must be
done for the implementation of the single behaviour components as well as for the overall
network structure. The latter will be addressed in Chap. 5.
The example has shown the application of the previously presented approach, applying
fault tree analysis to embedded systems using a behaviour-based control. The resulting
fault tree provides the developer or analyst a good insight into the relationships between
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hardware and software in respect to a special top event. For ravon, the sensor systems
have been identified as important elements in the fulfilment of safety requirements, as
expected. As already several redundant sensor systems exist as well as redundancy in
the control software, a further quantitative analysis using additional probability values of
basic events would provide interesting information about the effective compliance of safety
requirements. As many hardware components of the robot are individually designed, their
failure rates can only be estimated using similar components as reference.
4.3 Data Analysis
“Robot failure data provides invaluable information to concerned professionals [. . . ] as it
indicates the results of the reliability-related effort put in during the design and manufacture
phases of robots.” [Dhillon 15] In order to prove the systems performance it must be
tested under the compliance of the defined requirements. The data monitored during
system execution give useful hints about the internal dynamic processes and help to
identify failures. Especially for behaviour-based systems where the data calculation is
not straightforward, but distributed to concurrent components, the analysis of dynamic
data provides very valuable information. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, data analysis can be
assigned to the following analysis tasks: Gaining information about the relationship of
system events, the detection of failure sources and the detection of system faults.
This section deals with data analysis methods applied to data derived from behaviour-based
robot control systems. It is distinguished between static and dynamic analysis methods
which relate to the analysis after program execution or in the meantime, respectively. The
analysis only refers to the software parts of the robotic system. The hardware parts are
considered in the description of the robot conditions that define the context of a test case.
It is well-known that “program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but
never show their absence!” E.W. Dijkstra (1970), because it is impossible to cover the
whole set of possible scenarios in test cases. This holds especially for robotic systems,
that act in a complex environment which cannot be completely modelled. Nevertheless,
testing is an essential part of software development as it allows to test a system under
real conditions where also dynamic aspects can be proved. Numerous testing methods
exist which differ according to the subject to test (software, hardware, embedded system,
. . . ), the goal (functionality, reliability, . . . ), and the available time. What all have in
common is to achieve the most possible coverage of scenarios in order to find as many
bugs as possible. In this thesis, a test case will be defined by the following parameters
1. Property
2. Robot Action
3. Context
4. Monitored aspects
Property describes the requirement(s) that are verified with the test case. This can be for
example the safety property, that the robot shall not hit an obstacle. The actual subject of
the test case is described in the robot action. This can be a goal position a driving robot
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shall reach. Context defines the environmental conditions in which the robot shall act.
These are obstacles, ground conditions, weather conditions, and also robot conditions like
broken sensor systems, and so on. In the monitoring aspect, the system properties and
additional data that shall be surveyed during the test run are defined. Here, for example
the compliance of certain distances to obstacles or time constraints are mentioned. The
definition of data to be monitored correlates to the property aspect. For robotic systems,
software tests can be executed on the real system, as well as on a simulated system. The
latter provides advantages in early development stages as hardware cannot break due to
wrong software commands and several hardware conditions, like broken sensors can be
simulated with less effort.
The goal of data collection is to gain as much information about the inner systems state as
possible, in order to be able to find the causes of a failed test run. The question is which
information should be collected and how. For behaviour-based systems, single components
that realise basic robot actions, can be verified individually using common software testing
methods. The speciality of behaviour-based systems is the interconnection of components
that lead to the execution of sophisticated manoeuvres. Therefore, the focus of this thesis
lies on the data communicated between the single components. These are activity, target
rating and control data in the case of an iB2C network (see Sec. 2.2). The first two
provide information about a components state, whereas the latter transfers the data to
actually control the robot. In order to analyse failure cause, all this data need to be
monitored at every point in time during a test case. Special techniques are necessary to sort
and structure the data afterwards and to assist the developer in finding the problematic
areas. The remainder of this section presents methods for analysis subsequent to test run
execution (Sec. 4.3.1) and in the meantime (Sec. 4.3.2). Sec. 4.3.3 shows the application
the methods on the example of the autonomous driving robot ravon.
4.3.1 Static Analysis
In the context of this thesis, static analysis means that data is analysed after its retrieval
during test runs. This is also called oﬄine analysis. A positive result of test case execution
is the achievement of the defined goals under the compliance of all constraints. Naturally,
in the negative case, the cause of the violation of requirements (1a) or the missing of the
goal (1b) has to be discovered. Accordingly, the two tasks need to be handled separately.
For the first, the point in time where the violation occurs can be identified, which limits the
data set to be considered. The latter is more complex to analyse as there is no particular
time when the problem occurs.
But even for the positive case, that the goal is reached and all constraints are met (2), it
might be useful to analyse the data set. For the system expert, this analysis can reveal
irregularities in the system behaviour, that have no direct influence on the overall robot
behaviour, but might lead to problems in other situations. Additionally, it can be used
from non-system experts to gain understanding of the processes inside the behaviour based
network during run-time. Regardless the special analysis task, for all applies the need of
clearly structuring and representing the data. Furthermore, the handling of large data
sets is time expensive or impossible and therefore demands for automation.
The remainder of this section introduces a concept to structure and represent data with a
focus to support the developer in finding failures and their sources. Figure 4.19 gives an
overview over the methods and their application areas.
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Figure 4.19: Analysis techniques (white boxes) and their application areas (grey boxes)
Data structuring
As mentioned before, the data collected in a behaviour-based control system is activity,
target rating and control data. At every point in time during system execution, all
components are in a certain state dependent on the values of the respective input and
output values. Derived from that single datasets, a state for the complete system can be
defined. In a first step the data collected at a certain point in time can be summarised as
belonging to a system state.
Definition 4.4: System State
The state of a behaviour-based system is defined as SSystem(t) =
{BSB0(t), BSB1(t), . . . , BSBn(t)} with n being the number of behavioural com-
ponents in the system.
BSBi(t) = {aBi(t), rBi(t), ιBi(t)} defines the state of a behavioural component
Bi, with aBi , rBi , ιBi being the activity, target rating and activation of the component.
The stimulation and inhibition values of the component are implicitly included through
the activation (see Sec. 2.2) and are therefore not necessary for the definition of the state
of a behavioural component.
The system state is the basic structuring level. The system state at the time a problem
occurs is called critical system state. In the simplest case, this is the time where a constraint
is violated. Starting from critical system states a detailed analysis of the components and
the relation between the components belonging to this state takes place. In the following,
three techniques to analyse the data set are discussed.
Data Representation
A structured representation of the data is essential for all further analysis. The components
and their corresponding logged data belonging to a system state are arranged in a table
according to several appropriate aspects, e.g. components are grouped according to their
activity level and only the data in a certain time interval (e.g. before the crash) will be
displayed (see Fig. 4.20). With this representation, the developer has a structured view of
the data, which helps to detect the irregularities, that indicate the failure source. Then, a
closer look to the implementation of the respective component is possible to find the cause
of the wrong data signal.
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Figure 4.20: Table and graph representation of the behaviour-based network. The table
provides information about the states of each behavioural component in a network belonging
to one system state. The graph view simplifies the understanding. The abbreviations v and av
stand for the control data velocity and angular velocity.
A problem with this basic method is, that more than one problematic spot could be
identified, as data is distributed in the behaviour-based network. In order to find the root
cause of the problem, it is helpful to discover the path of the data inside the network. For
that task the data can be arranged according to the sequence of the components which
can be done with the help of a typed behaviour dependence graph as presented in Sec. 4.1.
Action Analysis
The manual analysis of the structured data set is still a time-consuming task, and expert
knowledge is needed in order to find anomalies. To mitigate the effort, a second technique
is introduced. The basic idea is to automatically distinguish between known (and proved)
and unknown system states.
A simple robot action like drive forward/backward or turn left/right, can be described
as a set of system states. The overall movement of a robot on the other hand, can be
described as sequence of several simple movements. As example, Fig. 4.21 shows a scene
where several way points are marked. Consider a robot task, that is to reach the goal
defined at point 6. The way points 0 and 2 must be included in the robots trajectory
when driving there. To do this, the robot has to drive straight forward, turn left and drive
forward again. These simple movements, so-called basic actions, can also be identified in
more complex scenarios. Deviations from the basic actions can again point to problems in
the network or the component implementation.
The determination of basic action as sequence of system states turns out to be unfeasible.
Environmental influences lead to changes in system states that make it nearly impossible to
identify one and the same state in different situations. Therefore, a more rough definition
of a basic action is chosen
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Figure 4.21: Simple scenario with four way points for the testing of basic drive manoeuvres
Definition 4.5: Basic Action
A basic action is defined by those components, that are active during a robots
action.
At best the collected data of a test run can be reduced to a sequence of basic actions.
States that cannot be assigned to a basic action point to possible failure sources. The
state can for example include additional or less active components. Both give hints to the
developer where to find the cause of the faulty robot behaviour.
This technique is also useful in finding actions that lead to the missing of the goal as
mentioned in the beginning of this section and in Fig. 4.19. For example, assume the
example above (Fig. 4.21) and the case that the robot never reaches point 6. The analysis
of the sequence of basic actions reveals that the movements sticks in the turn left action.
Further inspection of the responsible components may show that the activity and target
rating values are not set correctly.
Another application of this method is to find deviations in the specified system behaviour
without having the robot behave obviously wrong. In the example above, the sequence of
basic actions does not only consist of drive forward, turn left, drive forward. Instead of
the simple turn left manoeuvre, an oscillation between turn right and turn left actions
can be identified. This happens because the robot cannot turn in place and tries to find
the best trajectory under the given constraints. Further interesting insights in the control
network gives the analysis of the components that are active in addition to the behaviours
belonging to a basic action. Both usages give the system developer and also a non-expert
the possibility to gain understanding about the actions inside the complex network.
Action analysis can be automated. Basic actions can be learned by monitoring the data
during execution of the corresponding simple movements. Data from complex test runs
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can then be automatically compared with the data from basic actions. Section 4.3.3 shows
the application of the action analysis on the autonomous robot ravon and introduces a
tool that facilitate the analysis.
Automated Data Analysis
The presented techniques to analyse the big data set collected during a robots test run can
be supported by several automatic data checks. A very useful information for the developer
is the influence of a component inside the network. The component’s influence is equal
to its activity. The higher the activity, the more influence the component has in the
network. In that context an analysis that outputs components sorted according to their
activity value in always active, never active and sporadically active is very useful. The
representation can be done either in the form of a table or with different colours or markers
in the graph structure. Expert knowledge is needed to prove if the classification of the
single components satisfies the requirements. In combination with the action analysis, this
method provides information about the relevance of components for simple robot actions.
Another check refers to signal variability. Constant signals or heavily changing signals
can refer to faulty implemented components. A further, very important analysis task
in the context of behaviour-based systems is to search for oscillations. For the iB2C
it was developed in the diploma thesis of the author [Wilhelm 08] and published in
[Wilhelm 09, Proetzsch 10a]. Because of the competing components, it is possible to
generate an unintended oscillating robot motion. For an autonomous driving robot, this
can for example occur, when the robot faces an obstacle when driving to a goal. The
component responsible for evading the obstacle forces the robot to turn left, where the
one responsible for driving to the goal wants the robot to turn back in order to keep
the shortest path. This results in the robot getting stuck in front of the obstacle and
just turning left and right. Such a situation can be identified in the activity data of a
monitored robot manoeuvre. The automatic check for oscillations in a data set determines
the associated components, the type of data and the point in time where the oscillation
occurs. With this information, the developer can improve the systems functionality.
This section presented several techniques to analyse the data collected in a behaviour-based
control system after the test run execution.
4.3.2 Dynamic Analysis and Representation
Usually, a series of test runs is executed to prove the robots behaviour for the same
subject under different conditions. When using a simulation environment that simulates
the hardware parts of the embedded system, test runs can be performed automatically.
The success or failure is reported and the data can be analysed afterwards as described in
the previous section. Sometimes, it might be useful to survey the execution of a test, for
example, in the case the developer wants to test different implementations and see the
robots reaction. For this purpose, it is useful to not only observe the acting robot, but to
gain insights into the data flow inside the control network.
The finstruct tool (see Sec. 2.4) provides the possibility to survey the state of individual
components by displaying their current activation, activity and target rating value with
coloured bars. Additional information provides the integration of the previously mentioned
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oscillation detection method, which allows to mark oscillating components in the graph
representation of the network. This representation is very useful when wanting to observe
the states of only few components, but can be very challenging for many components,
which might be additionally distributed in different parts of the control network. For that
cases it is useful to chose only those information that is necessary for the situation to test
and display it in an adequate manner.
Consider the previously introduced example that ravon shall reach a goal while avoiding
obstacles lying on its way. As already described, the driving commands stem from the
drive control part of the control network, which can be influenced by commands coming
from the safety control part (see Sec. 4.2.2, Fig. 4.13). An interesting question for the
developer or analyst is, which part of the network is responsible for the robots action
at the current point in time. Both software parts output their activity and control data
which is merged and further processed until it is finally executed by the actuators. The
data can be surveyed using finstruct in an uncomfortable manner, as several parts of
the network need to be observed at the same time.
Figure 4.22: Example for dynamic data representation during test runs of complex systems in
a frame of the mcagui [Gänßinger 11]
The approach used in this thesis utilises the mcagui to solve this task as this tool allows
to visualise the robot in its environment during a (simulated) test run as well as several
user-defined information e.g. data flowing in the system. For the example above it is
preferable to visualise the outputs of the two different parts of the network as well as the
command that actually controls the robot at the current time. Figure 4.22 depicts the
view for the example. The view displays three columns for the three parts of network:
actual state for the final driving command output, target state for the output of the control
part and safety control for the output of the safety control part. Each column is divided
into two aspects (direction and turn) with three states, respectively. During a test run
execution, the coloured diodes indicate the actual output of the groups. This abstract
view provides a good overview of the current state of the system in respect to the velocity
and turning commands. It can be easily adapted to show other information according to a
certain problem. Three steps serve as guideline for the adaptation to new problems
1. Identify the relevant information
2. Monitor data (and process them if necessary)
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3. Display data in gui
This representation of dynamic data supports the developer in understanding system
behaviour and can speed up fault detection.
4.3.3 Tooling and Application Examples
For the execution of test cases in a simulation environment the Test Automation Runtime
System (taurus) is used [Proetzsch 10b, Schäfer 11]. It allows for the automatic execution
of several different test runs, checking the violation of given constraints, monitoring the
progress and journalise the state of the control system. taurus is itself implemented as
a behaviour network which is docked in between the robot control system and the user
interface (see Fig. 4.23). From this position taurus can control and monitor the system
by setting properties according to a special test run and in turn observing data in the
control system.
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Figure 4.23: Test case execution and evaluation using the taurus tool and different analysis
methods (adapted from [Schäfer 11])
Test cases consist of a scenario description containing information about the environment
and a mission the robot shall accomplish. In the case of driving robots, one or several
paths can be defined for each mission containing a sequence of way points. Additionally,
system properties that shall be supervised during a test run can be defined as so-called
invariants. They can be defined for all recorded data. taurus monitors the violation of
invariants, logs the respective data and uses them for a test report, created after each
test run. Examples for invariants are time-limits, distances to obstacles, that must be
kept, etc. The test report summarises the results of a test run. Among others, it holds
information of the elapsed time, and the time stamp of invariant violations.
In the context of this thesis, the robot control system is additionally equipped with several
logging units to collect the data for the static analysis as described in Sec. 4.3.1 and
the report of taurus is extended to provide additional information. Furthermore, the
4.3. Data Analysis 73
Figure 4.24: taurus view in the mcagui. The relevant test parameters are displayed (run
number, configuration number and repeat number, as well as the number of violations in the
current test run and the number of all violations in the already executed test runs). Additionally
the configuration of the robot is displayed.
evaluation of the test runs is modified to be performed in real-time instead of once at the
end of the test run. This enables the dynamic analysis and the visualisation of the current
state of a test run for the user.
To exemplify the application of tools in combination with the previously described action
analysis method, a safety property of the off-road robot ravon shall be checked. The
requirement can be writen as The robot shall not hit obstacles or rather in more detail
The robot shall hold a distance of at least 50 cm to obstacles. For the complete definition
of test cases, different paths (including different drive manoeuvres) and different robot
configurations are pretended, additionally.
In this section, the following test case (including three test runs) has been chosen:
1. The robot shall drive to point 4, which lies straight ahead in relation to the robots
position and orientation (see Fig. 4.21).
2. An overhanging obstacle is positioned in the middle of the direct path
3. Invariant: distance to obstacles greater then 50 cm
4. Different configurations
(a) All sensors work
(b) 3D Laser Scanner fails
(c) Only bumper system works
The data to be monitored have been chosen according to this test case. As the fulfilment
of the requirement is related to the drive control of the robot, control data regarding the
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velocity and turning movements have been monitored. Furthermore, behavioural data of
the components responsible for changes in the mentioned control data have been recorded.
After the definition of the test case and the data to be monitored, the test cases have
been executed by taurus. Additionally, finstruct was used to supervise the state of
the behaviour-based network and to visualise oscillations.
The taurus report revealed an invariant violation in test runs 2 and 3. For this case,
a comparison between the three test runs based on the sequence of basic actions is an
appropriate procedure to find differences in the robot manoeuvres and possibly hints to
the failure source.
As mentioned before, the system states belonging to a basic action can be determined
automatically. For that purpose, the analyser tool has been developed in the scope
of this work which determines the system states during simple test runs in an empty
scenario. The tool searches for components that are active during the whole test run.
These components are the relevant components for the respective basic action and are
stored together with a user given action name in the so-called action database. The basic
actions to be identified for the presented test case are straight forward (SF), turn left (TL)
and turn right (TR). They has been determined for all three configurations as ravon uses
different drive modi (see 2.3), which are implemented in different behavioural networks
and therefore using different components.
Once the database was filled with all basic actions, the monitored data from the test run
with the obstacle could be compared with them. This can also be done automatically with
the Analyser tool. It compares every system state with the actions stored in the action
library and outputs the name of the most suitable one. Additional active components are
also displayed.
For configuration 4a) of the test case, the result of the action analysis was a sequence
of SF, TL, TR and SF actions. For configuration 4b) and 4c), only the SF action could
be determined. A more detailed analysis of the system state at the point of time of
the collision with the obstacle revealed that no components responsible for evasion were
active. Further analysis of the internal implementation of the corresponding components
discovered that either the sensor (planar laser scanner) could not detect the obstacle, or
the faulty implementation of the component that evaluates the sensor data can cause this
fault.
The example showed the applicability of the presented analysis concept on a real-world
task. The identification of critical parts of the system that are responsible for wrong
robot behaviour is supported by the developed methods and tools facilitate their usage.
The automation of the action analysis process allows for analysing test cases in less time,
which enables the developer to execute more tests. This contributes to the detection of
more failures and additionally, leads to a better understanding of the system’s internal
behaviour.
4.4 Discussion
In this chapter several techniques to analyse behaviour-based robotic systems with respect
to their reliability and safety requirements were introduced and applied to the autonomous
robot ravon to demonstrate their use. A fundamental difference to monolithic control
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programs is the graph-like structure of behaviour-based control software. This offers
the possibility to use standard graph operations like the strongly connected components
algorithm for cycle detection. In Sec. 4.1, several methods were presented which are used
to gain knowledge about the system or to represent the system in a way that the developer
or analyst can easily distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. One of these
is the typed behaviour dependence graph, which allows to represent only those parts of
the network that transfer the respective information. This representation is the basis for
several other analysis methods. As the behavioural components of the behaviour-based
network have a standardised interface, behavioural data like activity and target rating
can be automated traced accurately. For control data arises the problem, that only the
full control vector can be traced through the network which can contain an arbitrary
number of data. The tracing of only one control factor like velocity cannot be automated
easily, as long as there exist no naming rules for the in- and outputs connection points
of the behavioural components. However, for correct designed behaviour-based systems,
this should not be a problem as different aspects of control are encapsulated in different
parts of the network where the control vectors only include information relevant to the
respective aspect.
In Sec. 4.2, fault tree analysis as method to analyse safety of a system is considered. The
application of fault tree analysis to engineering systems is a well-known and widely used
technique. It provides deep insight into the system behaviour, shows the relationships of
components and allows to concentrate on single specific failures. Several tools exist that
support the user in the creation and analysis process. Research is also done for applying
fault tree analysis to software systems. The structured composition of behaviour-based
control networks facilitates the generation of fault trees. In Sec. 4.2.1 fault tree models for
standard behaviours and fusion behaviours are introduced. Together with the behaviour
dependence graphs presented in Sec. 4.1 it could be shown that it is very easy to create a
fault tree for a behaviour-based network. The interfaces between hardware and software
are automatically integrated as data exchange is only done via dedicated input and output
ports. This allows for gaining good insight into the relationships of hardware and software
events. But, as could be noticed in the example in Sec. 4.2.2, there are also problematic
aspects of fault tree analysis. One is the modelling of fusion behaviours. Here, system
expert knowledge is needed in order to find out the correct combination between the
connected behavioural components. This makes an automatic fault tree creation difficult
to realise.
A further, well-known problem is that a fault tree grows very fast and thereby cannot be
visualised in a suitable manner. This can be solved partially by displaying only smaller
parts of the tree and marking the connections to the overall tree, or, in the special case
of behaviour-based software systems, omitting the inner structure of a group and just
integrating the groups interface as standard behavioural component in the tree. This in
turn leads to problems when trying to understand the overall relationship of events. The
visualisation of fault trees and analysis results for embedded systems in a manner that
fulfils the needs of system engineers and safety analysts is an open research task. This
problem was also subject of a research project utilizing ravon as demonstrator. The results
are published in [AlTarawneh 14, AlTarawneh 15]. The intelligent visualization of cut
sets is subject to the work of [Al-Zokari 10, Al-Zokari 12]. Both visualisation techniques
aim at the combined representation of hardware and fault tree components, respectively.
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Software is mainly unattended. Due to the standardised modelling approach of behavioural
components into fault tree elements presented in the thesis at hand, the mapping can be
done vice-versa to visualise the analysis results in the network representation.
Fault tree analysis is a good strategy to reveal dependencies between components. The
presented method allows to execute the analysis for hardware and software in one procedure.
For large systems as the ravon example is, it might not be the analysis technique of choice
to make a statement about the systems reliability or safety property as the fault tree
creation is time-expensive and the risk of missing relevant parts is high. However, fault
tree analysis can be established in combination with other analysis methods, which require
detailed knowledge about the interdependencies in specific parts of the whole system.
The evaluation of data monitored during the execution of a test case was the topic of
Sec. 4.3. Testing is, despite of its deficiencies, the method of choice to evaluate the
robots performance. Though, the analysis of the monitored data is system dependent and
needs expert knowledge in order to find the relevant information that help to improve
the overall system. The techniques introduced in this section demonstrate a first step
in automating the analysis for the subject of behaviour-based systems. The presented
methods and tools assist the developer or analyst to find the root causes of failures and,
furthermore, they provide the possibility to analyse the system also for non-experts. They
help to gain understanding about the system interdependencies and to improve the systems
functionality and allow to make statements about the reliability of a system by using
(quantitative) fault tree analysis or testing (calculating the mean-time-to-problems or
mean-time-to-failures) and to find the causes of failures using (qualitative) fault tree
analysis and data-analysis methods.
5. Formal Verification of
Behaviour-Based Systems
In contrast to testing, which tries to find errors in the control system in a special test
case, formal verification assures that a system fully satisfies a given specification in all
situations. Especially for robotic systems, that act in a natural environment, it is a
major task to ensure the fulfilment of several safety requirements. Already in 1995, the
authors of [Espiau 95b] discussed extensively the need for specification and verification
and former approaches evolving from the computer science area to the robotics area. In
[van de Molengraft 11] published in [Corke 11], this topic is also discussed with a focus
on the special challenges that come with robotic systems, e.g. the interaction with their
environment.
Several formal verification techniques exist. Among these are deductive methods using
theorem provers and model checking methods. Model checking techniques have already
been applied in the development process of robot control systems to gain correct robot
behaviour, e.g. in [Webster 11, Lowry 97] (see also Sec. 3.3). They offer two significant
advantages over other techniques: First, model checking is a highly automated process,
which reduces the verification effort. Second, model checking yields counterexamples and
witnesses, respectively, which help finding the cause of errors.
The reason why formal verification is not commonly used for the validation of robotic
systems is the high complexity. Software and the corresponding requirements must be
formalised in a first step. This can usually only be done by verification experts and can
take a lot of time. For large and complex systems, it is often not possible to fully formalise
them. A further open problem in this context is the formal modelling of the combination
of hardware and software parts and their interaction with the environment. In a second
step, properties are proven to be correct for the given system model by a chosen model
checker. The last step includes the interpretation of the results which needs an experienced
user as well.
This leads to the following requirements that shall be addressed in this thesis:
• Automation of the formal model creation process
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• Combination of hardware, software and environmental interactions into the formal
model
• Tool support for the interpretation of the model checker’s results
In the work at hand, behaviour-based systems are in the focus, which are used to realise
complex robot behaviour. The central aspect in these systems is the network structure,
where simple behaviours are interconnected to achieve a more sophisticated one. This
leads to the approach used in this thesis and described in [Armbrust 12, Armbrust 14a]
to focus on the formal verification of the interconnections of behaviours.
As connections between components must be programmed manually by the software
developer, failures (missing connections, connections to wrong components/ports) are
highly possible. A formal representation of the network structure is achieved using the
input language of the Uppaal toolbox. The representation comprises the components,
described via their common interface (see Sec. 2.2), and the connections between them.
The Uppaal model checking toolbox has been chosen because of its powerful graphical
user interface, a stand-alone verifier that can also be called from the command line and on
remote machines and the possibility of saving automata in an XML-based format. The
latter two features are important for the automation of the verification process and the
integration in the finstruct tool.
The work described in [Armbrust 12, Armbrust 13b, Armbrust 14b] focused on the inner
structure of the (software) control system. Environmental interactions as well as the
hardware of the robotic system is disregarded, although they have a great influence of
the fulfilment of safety requirements. Intuitive questions like “How many/Which sensors
must fail to lead to wrong robot behaviour?” or “Does the evasion behaviour get active in
case of obstacles?” represent important safety problems, but they cannot be answered
by verifying only the software system. A robot can fail for example when sensor data is
not correctly delivered to corresponding safety behaviours because of missing connections.
A further interesting task is the verification of robot behaviour under the assumption of
failing hardware. A possibility to integrate major hardware parts and their connections to
the control software as well as environmental situations is therefore a crucial task.
The work at hand presents a novel concept that allows to integrate the sensor processing
chain and environmental situations into the model checking process. Sensors and environ-
mental situations are formally defined and integrated into the system model in order to
be checked together. To simplify the verification process as much as possible, automated
processes and graphical support is additionally developed.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 gives a short introduction into model
checking and the Uppaal toolbox. The basic approach of formally modelling a behaviour-
based system is described in Sec. 5.2. In Sec. 5.3 the novel concept integrating sensors and
the environment of the robot into the formal model is presented. Section 5.4, gives several
examples on the usage of model checking on the behaviour model. Here, the extension to
the finstruct tool to support the verification process graphically is described as well.
Quantitative aspects like computation time and memory consumption are discussed in
Sec. 5.5. Sec. 5.6 discusses the application of model checking to behaviour-based systems.
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5.1 Model Checking
Model checking [Clarke 99] is a formal verification technique that proves a given property
of a system by systematically exploring the state space. Figure 5.1 depicts the process of
model checking. A model of the system and a corresponding property are given to the
model checker. If the property is fulfilled, the model checker returns a notification and the
next property can be checked, if not, a counterexample is provided and the system must
be revised.
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Figure 5.1: The general model checking process
A formal definition of the model checking problem based on the definition given in
[Clarke 08] is
Definition 5.1: Model Checking Problem
Let M be a Kripke structure (i.e. a state-transition graph). Let f be a formula of
temporal logic (i.e. the property). Find all states s of M such that M, s |= f .
Naturally spoken, model checking determines whether M is a model for the formula f .
The system model is given as a Kripke structure which can be seen as kind of automaton.
The following is a definition of a simple Kripke structure based on [Clarke 01].
Definition 5.2: Kripke Structure
A Kripke structure over a set of atomic propositions A is a tuple K = (S,R, L, I)
where
S is the set of states
R ⊆ S2 is the set of transitions
I ⊆ S is the non-empty set of initial states
L : S → 2A labels each state by a set of atomic propositions
Temporal logics are introduced for the specification of system properties. They use atomic
statements and boolean operators, such as conjunction and disjunction to formulate a
property. Temporal logics differ in the number and meaning of their operators. The
widespread used logic for model checking tasks is the CTL*. It is a superset of the
computation tree logic (CTL) and the linear temporal logic (LTL). Its formulae are based
on computation trees that can be extracted from a Kripke structure. For CTL* there exist
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two path quantifiers. The universal quantifier is used to express that a formula holds for
all computation paths, whereas the existential quantifier expresses that there exist at least
one path where the formula holds.
1. A: for every path
2. E: there exist a path
Path quantifiers can prefix a combination the five basic temporal operators (p, q: formulae):
1. Xp: p holds in the next state of the path
2. Fp: p holds in some state of the path
3. Gp: p holds in all states of the path
4. pUq: p holds until q holds
5. pRq: q holds up to the state and including the first state where p holds.
The combination of path quantifiers (A,E) and temporal operators (F,G) yields the
following cases:
1. AGp: p holds in all states of all paths
2. EGp: p holds in all states of some path
3. AFp: p holds in some state of all paths
4. EFp: p holds in some state of some paths
In other logics the path quantifiers A and E are written as ∀ and ∃, while the temporal
operators F and G are written as ♦ and .
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Figure 5.2: Computation tree example
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An important advantage of model checking is that it provides traces for a witness or a
counterexample, which help to find problems and failures in the system. Witnesses are
given in the case an existential property is evaluated to true, counterexamples are shown
when a universal property is evaluated to false. Traces represent a path in the tree and
therefore consist of states and transitions. Figure 5.2 gives an example of a computation
tree. A witness for the fulfilment of the formula EGp is given by the path S0→ S1→ S3.
In contrast, the formula AGp does not hold. A counterexample is the path S0→ S2.
There exist a great number of model checking tools that differ among other things in their
input language and their graphical interface. For the work at hand, the Uppaal toolbox
is used. Its basic features are described in the following.
5.1.1 The UPPAAL Toolbox
Uppaal is an integrated tool for modelling, validation and verification of real-time systems
modelled as networks of timed automata. It is developed at the Department of Information
Technology at Uppsala University in Sweden and the Department of Computer Science at
Aalborg University in Denmark.
A Uppaal system is a set of interacting timed automata. The basic definition is given in
the following, it is based on the one given in [Behrmann 06].
Definition 5.3: Timed Automaton
A timed automaton is a tuple (L, l0, C, A,E, I), where L is a set of locations, l0 ∈ L
is the initial location, and C is a set of clocks. B (C) is a set of conjunctions over
simple conditions of the form x ⊗ y or x − y ⊗ c, where x, y ∈ C, c ∈ N, and
⊗ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}. Furthermore, A is a set of actions, co-actions, and the internal
τ -action, E ⊆ L× A×B (C)× 2C × L is a set of edges between locations with an
action, a guard, and a set of clocks to be reset, and I : L→ B (C) assigns invariants
to locations.
A Uppaal system is build up of a set of automata, which are parametrised instantiations
of templates. Additionally, a system can have a set of global declarations of constants,
variables and channels. Automata consist of a number of locations (one of them must be
marked as initial location), which are connected via edges. Locations can have the special
property committed or urgent. The latter implies that time does not pass when the system
is in such a location. Committed locations are even more restrictive. If one automaton is
in a committed location, this state must be left with the next transition.
Edges can be labelled with guards (side-effect free Boolean expressions to determine
whether an edge is enabled), updates (assignments), and synchronisations. Detailed
information about the Uppaal toolbox can be found in [Behrmann 06] and on the official
website1. The modelling language of Uppaal extends the above given definition of timed
automata with several, additional features. In the following a list of those features relevant
to this thesis is described.
Templates: Templates are defined by a set of parameters of any type. They are instanti-
ated in the process declaration.
1Uppaal website: http://www.uppaal.org/
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Constants: Constants are of type integer and cannot be modified
Bounded integer variables: Guards, invariants, and assignments may contain expres-
sions ranging over bounded integer variables. They are declared as integers with a
minimal and maximal bound (int[min,max] name)
Binary synchronisation channels: Channels are used to synchronise different automata.
They are declared as chan c. Sending edges are labelled with c!, receiving edges
with c?.
Broadcast channels: Automata sending over a broadcast channel must synchronise with
any receiver that can synchronise in its current state. Broadcast sending is never
blocking.
Urgent locations: Time does not pass in an urgent location
Committed locations: More restrictive than urgent. At least one of the outgoing edges
of a committed location must be taken.
Arrays: Arrays can be defined for clocks, channels, constants and integer variables.
Initialisers: Integer variables and arrays of integer variables are initialised with initialisers.
User functions: User functions allow to define functions either globally or locally to
templates.
(a) ExampleAutomaton1 (b) ExampleAutomaton2
Figure 5.3: Two communicating automata. Initial locations are marked with a double border,
committed locations with a C. Channel names are coloured light blue (c1, c2), guards are green
(v1 ≥ 0, v2 == 5) and updates are blue (v2 = 5, v1 = 1)
In Fig. 5.3 an example of two communicating Uppaal automata is given to illustrate the
main elements used in the work at hand. The locations of all automata, clock values, and
the values of variables define the state of a system.
The properties to check on the system’s model need to be formulated in a formal language.
Uppaal uses a simplified version of the Timed Computation Tree Logic (tctl) introduced
in [Alur 93]. It allows to specify path formulae and state formulae, but does not support
the nesting of path formulae. State formulae are used to describe individual states of the
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system using side-effect free expressions, e.g. v2 == 5 to evaluate the value of the variable
v2, or ExampleAutomaton.Loc_2 to evaluate if a particular process (ExampleAutomaton1)
is in a given location (Loc_2).
Path formulae can be classified into reachability, safety, and liveness properties.
Reachability Properties: A reachability property checks if there exists a path starting
from the initial state that eventually satisfies the state formula ϕ along this path.
This is written as E♦ϕ or E <> ϕ in Uppaal.
Safety Properties: Safety properties are used to express properties of the form “some-
thing bad will never happen”. They are written in the form Aϕ or A[ ]ϕ meaning
that a state formula ϕ will always be fulfilled in all reachable states. Another
possibility is to ask whether there is a maximal path on which ϕ is always fullfilled
(Eφ). A maximal path is an infinite path or a path with no outgoing transition in
the last state.
Liveness Properties: To evaluate whether something will eventually happen, liveness
properties are used. They can be written as A♦φ, meaning that φ is eventually
fulfilled. Another possibility is to the check whether ϕ leads to (or response) ψ,
written as ϕ ψ or ϕ --> ψ in Uppaal.
Figure 5.4: The path formulae available in Uppaal. The yellow marked locations are those in
which the formula ϕ holds. Bold edges depict the paths the formulae evaluate on. [Behrmann 06]
The available path formulae are depicted in Fig. 5.4.
The Uppaal toolbox features a graphical user interface with three views, the editor, the
simulator, and the verifier view. In the editor it is possible to define automata and declare
variables and functions. The simulator offers the possibility to simulate the resulting
system, see the values of variables and states of automata. The user has the choice to select
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the transitions to be taken or use a random simulation. The simulator view also enables
the read-in of files, containing traces given by the verifier. The verifier serves the purpose
to type in queries, verify them on the model and show the results. The tool is extended
about two new views, named concrete simulator (added in version 4.1.15 in 2103) which
offers the possibility to simulate a system with concrete values of clocks and yggdrasil
(added in version 4.1.19 in 2015) for test case generation. Both views are not relevant to
the work at hand and are therefore not further explained. Furthermore, Uppaal offers
a stand-alone command line verifier, verifyta, which is more suitable to use with larger
applications. The verification can be done on a remote unix machine. The model files
and query files produced by the Uppaal toolbox can be used with the command line tool
and the resulting trace can be read back.
5.2 Formal Modelling of iB2C Networks
In the approach used in this thesis, the formal modelling of behaviour-based systems
is broken down to the modelling of single behavioural components and the connections
between those models. This allows to automate the modelling process for different (parts
of) robot systems. As the interaction of behavioural components is the central point in
the creation of complex robot behaviour, the focus of the verification described here, lies
in the interconnections as well. The transfer function ~F expressing the inner functionality
of a behavioural component is not integrated in the model checking process.
Single components are described via their interface of incoming, outgoing and internal
behavioural signals as described in Chap. 2.2. The influence of the incoming data,
stimulation s and inhibition i, on the outputs activity a and target rating r and the
internal activation value ι is modelled via a combination of five interconnected automata,
one for each behavioural signal.
The automata are created according to the definition of the automata used in the Uppaal
toolbox (see Sec. 5.1.1). As Uppaal allows only discrete values, the range [0, 1] of
the signals is abstracted to the set {0, 1}. These and several other design decisions are
extensively discussed in [Armbrust 14a].
The following sections give an overview of the modelling of standard behaviours and their
interconnections and a detailed description of the extensions that were made in the context
of this work related to the integration of hardware like sensors into the formal model.
5.2.1 Standard Behaviour Modelling
A standard iB2C behaviour is modelled via a set of five automata named: Stimulation-
Interface, InhibitionInterface, ActivationCalculation, ActivityCalculation and
TargetRatingCalculation (see also [Armbrust 12, Armbrust 14a]).
The StimulationInterface as shown in Fig. 5.5 models the stimulation of a behavioural
component. It contains two main states representing a stimulated behaviour or an
unstimulated behaviour. The distinction between only those two locations is due to the fact
that the decision to use discrete values is made. This means that a behavioural component
can only be stimulated or not, but it cannot be partially stimulated.
When the automaton receives a stimulation changed signal (s_changed?) it sets the global
stimulation value variable (s_value) to 1 and sends another signal (s_changed_internal!)
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Stimulated
s_changed_internal!
Unstimulated
s_changed?
s_changed_internal!
s_changed?
processing = false
s_value=1,
processing = true
s_value=0,
processing = true
processing = false
Figure 5.5: StimulationInterface of a behaviour-based component
to signalise its current state to the activation automaton. The same procedure is done
when the automaton receives another stimulation changed signal, setting the stimulation
value variable back to 0. As Uppaal allows only one synchronisation per transition, one
committed location is added on both transitions, respectively. The use of committed
locations is a common workaround and adds no further value to the model. As mentioned
in Sec. 5.1.1 transitions from committed locations have precedence over transitions from
normal locations, implying the automaton will transition to the next location before any
other “normal” transition is taken. To exclude those intermediate locations from the results
of queries a processing flag is introduced, which is set to true whenever a committed
location is entered and back to false when the committed location is left. This technique
is used in most of the other automata, too.
The basic functionality of the InhibitionInterface automaton is similar to the one of the
StimulationInterface. It receives an incoming inhibition signal, updates the variable
indicating the inhibition status of the behavioural component and sends out a signal to
the ActivationCalculation. Besides these basic similarities, the InhibitionInterface
must be treated specially, because of the possibility that a component can be inhibited by
more than one other. Therefore, the automaton for the inhibition interface is generated
in dependence of the number of connected behavioural components. Figure 5.6 shows
the automaton for two connected components. Because of the abstraction to the discrete
values {0, 1} the automaton can be in location Uninhibited where the global variable
i_value is 0 or in a location indicating an inhibited behavioural component (locations
Inhibited_by_First, Inhibited_by_Second, and Inhibited_by_Both for the example
automaton). In the latter case, the set of locations indicating an inhibited component is
needed to remember the correct number of inhibiting components. In all of these locations,
the variable i_value is 1. It is set only once when the first inhibiting signal is received.
At the same time a signal is send to the corresponding activation automaton. When the
last connected behavioural component changes its inhibition value back to no inhibition,
the variable is set back to 0, the signal is sent again and the automaton comes back to the
start location.
The signals from the stimulation automaton and inhibition automaton are received by
the ActivationCalculation automaton of the behavioural component, shown in Fig. 5.7.
In dependence of the global variables indicating the stimulation value and the inhibition
value the automaton is set back to the start location Inactivated or transfers to location
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i1_changed?
i1_changed?
i0_changed?
i0_changed?
i_changed_internal!
processing = false
i_value=0,
processing = true
i_value=1,
processing = truei_value=1,processing = true
processing = false
processing = false
Inhibited_by_Second
i0_changed?
Inhibited_by_Both
Inhibited_by_First
i0_changed?
i1_changed?
i_changed_internal!
i_changed_internal!
i_changed_internal!
i1_changed?
Uninhibited
i_value=0,
processing = trueprocessing = false
Figure 5.6: InhibitionInterface of a behaviour-based component that is inhibited by two
others
Activated. In the latter case, where the stimulation value is 1 and the inhibition value
is 0, the change of activation is signalled via iota_changed to its corresponding activity
automaton. The automaton transfers back to the start location Inactivated if either the
stimulation or the inhibition change their respective values again.
While the before mentioned automata trigger automata corresponding to the same be-
haviour, the signal coming from the ActivityCalculation automaton is sent to the
stimulation or inhibition automata belonging to other behaviours. Figure 5.8 shows the
ActivityCalculation automaton, which has three main states: Inactive, in the case
the behavioural component is not activated, Inactive_but_Activated for the case the
automaton received an activation changed signal from the activation automaton and
Active, for the case the component is both, activated and active. The latter is reached
non-deterministically as the activity of a behavioural component is calculated internally
dependent on different input conditions e.g. sensor data or other control values, which are
not modelled for basic behavioural components. This abstraction is sufficient in most cases,
as the focus lies on the verification of the network and the flow of the behavioural data.
In this context it is only interesting to verify the possible impact of an active component
inside the network. Although, for some cases it is useful to refine this automaton. An
example is described in Sec. 5.2.2.
The last behavioural variable is modelled by a very simple automaton, called Target-
RatingCalculation, containing only two states indicating satisfaction or dissatisfaction of
a behaviour (see Fig. 5.9). The states are chosen non-deterministically, where a r_changed
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Activated
Inactivated
iota_changed!
s_changed_internal?(s_value==0) || (i_value==1)
i_changed_internal?
s_changed_internal?
i_changed_internal?
iota_changed!
(s_value==1) && (i_value==0)
processing = false
processing = true
processing = true
processing = trueprocessing = false
processing = true
processing = false
Figure 5.7: Template for the ActivationCalculation of a behaviour-based component
Inactive
Active
Inactive_but_Activated
iota_changed?
a_changed!a_changed!
a_changed!iota_changed?
iota_changed?
a_value = 0
a_value = 1
processing = true
a_value = 0,
processing = false
Figure 5.8: Template for the ActivityCalculation of a behaviour-based component
signal is sent to the connected automata of other components and a global target rating
value variable is set to either 1 or 0 indicating the current status. This abstraction is
based on the same background as for the activity automaton. The target rating value is
calculated internally in the behavioural component and can therefore not be modelled.
Formal models of iB2C behaviour networks are generated automatically, where every
behavioural component is modelled as a set of the five above described automata. The
interconnection between the models of the components is achieved by renaming the channels.
Figure 5.10 shows an example. Here the previously used dummy names, a_changed! in
Fig. 5.8 and s_changed? in Fig. 5.5 are replaced by behaviour-name_a_changed which
at the same time improves the readability as the user directly knows which behavioural
component is connected to the stimulating input.
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r_changed!
Unsatisfied
r_changed!
r_value = 0
Satisfied
r_value = 1
Figure 5.9: Template for the TargetRatingCalculation of a behaviour-based component
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Figure 5.10: Example for the modelling of a connection between two behavioural components,
where component B0 stimulates B1 with it activity. The names of the synchronisation are
adapted to the component names.
5.2.2 Special Behaviour Modelling
The iB2C networks contain not only standard behavioural components but also several
special ones that are e.g. fusion behaviours and behavioural groups. See Chap. 2.2 for
details about them. The modelling of a fusion behaviour is a bit tricky as an arbitrary
number of behaviours can be connected to it and the calculation of its activity depends
on all inputs and the implemented fusion function. The details of the modelling of
fusion behaviours can be found in [Armbrust 15]. The modelling of behavioural groups is
explained in the following paragraph.
For the modelling of groups exist two possibilities. One is to model the group as one
single element in the network and hide the information inside. As a behavioural group
has the same interface as a standard behavioural component, the model of a group is
the same as the model of a single component. The second is to include the behavioural
components inside a group into the surrounding network. In this case the group information
is skipped, which means, the network of components and inner groups is modelled as a
flat structure. For the work at hand, both possibilities are used according to the given
task. The representation as a single behavioural component reduces the model size, which
can be very important for large networks. On the other hand, the inner structure of the
group cannot be verified in this case, which could be necessary for some queries.
Another special component, important for the work at hand are so-called safety behaviours
(sb). These components process sensor data and calculate their activity and target rating
in dependence of outer incidents. As an example, a behavioural component in the safety
layer of a robots control system responsible for slowing down the robot will get active in
cases where a front sensor detects an obstacle. It will calculate the desired drive velocity
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Figure 5.11: Template for the SBActivityCalculation of a safety behaviour. The pink
coloured locations and transitions mark the differences to the ActivityCalculation template
of a standard behavioural component.
of the robot and inhibit other components that send other driving commands, for example
a “Drive to Goal” behaviour. The target rating will be close to 1 as long as the obstacle is
close to the robot and will be set back to 0 when the obstacle is passed.
In this example, it becomes clear, that the modelling of the activity and the target rating
need to be adapted to the special properties of a safety behaviour. That means, the
automaton must react to outer signals. Figure 5.11 shows the extended SBActivity-
Calculation template. The edge from location Inactive_but_Activated to location
Active is refined, so that the a_changed signal is not send non-deterministically anymore
but only after receiving an obstacle_detected signal. Additionally, a new location is
added which represents the state that an obstacle is detected but the safety behaviour
is not activated. From that location, the automaton traverses to location Active when
the activation of the behaviour changes. The newly added location Triggered_but_not_-
Activated should never be reached as safety behaviours should always be activated to
ensure a safe robot behaviour.
Figure 5.12: Template for the SBTargetRatingCalculation of a safety behaviour. The
pink coloured locations and transitions mark the differences to the TargetRatingCalculation
template of a standard behavioural component.
The modelling of a safety behaviours target rating is done in a similar way (see Fig. 5.12).
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The previously non-deterministically taken transitions are now triggered by an obstacle_detected
signal, representing the fact, that a safety behaviour is unsatisfied as long as an obstacle
exist and satisfied in the other case.
The generation of the obstacle_detected signal is achieved by including the whole sensor
chain the robot is working with, into the formal model. This will be explained in detail in
the following section.
5.3 Including Environmental Influences in the Model
Checking Process
Model checking is most often applied to hardware models or software models. A combina-
tion is usually neglected, which is, in the case of embedded systems, done by assuming
perfect sensing and acting when verifying the software system. As especially robotic
systems permanently interact with their (changing) environment, the need to check the
overall system, also in the presence of hardware failures, is obvious.
Several papers address this topic using different modelling approaches as basis. For
example, [Johnson 11, Johnson 13, Johnson 15, Lahijanian 10] use robot controllers, that
are automatically synthesised out of a set of specified formal properties. These synthesised
systems are guaranteed to meet their specified properties under the assumption of perfect
sensors and actuators. Johnson et al. relax this assumption in order to analyse the
probability that the synthesised robot controller satisfies a set of high-level specifications
in the presence of sensor and actuator errors. They define models for the robot controller,
the environment behaviour and the sensor error, combine them and analyse the resulting
model with a parametric and a probabilistic model checker. [Lahijanian 10] consider
disturbances in sensors and actuators in their analysis to find a synthesis algorithm that
satisfies the specification with the highest probability.
In [Webster 14], an approach similar to the one used in the work at hand serves as basis
for the verification process. A specified system is modelled in the Process Meta-Language
promela, which is the input language for model checker spin [Holzmann 97]. The authors
additionally model the robots environment to be able to verify specifications with respect
to the robots situation. In contrast to Johnsons work and the approach presented in the
following, the authors do not consider the actual hardware components and their possible
errors.
The approach presented in this thesis is published in [Kiekbusch 14] and [Kiekbusch 15].
The focus lies on the interface between the hardware (sensors) and the software (safety
behaviours, that react on sensor data). This enables to verify the correct connection of
sensor data into the system. Additionally, the possibility to include an arbitrary number
of failure sources in the sensor chain is modelled. To simplify the definition of queries,
a so-called scenario automaton is introduced which allows to specify the environment
conditions for a special scenario in an easy manner. In Sec. 5.4 tool support for the
generation of corresponding queries is introduced.
The following subsections give a detailed description of the integration of sensors into the
formal model of the behaviour-based software system.
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5.3.1 Sensor Integration
For the integration of sensor information into the formal model of the control system,
detailed knowledge about the sensor processing chain is needed. In the work at hand, the
control-driven sensor processing chain as described in Sec. 2.3.2 is used as basis.
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Figure 5.13: Flow of sensor data from the real sensor to the controlling behavioural component
inside the network
The overall goal of sensor processing is to provide the data needed for different navigation
tasks in an appropriate manner. For this, the data from the diverse sensors have to be
composed and put into an abstract view for further access. Figure 5.13 depicts the flow
of data. Starting from the raw data sensed by the real sensor and saved in a grid map,
selected and processed data are combined in a so-called virtual sensor which provides the
data to a safety behaviour.
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Figure 5.14: Abstract view of the sensor processing chain depicting the relation between
environment, real sensors, virtual sensors, and safety behaviours
Since data from a real sensor can be processed in several different ways according to
special properties or processing algorithms, there may exist multiple virtual sensors per
real sensor. In turn, virtual sensors can provide their data to several safety behaviours.
This leads to the abstract view given in Fig. 5.14. In this representation, grid maps are
neglected as they belong to the real sensor from a software view. Instead, the environment
is added as trigger for sensor events.
For the formal verification real sensors and virtual sensors are modelled as finite state
automata to get integrated into the formal model of the control system. Additional failure
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automata are included to model failure states. The modelling procedure for the two
links in the sensor processing chain will be explained in detail in the following sections.
Furthermore, a so-called ScenarioAutomaton is introduced, which is used to define the
scenario in which a system property will be checked.
Scenario-
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SensorFailure-
Automaton
SensorFailure-
Automaton
RealSensor-
Automaton
VirtualSensor-
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Stimulation-
Interface
Inhibition-
Interface
Activation-
Calculation
SBActivity-
Calculation
SBTargetRating-
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Figure 5.15: The dark blue boxes mark the components that must be formally modelled as
automata in order to integrate sensor information into the system model. For the behavioural
component, the models for the behavioural signals activity and target rating must be adapted.
Figure 5.15 depicts the different automata that are needed to model the sensor chain.
For the modelling of a safety behaviour, the automata modelling the activity and target
rating have to be adapted as described in the previous section. As mentioned before, the
modelling of grid maps is neglected in this approach. This decision was made, as they
would be represented only as another simple failure automaton indicating whether the
data is recorded correctly or not. They add no further connection to the model that need
to be verified for the whole system.
5.3.2 The Virtual Sensor Automaton
In the concept of sensor processing used as basis for the modelling process described in
this work (see 5.3.1) virtual sensors serve as abstraction layer between the map including
all data coming from the real sensors and the software layer operating on the sensor
information. A virtual sensor covers an area around the robot with the data coming
from this special part of the grid map. As there can be several processing algorithms for
the data, there may exist more than one virtual sensor for a certain area (e.g. obstacle
detection algorithms, water detection algorithm, unfiltered data).
5.3.2.1 Preliminary Modelling Ideas
In the modelling process every virtual sensor is mapped to an instance of a Virtual-
SensorTemplate. On the one hand, this assures that the data flows correctly (from real
sensors to safety behaviours) as every safety behaviour acts on the data of one virtual
sensor. On the other hand possible programming errors can be modelled individually as
every virtual sensor stands for a special algorithm, which could possibly be incorrect.
There exist several possibilities to model failures and failure states of a virtual sensor
(implying the modelling of failures in the implemented algorithm). The concept proposed
in this work follows the idea, that the failing of a virtual sensor means that its output is
the opposite of the correct output. A correctly working sensor would detect the occurrence
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of obstacles in the area observed by this sensor correctly. A failing sensor would output
“no obstacle” in cases there is one and “obstacle detected” in cases where no obstacle exist,
accordingly.
Other possibilities to model failures in the implementation of a virtual sensor could be
the output of the same value independent of the actual state, or no output at all. The
advantage of the used variant is that a special failure state can be queried using one state
of the automaton. For the others, a combination of the failure trigger and the actual state
must be used for verification tasks.
5.3.2.2 The VirtualSensorTemplate
The VirtualSensorTemplate (Fig. 5.16) consists of one location modelling the correctly
working of the sensor (Correct) and two locations modelling a failure state (false negative:
Failure_FN and false positive: Failure_FP). Initially, the automaton is in location
Correct and the variable obstacle which holds the information whether an obstacle is
currently detected or not, is false. If the automaton receives the signal exist_obstacle
from its corresponding RealSensorAutomaton (see Sec. 5.3.3.1), obstacle is negated and
detect_obstacle is send to the corresponding safety behaviour.
For triggering failure events, an additional failure automaton is used2, see Sec. 5.3.4 and
Fig. 5.18. It sends out a failure signal accidentally. Dependent on the current state
of the obstacle variable, the automaton changes to one of the failure locations sending
out detect_obstacle. If the sensor recovers from the failure sending out failure again,
the automaton comes back to location Correct with sending the respective signal to the
safety behaviour.
5.3.3 The Real Sensor Automaton
The real sensor is the first link in the chain of processing sensor data (see Fig. 5.13). Its task
is to collect environmental data and process them with some rudimentary preprocessing
techniques. As the intermediate step of creating grid maps is not modelled, the model of
the real sensor includes that step. The model reacts to changes in the environment and
sends out the relevant information to the virtual sensors. A formal model is created for
every real sensor. This allows to introduce failures in every single sensor.
5.3.3.1 The RealSensorTemplate
The RealSensorTemplate is proposed to model arbitrary sensors. It contains three
main locations representing a correctly working sensor (Correct) and a defective sensor
(False_Positive and False_Negative). Starting from the Correct location, the automa-
ton can receive a signal indicating a change in the environment (covered_area_changed).
It then sends out area_changed signals for all the areas where an environment change
occurred. This signal is received by the corresponding VirtualSensorAutomata. The
number of areas is defined in dependence on the characteristics of the robot. In the case
of ravon the whole area around the robot is divided into ten sectors (see Fig. 2.9).
2This version of the modelling of virtual sensors is described in [Kiekbusch 15], whereas the previous
version described in [Kiekbusch 14] used an automaton with an integrated failure automaton.
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Figure 5.16: Template for the VirtualSensorAutomaton
The modelling of the single sectors is done via a boolean array where 1 means that an
obstacle exists in the corresponding sector. The array is updated whenever a change in
the environment occurs (see Sec. 5.3.5). As example, an obstacle in the front of ravon
would lead to the assignment of the array [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0], as the front area of the
robot is divided into 4 sectors.
The RealSensorAutomata are notified about changes via the covered_area_changed
signal. To determine which areas are affected, a loop using two committed locations
is included. Here, the internal function HasAreaChanged() compares the values of the
current array with the values of the array given by the scenario automaton (Sec. 5.3.5). In
the case a deviation is found, a signal is sent to the corresponding virtual sensor.
A sensor failure is modelled via an external automaton in the same way as for the virtual
sensor. A difference is, that for the real sensor two possible failures are distinguished,
false positive and false negative failures, which are modelled by two different automata.
This gives the analyst more freedom to model different types of sensor failure. A failure
state can only be reached from the Correct location when a respective signal is received
from one of the failure automata. The path to the failure locations and back includes the
same steps as for a normal environment change signal, with the addition, that the actual
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Figure 5.17: Template for the RealSensorAutomaton
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environment state is saved to facilitate the way back to the correct state.
5.3.4 The Sensor Failure Automaton
Sensor failures are modelled as simple automata consisting of two locations Correct and
SensorFailure. The transitions between them are taken non-deterministically to simulate
a sudden occurrence of a failure. The SensorFailureAutomaton is pictured in Fig. 5.18.
The recovery function of the sensor (transition from location SensorFailure back to
location Correct) is a theoretical possibility to model a sensor with the ability to recover
from a failure. Dependent on the real hardware and software, this edge can be omitted.
Figure 5.18: Template for the SensorFailureAutomaton. The recovery edge (orange) is
optional.
The advantage of having an externally modelled failure instead of modelling failures
directly in the automaton of the real or virtual sensor is the option to easily add several
failure causes. This enables the definition of more exact queries. This concept seems to
be necessary for real sensors, but not essentially for virtual sensors as software might fail
because of wrong code, without the need of defining different causes. Therefore, the first
version of the virtual sensor model as introduced in [Kiekbusch 14] used integrated failure
locations. The second version as described in Sec. 5.3.2.2 is adapted to unify the modelling
of the two sensor aspects. This simplifies the understanding of the automata.
5.3.5 The Scenario Automaton
Requirements of a robot control system often correspond to a certain context. For example,
“the robot must slow down in case of obstacles to its front” or “the robot should drive in
full speed mode if the respective control signal is given and no obstacles stand in its way’ ’.
To verify such requirements, environmental properties must be included into the model and
the formal query. This can be done using the previously described real sensor automaton.
The values of the areas must be set manually. A query formulating the part of the property
that a front obstacle exist could be written as
E<> ... && RealSensor_1.Correct && area_occupied[0]==1 && area_occupied[1]==0
&& area_occupied[2]==0 && area_occupied[3]==0 && area_occupied[4]==0
&& area_occupied[5]==0 && area_occupied[6]==1 && area_occupied[7]==1
&& area_occupied[8]==1 && ...,
with the boolean array area_occupied containing the states of all sector maps around
the robot. 1 indicates an obstacle in an area. According to Fig. 2.9 and the scenario
obstacle in the front, the areas corresponding to the sector maps 0, 6, 7, 8 are set to 1. With
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increasing number of sensors, such a query would get long and confusing. The possibility
of failures during the query definition process increases.
To avoid these problems and to simplify the generation of queries for unexperienced users
a so-called scenario automaton is developed. It is a simple automaton describing the
environment of the robot in terms of existent obstacles using a set of predefined keywords
(e.g. front, left, rear middle, . . . ). Figure 5.19a shows an example of a scenario automaton
which includes three different scenes. Edges define the position of the obstacle with
the keywords. The names of the locations are user-defined and needed for the query
formulation. As can be seen in this example, several environmental states can be defined
in one scenario automaton.
During the automatic modelling process, this user-defined automaton is automatically
adapted to the extended formal model of the specific robot control system. Figure 5.19b
illustrates the generated automaton on the example of the robot ravon, where the
keywords are replaced by variable assignments and the signal covered_area_changed.
The broadcast signal covered_area_changed is received by all of the real sensor automata.
With the help of this scenario automaton, the formulation of the query becomes very easy
as only one location in the scenario automaton needs to be specified instead of a location
in several real sensor automata. The above described query can now be written as
E<> ... && Scenario.obstacle_front && ...
with the help of the scenario automaton.
(a) User defined scenario automaton. Edge labels contain keywords.
(b) Generated scenario automaton for the robot ravon (see Fig. 2.9
for the assignment of array positions to virtual sensors)
Figure 5.19: Definition of a scenario automaton and adaptation to the respective formal model.
The keywords from Fig. 5.19a are transformed to a signal and variable assignments according to
the formal system model of a specific robots control system in Fig. 5.19b.
5.4 Tool-Assisted Query Generation
As mentioned before, the formulation of formal properties is a tedious task and knowledge
about the formal language and the procedure to translate a property is needed. In Sec. 2.4
as well as in [Armbrust 14a] and [Ropertz 12], an extension of the finstruct tool is
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described, which enables the user to graphically define queries. The underlying concept is
to select behavioural components in the VerificationView of finstruct, transfer them to
the Query Development User Interface (QDUI) and connect them via edges representing
their relation. The presented concept allows to define rather complex properties, which
cannot be formulated in one query. They are automatically transferred to observer
automata, which can then be checked to verify the property on the system model.
The extension about the environmental influences described in the previous sections can
not be represented in that standard VerificationView as the components modelling the
sensor chain are not represented there. That means, properties including special conditions
of sensors need to be written by hand. This can get a really tedious and error-prone task.
The procedure of checking safety related properties shall be presented on the example
introduced in Sec. 5.2.2, where a robot faces an obstacle to its front and shall slow down.
The example is restricted to the part of the safety layer of ravon given in Fig. 2.10 for
readability reasons. The state of this sub-network depends on the output of the fusion
behaviour (F) Fast Front Slow Down. The property to be checked in this example can be
written as follows:
R1) (F) Fast Front Slow Down ((F) Fast Front SD) shall be active if an obstacle is present
in front of the robot.
The corresponding query
E<> F_Fast_Front_Slow_Down_a_value==0 && scenario_now.obstacle_front && !Processing()3
uses the negation of the property “(F) Fast Front SD shall be active”.
The result of the model checker states that it is possible that the behavioural component
will not get active even if there are obstacles. The back trace reveals that failures in all
sensor chain links can lead to that result. As consequence, failures must be excluded
step-by-step to find the conditions under which the property is fulfilled. For example,
E<> F_Fast_Front_Slow_Down_a_value==0 && scenario_now.obstacle_front
&& laser_2d_real_sensor.Correct && front_cartesian_laser_2d_virtual_sensor.Correct
can be used to check whether the property is fulfilled in the case of one correct working
real sensor and a corresponding correct virtual sensor.
To simplify the creation of such requests, an extension to the VerificationView is developed.
The new SafetyQueryView (SQV) shall fulfil the following requirements:
SQVR 1) Components of the sensor chain and scenario information shall be integrated
into the VerificationView of RRLABfinstruct
SQVR 2) Graphical support during query generation
SQVR 3) Integrated possibility to check the query on the formal model from within
finstruct
SQVR 4) Display the trace of the witness or counterexample in the TraceView of finstruct
using the integrated representation from the first requirement
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Figure 5.20: Main window of finstruct’s VerificationView showing a small part of ravon’s
safety layer with integrated sensor chain (yellow boxes) (cp. Figure 2.10 showing the same network
without the integration)
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Figure 5.20 shows the integration of the sensor chain and the scenario into the Verifica-
tionView (requirement SQVR 1). The information of the connections between sensors and
safety behaviours is extracted from the formal model that underlies the following model
checking procedure. The model serves as basis for all parts of the SafetyQueryView.
(a) The tab of the SQCW showing the behavioural components included in the model and
some of their properties
(b) The tab of the SQCW showing the scenario automaton
Figure 5.21: Two views of the Safety Query Construction Window (SQCW)
For the graphically supported creation of queries (requirement SQVR 2) a new window,
called Safety Query Construction Window (see Fig. 5.21), is created. It displays the
different components of the formal model in different tabs (All as table,Scenario,Real
Sensor, Virtual Sensors, Behaviours). These tabs contain tables with one line for every
behaviour/sensor automaton and columns with the name and properties of the component.
As example, for behaviours the properties Active and Inactive are displayed, as those
are the most frequently asked properties of a safety behaviour. For the definition of
other properties, the table can be easily extended. The cells corresponding to a special
3As mentioned in Sec 5.2.1, the Processing flag needed because of Uppaal’s special restrictions. For
the sake of clarity it is left out in the following queries.
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Figure 5.22: Extended TraceView including the sensor chain and the scenario. The states of
the sensor components that represent states of the backtrace of the model checker are displayed
in the yellow box below the component’s box. The green and red balls on the upper left edges of
the boxes illustrate the state of the component additionally.
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component and property contain a drop-down menu to allow the user to define the state
(Forced, Forbidden or Don’t care) of the property for this component. Once, the user
chooses a special state, the respective part of the query is written in the query text field
in the lower half of the window. As the component tables can become very large for big
networks, it is possible to select a component in the VerificationView, which will highlight
the corresponding component in the table to simplify the identification. One exception
of the table representation of the components is the Scenario tab. As the scenario is
normally a very simple automaton, a more intuitive representation which shows the original
automaton with the possibility to right-click on a location to select a certain state is chosen
(see Fig. 5.21b). The query field shows the final query and offers the possibility to select
the type of the query and to negate the whole query. Additionally, a comment can be
added.
The window offers the functionality to create several different queries for the model and
save them into a file. Furthermore, according to requirement SQVR 3, it is possible
to automatically check the query/queries on the formal model. Here, it is also possible
to choose a verifier on an external machine, which is useful in case of computationally
intensive queries.
The result of the model checking process is displayed in a pop-up window and the trace
to the witness or counter-example can be shown in the TraceView as required in SQVR
4. The trace is a sequence of states of the formal model. This means the state of every
automaton is given for every step in the trace. An example that depicts one of these steps is
presented in Fig. 5.22. It shows the same components as Fig. 5.20 with the difference that
additionally the states of the automata corresponding to the sensor processing components
are illustrated. This is done using a textual information with the state name as well as
a symbol indicating if this is a failure state. This visual support allows the developer
a quick and easy insight into the model checker’s result. More information about the
implementation details of the SafetyQueryView and the underlying concepts can be found
in the bachelor’s thesis of [Vonwirth 15].
5.5 Quantitative Aspects
One major challenge of model checking techniques is the state-space explosion. To illustrate
the meaning of this problem for the approach presented in this thesis, this section gives
insights in the size of formal models of behaviour-based systems calculated in terms of
numbers of locations and edges and the corresponding size of the state-space needed
for Uppaal’s calculations. In [Armbrust 13a] and [Armbrust 15] this topic is already
discussed with a focus on fusion behaviours and the central behaviour stimulator. In this
section, the effects of including the sensor chain into the formal model will be discussed.
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the numbers of locations and edges for each model presented
before. As can be seen there, the templates for stimulation, inhibition and activation
are equal for all behaviour types, whereas the activity and target rating are modelled
individually for fusion behaviours and safety behaviours. The numbers of locations and
edges for the InhibitionInterface cannot be directly extracted from the template, as the
size of the automaton depends on the number ni of inhibiting behaviours. The template
has the structure of a hypercube of dimension ni with bidirectional edges (Locations: 2ni ,
Edges: 2 · (ni · 2ni−1)). Additionally, whenever ιB changes a committed location and an
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additional edge are needed. This must be applied for all additional inhibiting behaviours.
In summary, the template contains 2ni+2·ni locations and ni ·2(ni−1) ·2+2·ni = ni ·(2ni + 2)
edges.
Table 5.1: The numbers of locations and edges of each template (ni: number of inhibiting
components; nc: number of competing components; ns: number of scenario locations). The *
indicates a template that is used for all types of behavioural components.
Template #Locations #Edges
StimulationInterface* 4 4
InhibitionInterface* 2ni + 2 · ni ni · (2ni + 2)
ActivationCalculation* 4 7
ActivityCalculation 4 6
TargetRatingCalculation 2 2
FBIBActivityChanged 8 12
FBActivityCalculation (V. 2) 2nc + 2 · nc nc · (2nc + 2)
FBTargetRatingCalculation 2nc + 2 · nc nc · (2nc + 2)
SBActivityCalculation 8 12
SBTargetRatingCalculation 4 4
VirtualSensorAutomaton 9 13
RealSensorAutomaton 13 22
SensorFailureAutomaton 2 1-2
Scenario ns ns − 1
The same calculations must be done for the activity and target rating automata of the
fusion behaviours, as they depend on the number of connected behaviours. As described
in [Armbrust 13a], there exist two versions for the modelling of the activity of fusion
behaviours. The first version uses only one automaton, whereas the second version uses two
(FBIBActivityChanged and FBActivityCalculation). As the implementation is based
on the latter, it will also be used for the following calculations. The numbers of locations
and edges of the sensor automata (VirtualSensorAutomaton, RealSensorAutomaton
and SensorFailureAutomaton) can be directly seen in the templates. For the sake of
completeness Tab. 5.2 gives an overview of the number of variables and channels needed
in the set of templates of the different components.
When calculating the total number of locations and edges of a behavioural network, the
number of instances of each template has to be considered. As example, the group pictured
in Fig. 2.10 will be taken. Each of the inner groups consists of one fusion behaviour (fb)
and three safety behaviours (sb). Each safety behaviour corresponds to one virtual sensor
(vs). Every group relates to one real sensor (rs). This leads to a set of automata containing
1 fb, 3 sb, 3 vs and 3 sf, 1 rs and 2 sf, where sf stands for SensorFailureAutomaton.
This implies in total 154 locations and 230 edges for each inner group. As none of the
behaviours is inhibited by another, the InhibitionInterface is not instantiated in the
formal model and therefore provides no locations and edges to the model. Due to some
improvements during the generation process of formal models, the number of locations
and edges can be slightly smaller than the above mentioned. Those improvements are
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Table 5.2: The numbers of variables and channels used in the set of templates of the different
components (nc: number of competing behavioural components; na: number of areas around the
robot).
Component #bool #int[0,1] #chan #broadcast
chan
Others
Behaviour 5 4 3 2
Fusion Behaviour 5 + nc 4 2 + nc 3
Safety Behaviour 5 4 3 3 bool [na]
Virtual Sensor 1 - 1 1
Real Sensor 1 - 2 - broadcast
chan [na]
technical details which reduce the amount of locations and edges in some special cases.
They will not be discussed here. The numbers presented in this section can be seen as
worst case estimation.
The type of groups used in the example above, consisting of a fusion behaviour and about
three safety behaviours occur frequently in the safety layer of the behaviour-based systems
used in this work as the several parts of this layer can be generated automatically with the
same design pattern. For the verification of tasks corresponding to environmental situations
it is useful to verify such a group entirely as all contained behavioural components are
based on the same real sensor. Because of that, Fig. 5.23 shows the trend of the number
of states that need to be explored when traversing the whole state space in dependence on
the number of locations or the number of groups consisting of three safety behaviours and
one fusion behaviour (called sg for safety group in the following), respectively. The third
and fifth markers correspond to the number of groups of the preceding markers with an
additional fusion behaviour that fuses the outputs of the groups. The graph illustrates the
state explosion problem when verifying a behaviour-based system with Uppaal’s verifier
very well. For each additional sg the state space grows rapidly. For the exploration of the
whole state space for three sg’s already about 200GB of memory are needed. This points
out the need for improvements on the model size and complexity.
The tests are executed on an Intel XEON processor with 2.7GHz and 1024GB memory.
Uppaal’s verifier is called with verifyta -u -S 2 model.xml query.q, where -S 2
indicates that the optimisation of the memory consumption is set to “most” and -u shows
a summary after the verification. The summary includes the number of explored states
as well as time and memory consumption. The query used to determine the size of the
complete state space of a model looks like
E<> !(FB_a_value==1) and RS.Correct and VS_1.Correct and VS_2.Correct and VS_3.Correct
and scenario.Pos_1 and !Processing()
where FB is any of the included fusion behaviours and scenario.Pos_1 is the first location
after the start location in the scenario automaton. For one of the inner groups (sg) of the
network in Fig. 2.10 and the scenario automaton in Fig. 5.19 this will result in the query
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Figure 5.23: The chart depicts the number of explored states (blue, green) and the memory
consumption (red, orange) in dependence on the number of locations calculated for one, two or
three sg’s containing three sb’s and one fb. Model 1 is created with a sensor failure automaton
without reset edge. The ones integrated in model 2 have a reset edge. Both models are created
together with a scenario automaton with two locations.
E<> !(F_Fast_Front_Slow_Down_Laser_2d_0_a_value==1) and laser_2d_real_sensor.Correct
and front_right_polar_laser_2d_virtual_sensor.Correct and front_cartesian_laser_2d_
virtual_sensor.Correct and front_left_polar_laser_2d_virtual_sensor.Correct
and scenario.obstacle_front and !Processing()
which asks if it is possible that the fusion behaviour does not get active in case of correct
working sensors and an obstacle to the robots front. As the example network is responsible
to react to front obstacles, this query is evaluated to false after the whole state space is
traversed in order to find a counter-example.
Sometimes, properties do not correspond to the whole network of the safety layer, but only
on a part of it. The query above, for example, refers only to the functionality of the group
responsible for sensor data coming from the 2d laser scanner. If this query is verified on
a model of this group its state space contains about 13 371 states and can be evaluated
in seconds using about 40MB of memory. However, if it is evaluated using a model of
the surrounding group (Fig. 2.10) again the whole state space is explored which contains
about 876 428 843 states and uses more than 200GB of memory in 6.6 h. This result shows
the need to find a mechanism to model only those parts of the network, that are relevant
for the property to check. An approach referring this topic is presented in Chap. 6.
In the following some basic ideas, to reduce the size of the model are discussed. One
possibility mentioned in Sec. 5.3.4 to reduce the state space is to omit the reset edge of the
SensorFailureAutomaton. As the automaton is instantiated twice per real sensor and
once for each virtual sensor and can change its state non-deterministically, this seems to
have great potential. The results show indeed a difference in the size of the state space,
but not enough to have great influence on memory consumption. Figure 5.23 show the
slight difference in the size of the state space and the memory requirements for models
with sensor failure automata with and without reset edge.
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Another question related to the integration of environmental conditions is the influence of
the scenario automaton on the size of the formal model. To answer this, the models of the
test cases written above are build with different scenario automata containing two, three or
four locations, respectively. The used scenario automaton is based on the one presented in
Fig. 5.19, where the last one or two locations are removed. The results show a big step in
the number of explored states for models with two and three locations. In contrast, there
is only a small difference between models with three and four locations. When changing
the position of the location used in the query (e.g. for the examples above, position 2
obstacle_front is used, for the test here, the ordering of the scenario automaton is changed
so that obstacle_front is on position 4), the number of explored states is smaller. The
reason for that lie in the implementation of the verifier. In the context of this thesis, it is
sufficient to know, that scenarios with more than two states expand the state space a lot.
Another aspect when trying to reduce the model size is to skip the instantiation of
automata that are not needed. One example is the InhibitionInterface which is only
included in case of inhibiting connections. Another one is the TargetRatingCalculation.
For standard behaviours and fusion behaviours, the target is an independent automaton,
which is not triggered from the outside. In the case, the output is not connected to
another behaviour, there is no need to include its automaton in the model. For safety
behaviours, the automaton is triggered by the virtual sensor, but if the output is not
received by another behaviour it is in most cases unnecessary to model it. Tests showed
that this step reduces the memory consumption a lot, from previously 200GB to only
60GB, approximately.
5.6 Discussion
In this chapter a concept for the formal verification of behaviour-based systems is presented.
The need for a formal definition of a system and its properties is discussed and an approach
to model behaviour-based components is introduced. With the focus on verifying au-
tonomous robotic systems, a further step is taken, that integrates environmental conditions
into the formal model. In Sec. 5.3, related work is discussed and the actual modelling of a
robots sensor chain is presented. The robot ravon serves as example application.
Several problems, that are often discussed in the context of formal verification, are also
discovered during the application of the presented approach. These are, for example,
the complexity of the model creation process and the formal definition of properties, the
problem of interpreting the model checker results and the state-explosion problem. The
first problem is faced with the automation of the modelling process. Together with the
graphical user interface, this allows to model arbitrary behaviour-based networks in very
short time. The integration of the sensor chain and the environmental conditions into
the GUI is also presented. With that, all components that are formally modelled with
finite-state machines can be seen in a simple component-network view in finstruct (see
Sec. 5.4). The possibility to graphically define queries and to directly start the model
checking process simplifies the verification procedure for the developer enormously. The
problem of interpreting the model checkers result is faced with a special view, that shows
the state of the behaviour network in every step of a trace. That TraceView provides
the state of the elements of the sensor chain as well as of the scenario automaton. The
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scenario automaton is a facilitation for the creation of queries which allows to define the
state of the environment in an easy manner.
In Sec. 5.5 quantitative aspects in relation to the integration of the different components
of the sensor chain into the formal model are discussed. Here, it becomes apparent, that
state-explosion is a big problem in the verification of models of behaviour-based systems
already for relatively small networks. Some basic ideas to counteract this problem, which
are also partly integrated into the implementation of the approach are discussed. Chapter 6
will deal with a more sophisticated approach and discusses some further ideas that support
the developer in analysing and verifying large behaviour-based networks.
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6. Reduction Techniques Supporting
Large Network Verification
The formal verification techniques presented in this thesis are laid out to prove the structure
of the behavioural network. Highly relevant are queries, that address the activity status of
a certain component under special circumstances. The activity of a component indicates
its relevance in the overall network, this implies, components that never get active, have no
impact on the overall robot behaviour. For the verification of safety properties, the query
if a certain component gets active at all or under certain environmental conditions is a
standard question. For example, one of the queries verified in Sec. 5.4 is, if the slow down
component of the robot is active during forward motion in the case of obstacles in the
front of the robot. The proved component is the fusion behaviour of the group (G) Fast
Front Slow Down, which is one of the innermost subgroups of the safety control network.
But, this behavioural component does not actually indicate the state of the overall slow
down behaviour of the robot. This can be seen in Fig. 2.6, where the outermost group
for the safety control in full speed mode is displayed. The state of the fusion behaviour
(F) Fast Forward (Slow Down) is responsible for the relevance of the transferred control
data to slow down the robot. However, the proposed technique is not suitable to check
the whole network related to that behaviour as the state space gets to large. Reduction
techniques are needed.
The addressed problem is not specific to the verification of behaviour-based systems, but
is well-known under the term state-space explosion. It means the number of states of the
formal model exceeds the amount of available memory. Lots of research has been done
considering this state-space explosion problem. According to [Pelánek 08] there were more
than 100 paper addressing this topic from the year 1994 till 2009.
Many researchers aim at improving the actual model checking process by changing the
formal model before or during the state exploration process in order to reduce the amount
of needed memory. Since the freely available verification tool Uppaal is used in this work,
improving the model checker goes beyond the scope. For the sake of completeness, Sec. 6.1
gives an overview of the major approaches and mentions the techniques used by Uppaal’s
model checker.
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Another possibility for solving the state-space explosion problem is to reduce the system
before the model checking process or even before formally modelling it. To achieve the
best possible result a combination of the strategies can be applied which uses a minimised
model and an “intelligent” model checker. Model reduction techniques can be divided
into two subcategories: One summarises techniques that dynamically change the model
with respect to the results of the model checker, the other category includes methods to
statically reduce a model.
Dynamic reduction techniques are known under the term Abstract-Check-Refine or counter-
example-guided abstraction [Clarke 00, Henzinger 02, Bouajjani 04]. Here, a minimal
abstract model of the system is created, which is refined in dependence on the result of
the model checker. The difficulty with this technique is to map the results of the abstract
model to the original one. Section 6.3 gives an example of this technique and drives a
method to reduce the model of behaviour-based systems.
The second category of model reduction techniques reduces the model statically according
to properties or environment definitions. Context-aware verification is introduced by the
authors of [Dhaussy 11], who assume that a special context belongs to a certain subset of
the complete system. They form the model correspondent to the subset. Another static
reduction technique is slicing. It aims at modelling only those parts of the software, that
are relevant for the given problem. The first approach, known as program slicing was
introduced by [Weiser 81, Weiser 84]. Since then lots of research has been done in this
field and slicing was transferred to many different systems. Several papers summarise the
approaches under different aspects, see [Tip 95, Xu 05, Silva 12]. Section 6.2 introduces
the technique in more detail and describes the transfer to use it with behaviour-based
systems. The presented methods to reduce the formal model of the behaviour-based system
before the actual model checking process are applied to the example of the ravon robot
in Sec. 6.4.
Large and complex systems cause not only difficulties for formal verification, but also for
other analysis methods. The complexity makes the analysis not necessarily impossible as
with formal verification, but it makes the analysis process and the results confusing and
difficult to evaluate. In Chap. 4.2 this problem was already mentioned in the context of
fault tree analysis. The above mentioned techniques, slicing and abstraction, can also be
used to reduce the behaviour network before analysis. But furthermore, current research
deals with the combination of formal methods and fault tree creation, where one of the
research topics is how to integrate one method into the other in order to reduce the analysis
effort. Sec. 6.5 gives an overview of current research in this area and discusses the possible
transfer to behaviour-based systems.
6.1 Techniques to Optimize the Model Checking Pro-
cess
The methods to fight the state-space explosion problem during the model checking process
can be divided into two categories based on how the state space is explored: enumerative
algorithms and the symbolic algorithms. The authors of [Rafe 13] identify four major
methods, namely symbolic model checking, partial order reduction model checking, symmetry
reduction, and on-the-fly model checking, which will be shortly introduced in the following.
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Table 6.1: Overview of reduction techniques used in Uppaal (corresponding to [Slomp 10]).
(*) In order to use symmetry reduction, some manual changes have to be done before model
checking. (**) Implemented, but actually not integrated into current Uppaal version.
Technique In Uppaal Automatically enabled?
Symmetry reduction + +/- (*)
Partial order reduction - (**) -
Slicing - (**) -
Dead variable analysis - (**) -
Symbolic model checking techniques are based on binary decision diagrams. The state
space is represented by boolean functions and formulae in propositional logic. With this
method, large systems can be checked as this representation needs much less memory than
the explicit storage of the transition system as done using enumerative methods.
For concurrent systems the partial order reduction technique can be applied. Here the
system is modelled as a set of interleaving sequences. Some of theses sequences might
be similar in a way that they produce the same output but have a different internal
arrangement of the concurrent components. Partial order reduction techniques find these
and reduce the system by these sequences. [Pelánek 08] gives further examples of techniques
that reduce the model by analysing the paths in the model.
In contrast to that path based reduction techniques, symmetry reduction is based
on the system states. The technique identifies bisimilar states. These are states that
behave in the same way, meaning one system simulates the other and vice-versa. The
traversal is done for only one of them. This method can be used on-the-fly during the
exploration of the state space or before the exploration as a static modification of the
system. On-the-fly model checking techniques construct the state space incrementally
instead of building the whole state space first. This method reduces the state space in
case where a counter-example is found early in the model checking process.
More detailed information about these techniques can be found in [Pelánek 08]. The paper
shall be used as a decision guidance for practitioners who want to use model checking for
the verification of their industrial projects. They focus on enumerative methods. Other
overview papers which focus on different aspects are written by [Clarke 01, Clarke 12].
For the execution of model checking tasks the model checker of the Uppaal toolbox is
used in the context of this thesis. Table 6.1 gives an overview of the reduction techniques
implemented in Uppaal’s model checker according to [Slomp 10]. Actually, only symmetry
reduction is implemented in the available Uppaal version (see [Hendriks 04] for details).
The other three reduction techniques are implemented as tools or prototypes but not (yet)
integrated into Uppaal. The implementations of the techniques all aim at modifying the
formal model before the actual model checking process in order to reduce the resulting
state space. The authors of [Thrane 08] present a promising approach, that uses slicing
techniques to reduce the model with respect to a given property. In contrast to the
approach presented in Sec. 6.2, they construct a slice from the formal model including
C code and automata components. According to the Uppaal tutorial [Behrmann 06],
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partial order reduction [Bengtsson 98] is not supported by the tool, but some unnecessary
interleavings can be avoided using committed locations. A further reduction possibility
mentioned in the tutorial is the resetting of variables to their initial value when they
are not used. [Slomp 10] discusses this problem and presents a tool that automatically
identifies dead variables and includes the resets into the model.
6.2 Model Reduction Using Slicing Techniques
In contrast to the previously described methods, that are based on the formal model, the
slicing technique introduced by [Weiser 81] reduces the program code. The reduction is
done according to a given slicing criterion. In a first step, the code is decomposed based
on a data and control flow analysis. The result is called Control Flow Graph(cfg), where
nodes correspond to program statements and edges relate to the control flow. The elements
of the graph that form the slice are computed according to the slicing criterion which is
defined as a pair c = {s, v}, where s is a statement in the program and v represents a set
of variables.
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Figure 6.1: Example of a control flow graph (middle) derived from a C program (left) and the
corresponding program dependence graph (right) [Yatapanage 12]
Following research is often based on a so-called Program Dependence Graph (pdg). Here,
statements and expressions represent the nodes of the graph, edges define the dependencies
between the nodes (see [Ottenstein 84] for the first approach with this topic). Figure 6.1
shows an example of a cfg and a pdg from a given program.
Having this graph representation, a slice is received via a backward traversal starting from
the node of interest, which is defined by the slicing criterion. Figure 6.2 shows the general
procedure to create a slice from program code.
For debugging purposes usually backward slicing is used, which means that the resulting
slice contains those elements that directly or indirectly influence the node of interest.
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Figure 6.2: The steps to create a slice from program code
Forward slicing [Bergeretti 85] starts from the point of interest and traverses the graph to
find out which other nodes are affected by the start node. This method is used mainly for
dead code removal and software maintenance. Slicing methods can also be distinguished
in static and dynamic slicing. A dynamic slice is computed with respect to a specific test
case or rather a certain set of input variables. Static slices are extracted without making
assumptions about the input.
Apart from the methods that operate directly on program code, several approaches that use
specifications written in other languages were published in the last decade. For example,
[Androutsopoulos 13] surveys the domain of state-based model slicing, which refers to
slicing on the basis of finite state machine based models. Especially interesting in that
context is the work of [Thrane 08], which apply slicing to Uppaal models to achieve a
syntactic reduction. Their experiments proved the advantages of using slicing methods
in combination with the existing internal reduction strategies. Unfortunately, this work
doesn’t seem to be continued or even be integrated into the Uppaal toolbox.
[Yatapanage 10] apply slicing to models written in the graphical Behaviour Tree language,
whereby a behaviour tree is derived from the requirements the system must fulfil. For
the automation of the slicing procedure, the slicing criterion is not manually defined but
derived from a property (often) written in a formal language. That implies, that the
criterion not necessarily corresponds with one node in the pdg but can refer to several
statements. This technique of property-directed slicing was first introduced by [Hatcliff 00]
and will be applied to the behaviour-based system used in this thesis as well.
An approach which includes the external environment into the verification process is
presented in [Matsubara 12]. The paper introduces a variable dependence graph (vdg),
which is similar to a pdg with a difference in the data unit. Before the actual slicing
procedure, the parts of the system that are relevant to the given property are defined
manually. Irrelevant parts are treated as part of the external environment and are not
modelled in detail. The authors also developed a tool which supports the slicing and
verification process by graphically representing the results.
For behaviour-based systems the need to identify context-specific relevant parts is already
discussed in Sec. 4.1. Influence graphs, which include those nodes that influence a certain
one, seem to be similar to a slice as defined in the former. The remainder of this section,
discusses the application of the slicing technique to behaviour-based systems and presents
the developed tool support on an application example.
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6.2.1 Slicing of Behaviour-Based Systems
In this thesis, the verification of behaviour-based systems refers to the verification of the
network structure. The formalization is done by modelling each behavioural component as
a set of finite-state-machines, and connect those sets according to the connections in the
network. The size of the formal model is therefore related to the size of the network. This
implies, that a reduction of the network would decrease the model size.
In Sec. 4.1, the network structure is presented as behaviour dependence graph. With
having this structure automatically when developing behaviour-based control systems, the
first two steps of the regular slicing approaches - the creation of the data flow graph and
the program dependence graph (see Fig. 6.2) can be omitted.
The slicing criterion must be defined in relation to the property, that should be checked
on the formal model. For the definition of the slicing criterion, the approach at hand is
based on the property-directed slicing technique introduced by [Hatcliff 00]. According
to this, a slicing criterion can refer to several nodes in the graph. This is important, as
queries for models of behaviour-based systems often contain more than one element (see
Sec. 5.4 for examples).
A slicing criterion for a behaviour dependence graph must therefore contain the set of
graph nodes B(p) that corresponds to the formal query related to the property p. The
slicing criterion is defined as follows.
Definition 6.1: Slicing Criterion
A slicing criterion C for a behaviour dependence graph GBD is a non-empty set
of nodes {n0, ..., nk} where each ni, with i ∈ [0, k], is a node in the behaviour
dependence graph. The slicing criterion C(p) for the property p contains all nodes
in B(p) ⊆ GBD.
The slice S(p) for the property p is extracted from the bdg GBD via a backward traversal
starting from the nodes included in the slicing criterion. Here, every node is included
into the final slice only once to avoid infinite traversals. The resulting slice is a graph
S(p) ⊆ GBD that contains all components corresponding to C(p) and all components that
influence them. Usually, only one slice emerges containing all nodes of C(p). If there arise
two or more slices this implies that the behavioural components of C(p) have no common
basis. In order to minimise the model as much as possible, it is useful to split the property
and prove each with its corresponding slice. In contrast to influence graphs presented
in Sec. 4.1 a slice can have more than one start nodes and the resulting graph contains
connections of all types.
According to Chap. 5.3, where an extension of the formal model is presented, properties
can also include environmental conditions and states of sensor components. As those
components are not part of the bdg they have no influence on the slicing process. The
environment is still integrated in the model as soon as a safety behaviour is contained in
the slice.
Figure 6.3 gives an example for the slicing of behaviour networks. The complete network
in Fig. 6.3a contains 16 behavioural components where three are encapsulated in a
group (G) G1. The property to check is Is it possible, that behaviour (F) FB4
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Figure 6.3: The original graph 6.3a and the slice 6.3b created according to the slicing criterion
C(p) = {(F )FB4}
gets active?. From this, the slicing criterion C(p) = {(F )FB4} is formulated. The
corresponding slice is pictured in Figure 6.3b.
The sliced graph S(p) consists of only eight behaviour modules which is only half the
number of the original graph. The generated formal model of the sliced graph consists of
30 automata with a total of approximately 55 locations and 71 edges in contrast to the
model of the full graph with 64 automata (95 locations, 143 edges).
6.2.2 Tool-Assisted Slice Generation
In this section, the advantages of the slicing procedure shall be pointed out on the example
presented in the previous chapter (see Sec. 5.4). Furthermore, the extension of finstruct’s
VerificationView, that allows to execute the process and to display the results are discussed.
The property to prove is again
P1: (F) Fast Front Slow Down shall be active if an obstacle is present in front of the
robot.
It was verified on a small part of ravon’s safety control, namely the group (G) Fast Front
Slow Down. This group was chosen manually in order to keep the formal model as small
as possible. This is additional effort which can be reduced when executing the previously
described slicing procedure.
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In order to simplify the application of slicing techniques to behaviour-based networks, the
functionality is integrated into finstruct’s VerificationView. The tool is enhanced by
the following features:
SV 1 Automatic slice creation for a property inserted as query
SV 2 Possibility to define the initial behavioural component for the slice manually in the
graph view
SV 3 Display a slice
SV 4 Creation of a formal model from the slice
With the integrated automated slicing process, the model checking process containing the
creation of the formal model and the submission of a formal property stays the same as
described in Chap. 5. The slice corresponding to the given property is calculated in the
background and the formal model of the slice is used as input for the model checker. This
can also be done for several queries at the same time, which highlights one of the major
advantages of applying the slicing procedure to the verification process of behaviour-based
networks. The scope of the network must not be defined manually for each property in
order to keep the resulting formal model small. It is done automatically and guarantees to
output a minimal network including all relevant components.
For the developer, it might be of interest to view the slice displayed in the context of the
overall network. This functionality is also integrated in the network view of finstruct.
Figure 6.4 shows a detail of the group (G) Full Speed Safety Control (cp. Fig. 2.6) with
the slice related to the example. All components belonging to the slice are shown in full
colour, whereas other components are greyed out. Here, the slicing criterion was extracted
from the property C(p) = {(F) Fast Front Slow Down}. The slice is calculated using
this element as starting position in the behaviour dependence graph. The resulting slice
includes the starting fusion behaviour of the group (G) Fast Front Slow Down and the four
inner groups, that deliver data to it. All behavioural components inside the four groups
are connected to the respective fusion behaviour and are therefore included in the slice as
well. Due to readability constraints, only one of the groups is exemplarily unfolded.
The example shows again the possibility to dramatically reduce the model when using
slicing. The overall group contains 112 components, whereas the slice includes only 14.
The advantage of using the bigger group is to be able to create several queries containing
components of different groups without changing the view.
The slicing functionality can also be used independent from query definition. The network
view provides the possibility to mark single behavioural components as starting point for
the slicing procedure. This enables the user to easily detect dependencies in the network
structure. This view can also be used for the analysis tasks discussed in Sec. 4.1.
6.3 Model Reduction Using Abstraction
Abstraction is a very important technique for handling the state-space explosion problem.
It means reducing the original programme or model in a way, that a property can be
checked on the abstract model and a positive answer will hold for the original, as well.
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Figure 6.4: Representation of a slice in finstruct’s network view showing a part of the
network given in Fig. 2.6. All behavioural components not included in the slice are greyed out.
The small window in the upper right corner (red bordered) shows the dialog that is used to
choose the query for which the slice should be visualised. The red arrow points to the element
included in the slicing criterion.
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In the case the check fails and the negative result could be due to the reduction and
the process must be restarted under different preconditions. [Henzinger 02] describe the
traditional flow for the model checking process of abstracted models as follows
Abstraction Choose a finite set of predicates and build an abstract model of the given pro-
gram as a finite automaton. The states of the automaton represent truth assignments
for the chosen predicates.
Verification Check the abstract model for the desired property. A positive result is
equivalent to a positive result for the original program. A negative result produces a
counterexample, which leads to the next step.
Refinement If the counterexample corresponds to a concrete counterexample in the
original program, a program error is found. In the other case, the model must be
refined, for example new predicates must be added and the process starts again.
Figure 6.5: Abstraction on the example of a traffic light [Clarke 00]
An example for data abstraction is given in Fig. 6.5. A traffic light has three states, red,
yellow and green. In order to check if cars can collide on a crossing, it is sufficient to
prove whether they are allowed to drive or not. Therefore, an abstract model can be built
which summarises the states green and yellow and map them to a state go. As the model
allows cars to stop and go, respectively, the property is evaluated true, which holds for the
original model with three states as well.
As example for the case where the abstraction is not fine enough, consider the property
that the traffic light will always eventually come to state red. It can be easily seen in
the original model, that the property is fulfilled there. Checking the property on the
abstract model fails, returning a counterexample. For example there exists an infinite
trace < red, go, go, ... > that will never reach state red. As the counterexample contains
abstracted elements, it does not correspond to a concrete counterexample. In that case,
the abstract model needs to be refined.
Several research is done introducing different abstraction and refinement techniques and
methods that automate the complete process of abstraction, checking and refinement
[Clarke 00, Saïdi 00, Henzinger 02, Bouajjani 04]. The following section shows how the
basic ideas of abstraction can be applied to behaviour-based systems.
6.3.1 Abstraction of Behaviour-Based Networks
Working with large behaviour-based systems one structuring element is frequently used:
behavioural groups. Behavioural groups encapsulate a number of behaviours (see Sec. 2.2 for
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the implementation in the iB2C). On the one hand, this is useful for displaying purposes,
as large networks can not be represented in a proper way otherwise. On the other hand,
groups combine a number of correlating components, which implies that the interface of a
group provides a behaviour which is a combination of several sub-behaviours. This factor
will be used for the generation of an abstract model of the system.
Abstraction: In a first step, the internals of all sub-groups of the behaviour-based network
are neglected and represented by just one standard behavioural component for each group.
The result is a network without nesting. In order to minimise it as much as possible, the
slicing approach can be applied before. In the following, the network can be modelled
formally as described in Chap. 5.
Verification: The formal model is checked for the respective property. In the case the
property is fulfilled or the counterexample does not contain any component that represent
folded groups, the result correlates to the original model. If the result depends on the state
of the behavioural component that encapsulates a group, the network must be refined.
Refine: The state of a behavioural group is determined by the state of its corresponding
fusion behaviour. Therefore, a model of the network influencing the fusion behaviour’s
activity or target rating must be build. The property to be checked includes the activity
or target rating status of the fusion behaviour.
As a group may include further nested groups, this process must possibly be repeated. If
the sub-requirements are fulfilled for every group component, the starting requirement is
fulfilled, too. If not, the counterexamples point to a faulty part of the network.
G1
BL4
(F) FB4
BL3
(F) FB1
BL2
(a) Abstract network with folded inner groups
(F) FG1
BL0_G1 BL1_G1
(b) Refinement of the inner group of the nested
graph
Figure 6.6: Application of abstraction and refinement on the example of the network depicted
in Fig. 6.3a
As example, the network introduced in Sec. 6.2.1, Fig. 6.3b is used. Figure 6.6a depicts
the abstracted network. The group (G) G1 is represented by the component G1. The
property to prove is
P1: It shall be possible, that fusion behaviour (F) FB4 gets active when component BL2
is inactive
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Here, the model checker discovers, that the property is fulfilled if G1 is active. As the
behavioural component is modelled as described in Sec. 5.2.1 where the activity value
switches non-deterministically between active and not active {1, 0} the property is fulfilled.
But, the internals of the folded group may determine its output otherwise. Therefore,
the abstracted component is essential for the result of the model checker and it must be
checked if it fulfils the requirements.
This means for the example, the group must be unfolded and the internal network must
be checked. Figure 6.6b shows the refined behavioural group (G) G1. It is either possible
to check the previous query on the refined model, or to use a new query with only the
refined group. The latter allows to keep the formal model as small as possible, and will be
used here. The property to check is
P2: It shall be possible, that (F) G1 gets active
The corresponding query is evaluated to false, meaning the component can never get
active. This implies that the initial requirement is also not fulfilled and the network need
improvements. The reason for this failure must be discovered with further analysis. In
this case, this is due to the fact that the input behaviours BL0_G1 and BL1_G1 can
never get active, as they have no stimulating edges and are therefore inactive.
The presented approach enables the piecewise verification of nested behaviour-based
networks. The network is verified starting with the highest layer and descending into the
deeper layer according to the result of the model checker. The method avoids rechecking
as far as possible since the inner groups structures are verified individually provided that
no influences from outside of the group exist. The following section gives an example of
the verification of a large behaviour-based network.
6.4 Application Example
The ravon control system serves as an example for large behaviour-based networks. The
before described applications of verification techniques have been done on small parts of
the network, as their application on the complete network always lead to problems with
memory consumption. This section will show how the previously introduced reduction
techniques can be used to verify a large network piecewise on the example of the safety
control of ravon. The whole verification process can be executed with the help of the
tool finstruct. For displaying purposes, the representation of the network parts will be
done using Graphviz in this work.
ravon’s safety control is responsible for avoiding collisions by forcing the robot to slow
down, evade obstacles or to initiate an emergency stop. It is integrated in the overall
control system as a safety layer which is able to override control commands. As introduced
in Sec. 2.3.1, the safety control distinguishes three drive modi related to the actual robot
speed. The respective networks have an equivalent structure with differences in the use of
sensors and sensor processing algorithms. For the example discussed in this section, the
focus is on the network for the full speed mode as depicted in Fig. 2.6. The verification
could have also be done on the whole safety control network or one layer above, but this
would lead to problems in representing and understanding the correlations within the
limits of this thesis.
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The network of the group (G) Full Speed Safety Control is already to large to be verified
without using reduction techniques and is therefore sufficient to show the introduced
reduction approaches. The group facilitates the calculation of velocity and steering angles
for evasion and slow down actions. In previous examples, subgroups of this group have
been verified.
Here, the requirement The robot shall slow down in case of front obstacles shall be proven
on the complete group. The fusion behaviour that fuses the components responsible
for slowing down the robot is (F) Fast Forward (Slow Down) (see the part of Fig. 2.6
highlighted in green). This fusion behaviour should be active in case of obstacles in
front of the robot and transfer adapted control commands. Furthermore, the behavioural
component (F) Fast Forward (Input) which passes the original control data to the fusion
behaviour should be inhibited by the safety groups. The exact property can be formulated
as
P1: In case of obstacles in front of the robot, (F) Fast Forward (Slow Down) (F_FF_SD)
shall be active and (F) Fast Forward (Input) (F_FF_Input) shall be inactive.
The property is translated to the formal query
E<> !(F_FF_SD_a_value==1) and !(F_FF_Input_a_value==1) and scenario_now.obstacle_front
and checked by Uppaal’s verifier. For all verification tasks in this section, the 64 bit
version of Uppaal’s standalone verification tool verifyta is called with verifyta -u
-S 2 model.xml query.q, where -S 2 indicates that the optimisation of the memory
consumption is set to “most” and -u shows a summary after the verification. The
calculations are done on an AMD OpteronTM 6134 processor with 2.3GHz and about
120GB of memory.
Proving this property on the model of the complete group containing 118 behavioural
components exceeds the available memory. Applying the slicing method described in
Sec. 6.2, the network can be reduced to 32 behavioural components. Verifying the property
on the slice reveals, that the property is not fulfilled. The counterexample shows, that
this is the case, when all sensors fail. In order to find out further failure possibilities, the
failing of one of the sensors is excluded (similar to the examples in Sec. 5.4). With this
configuration, the available memory size is reached before a result could be achieved.
This shows, that using only the slicing approach for model reduction is still not sufficient
to verify the whole network. Therefore, the abstraction technique is additionally applied
to the network. That leads to a network containing three behavioural components each
representing a folded group and two fusion behaviours, see Fig. 6.7. As assumed, the
verification of the above query leads to a counterexample which proves that the fusion
behaviour is inactive in the case that all other components are inactive. A further query
shows, that it is sufficient for the fusion behaviour to become active when one of the
components representing a group is active.
Therefore, one of the three groups, namely (G) Fast Right Slow Down is refined to verify
its inner network. The group contains four subgroups and a fusion behaviour that fuses
the outputs of the subgroups. The content of the group (G) Fast Right Slow Down with
folded subgroups is depicted in Fig. 6.8. Three of the subgroups include a safety behaviour
which is connected to its respective groups fusion behaviour. The group (G) Right Slow
Down Voxel Filter Laser 3D contains only a fusion behaviour.
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(F) Fast Forward (Slow Down)
Bottom interface
(G) Fast Right Slow Down (G) Fast Left Slow Down (G) Fast Front Slow Down
(F) Fast Forward (Input)
Top interface
Figure 6.7: Abstraction of the slice S(P1) according to the slicing criterion C(P1) extracted
from the network of the group (G) Full Speed Safety Control
For a first refinement step, the subgroups of the group are folded and each represented
by a behavioural component, respectively. The property to prove for the group (G) Fast
Right Slow Down is
P2: In case of obstacles in front of the robot, (F) Fast Right Slow Down shall be active.
Again, the model checker provides a counterexample showing that the fusion behaviour
cannot get active in the case of all connected components being inactive, and just as in
the previous step, one active component suffices to fulfil the query. A further refinement
step leads to the unfolding of the subgroup (G) Right Slow Down Laser 2D (see Fig. 6.9)
and the property
P3: In case of obstacles in front of the robot, (F) Fast Right Slow Down Laser 2D shall
be active.
Here again, the query is not fulfilled. The counterexamples show a trace to the state
where the safety behaviour is inactive and the connected virtual sensor and its real sensor
work correctly. That means, that the subgroup (G) Right Slow Down Laser 2D will never
get active in case of front obstacles (except for the case of failing sensors generating false
positive results). The same result holds for the other two subgroups, (G) Right Slow
Down Water Laser 3D and (G) Right Slow Down Unfiltered Laser 3D. The subgroup (G)
Right Slow Down Voxel Filter Laser 3D can also never become active, as its input is not
connected to another component. Combining the results of the four groups leads to the
conclusion, that the group (G) Fast Right Slow Down never gets active in case of front
obstacles.
Starting again in the first abstraction layer, the next step is to refine the group (G) Fast
Left Slow Down. As it is build up from the same basis as the group for the right side, the
results are similar. Therefore, the third group (G) Fast Front Slow Down must be refined.
The group contains four subgroups encapsulating each a set of safety behaviours, which
are combined according to their correlating sensors. The network with folded subgroups is
depicted in Fig. 6.10.
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(G) Right Slow
 Down Voxel Filter
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Top interface
Figure 6.8: Abstracted network of the group (G) Fast Right Slow Down
Here again, the property
P4: In case of obstacles in front of the robot, (F) Fast Front Slow Down shall be active.
is verified on the network with folded groups, and, as assumed it is not fulfilled in the case
that all four behavioural components are inactive. Once again, a subgroup, namely (G)
Fast Front Slow Down Unfiltered Laser 3d is refined (see Fig. 6.11). It encapsulates three
safety behaviours that react to data provided by one of the virtual sensors, respectively. A
fusion behaviour combines the outputs of the components and transfers it to the groups
output.
Verifying the property
P5: In case of obstacles in front of the robot, (F) Fast Front Slow Down Unfiltered Laser
3d shall be active.
reveals, that the property is not fulfilled in the case of a sensor fail (false negative).
Excluding this possibility still leads to an example, where the property is not fulfilled.
This is the case when all three virtual sensors fail and therefore provide false negatives to
the safety behaviour. Forcing one of the virtual sensors to work correctly together with a
correctly working sensor, the fusion behaviour gets always active. This result similarly
fulfils the initial property Prop. P1. The fusion behaviour (F) Fast Forward (Slow Down)
is always active, when the 3D laser scanner and one of its corresponding virtual sensors
work correctly and obstacles in the front of the robot exist.
In order to check the redundancy of the system, the refinement process can be done for
the other two subgroups. The result will show, that it is sufficient if one of the sensors and
one of its corresponding virtual sensors work correctly to fulfil the initial property. The
example shows, that using the proposed reduction techniques facilitates the verification
of large behaviour-based networks. The models created from the reduced networks are
small enough to be verified using minimal memory and short computation time. Thereby,
the overall computation time is also shortened dramatically. However, the technique
requires additional effort from the safety expert to manually chose the next refinement
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(F) Right Slow Down Laser 2D
Bottom interface
Fast Right Right Slow Down Laser 2D
Top interface
Figure 6.9: Abstracted network of the group (G) Fast Right Slow Down Laser 2D
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Figure 6.10: Abstracted network of the group (G) Fast Front Slow Down
steps and to define queries for them according to the counterexample. But, extensions to
the finstruct tool support the developer in order to simplify and accelerate the process.
6.5 Combining Fault Tree Analysis and Model Check-
ing
Fault tree analysis and model checking are two radically different methods with the same
goal: the analysis of safety critical systems. While fault tree analysis is used by safety
engineers to calculate the probability of undesired events and to discover the possible
root-causes, model checking proves a property given in a formal language to be correct
on a formal model of the system. The advantages of fault tree analysis are their wide
acceptance in industry, the comparatively simple creation of fault trees, and the definition
of the property to analyse from the specification. The latter is one of the difficulties of
model checking, as system specifications are rarely written formally, but include natural
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Figure 6.11: Abstracted network of the group (G) Fast Front Slow Down Unfiltered Laser 3D
language, figures, etc. A disadvantage of fault tree analysis is that its completeness is not
naturally given.
The combination of fault tree analysis and model checking aims at taking the pros of both
methods, while eliminating the cons. The great number of different research approaches
show the various possibilities in which the methods can be combined. The intention of
[Bieber 02] is to use both methods independently depending on the special task, and
to represent the results on a common basis in order to combine them and make them
available for both, safety engineers and system designers. [Thums 03, Schäfer 03] use
model checking techniques to verify the proper design of a fault tree. Other approaches use
the results of fault tree analysis, the minimal cut sets, to generate properties to be checked
by the model checker [Santiago 05, Cha 12]. A different approach is used by [Akerlund 99],
who creates fault trees according to counter-examples generated by the model checker.
To overcome the difficulties in manually creating fault trees and formal queries, [Cha 12]
present an approach that automates the whole process. In the remainder of this section,
the possibilities to use similar approaches for the analysis procedure of behaviour-based
systems are discussed.
Model Checking of Fault Tree Events
In Chap. 4.2 the application of fault tree analysis to behaviour-based systems was intro-
duced. By the use of the structured composition of the software, the completeness of the
fault tree can be achieved for the software part. But, another problem could be identified
when using this technique: the size and complexity of the fault tree. One idea is therefore,
to use model checking to eliminate parts of the fault tree by verifying their correctness.
The approach proposed in this thesis models a faulty data signal output of a behavioural
component as combination of its data calculation and its activity calculation (see Sec. 4.2.1
and Fig. 4.9). In both cases, the event structural fault is introduced which addresses the
possibility that the behavioural component is not correctly interconnected with others.
This problem is also covered by the model checking approach. Model checking can verify
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the connection to be correct under given conditions, which would eliminate the event from
the fault tree. By way of example, consider the network introduced in Sec. 4.2.2, Fig. 4.16
and Fig. 4.18. The structural fault considering the activity calculation of the component
Fast Front Slow Down Centre can be excluded by verifying whether it is possible that
the component can get active and inactive, respectively in case of obstacles. This result
shows, that the state of the component is dependent on the sensor hardware, which is
correct. The event can therefore be removed and therewith the size of the fault tree can
be reduced.
Fault Tree Design Using Model Checking
Using model checking to design a fault tree has the goal to create a complete and correct
tree. Some approaches build a formal model of the underlying system and build the fault
tree from this model, others use series of queries for every leaf and use the counter-examples
for further division. In the case of behaviour-based systems, the structuring of the software
already enables a straight-forward fault-tree creation. The process can be automated
in large parts and needs manually treating only in special cases. These are for example
fusion behaviours (see Sec. 4.2.1) and behavioural components which interact with the
environment (safety behaviours). In the case of safety behaviours, a negative result of the
model checker provides a witness or backtrace including statements about the relation of
the state of sensor hardware and behavioural components in the software network. For
example, a behavioural component cannot be active in the case of a faulty sensor. The
event faulty sensor can then be integrated in the fault tree. This procedure helps to create
a correct and complete fault tree on the interface between (sensor) hardware and software.
Combining the Results of Model Checking and FTA
Using both analysis methods provides the possibility to overcome the drawbacks of the
single ones. In the case of behaviour-based systems, the abstraction level of the formal
model limits the possible queries. These can be covered by fault tree analysis, which allows
to integrate any states of behavioural components and to consider data signals, which are
neglected in the formal model. However, the evaluation of structural faults must be done
manually for fault tree analysis and can be easily executed with model checking. Thanks to
the structured representation of behaviour-based software systems, both methods can work
on the same basis. The same holds for the representation of the results, counter-examples
can be displayed in the network view as well as the set of components belonging to a
certain cut set.
6.6 Discussion of Reduction Techniques
In this chapter several approaches to fight the state-space explosion problem are discussed.
All aim at the reduction of the formal model. Some techniques reduce the model auto-
matically during state exploration, others focus on the reduction of the original program
before it is modelled formally and given to the verifier. Two of the latter, slicing and
abstraction are presented in more detail and their fundamental ideas are transferred to
behaviour-based systems. A combination of both reduction techniques is applied to the
control system of the ravon robot. The example shows that using the reduction methods
enables to verify large networks that could not have been verified without them.
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The application of slicing to the behaviour-based network is a simple, but powerful
approach, that uses influence graphs to find out the components that relate to the one
specified in a property. The slice can be used in various ways, not only to be the basis of
the formal model for formal verification, but also for other analysis tasks (see Chap. 4) or
to gain understanding about the network structure e.g. for non-system-experts.
The abstraction approach is also based on the existing structure of behaviour-based
networks. It utilises the concept of encapsulating a number of network components in
groups. Using this technique, the number of network components can be drastically reduced.
The method is the basis for the automation of the reduction and refinement processes
for behaviour-based systems. Moreover, the abstraction approach offers further reduction
possibilities taking other system conditions into account. For example, environmental
conditions like the precise definition of the position of an obstacle can be used to exclude
further elements of the network.
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7. Conclusion
The increasing number of robotic systems entering our daily life raise the need for methods
to analyse and verify the safety of such systems. For decades, this question was limited
to either hardware or software, or later to industrial robots that are a combination of
both, but acting in a restricted area with great safety arrangements concerning their
environment. Today, embedded systems are wide-spread in various devices interacting
with humans and in changing environments.
Behaviour-based systems have been described in this thesis as an architecture for the
control of robotic systems. They feature among others, redundancy, expandability and
reactivity implemented in simple, reusable components, which make them a promising
approach for the control of autonomous mobile robotic systems. The complexity of the
control network structure of advanced systems has been identified as a downside of this
approach.
The requirement of having a flexible architecture for the implementation of robotic systems
as well as the need for save and reliable systems formed the topic of the thesis at hand.
The presented concepts allow a comprehensive analysis and verification of behaviour-
based control systems. They support the developer to gain a deep understanding of
the relationship of hardware/software components and the relationship of system events
that cause a robot’s action. Furthermore, they allow for the identification of root causes
of failures and for the formal verification of safety requirements. The work has been
divided according to two objectives. The first has been the identification of suitable
analysis methods, whereas the second has dealt with the application of formal verification.
Figure 7.1 shows the concept.
Analysis is an elastic term with several areas using it to name their special methods. In
the context of this thesis, it has been utilised in three different meanings in Chap. 4.
Structural Analysis: The structural analysis targets the determination of the static
characteristics of a behaviour-based network. Here, basic checks as the correct
connection of edges are combined with more sophisticated ones analysing cycles and
dependencies in the network, or the determination of the relevance of a component.
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Figure 7.1: The concept of this thesis. The behaviour-based network together with its execution
platforms (simulated or real robot) embedded in its environment is verified and examined using
several analysis techniques. For formal verification a formal model is created. The results of the
Uppaal model checker can be fed back to the control system and/or used as reference point for
analysis. Vice versa analysis methods can be used to detect sources of failures detected in the
formal verification process.
The techniques and outcomes of the structural analysis have proven to be useful for
the other analysis methods presented in this work.
Hazard Analysis: Fault tree analysis has been chosen in the work at hand as a technique
to identify system components and events that lead to a safety hazard. A special
focus was set on the creation of fault trees combining hardware and software events.
A concept to model the behavioural network as a fault tree has been presented and
the application has been shown on the example of the outdoor robot ravon.
Data Analysis: The problem of detecting and tracing faults in the network has been
addressed using the term data analysis. As the interaction of single components make
it difficult to clearly identify the root causes of a robot failure, several techniques have
been proposed to support the developer. Among these are static analysis techniques
that use data derived during test cases for oﬄine analysis as well as online methods.
All these methods aim at the verification of the system with respect to safety. Formal
verification is a special kind of verification using mathematical methods to prove a system’s
correctness. Model checking, as one method to formally verify systems, has been chosen
for the verification of behaviour-based systems in this thesis. The basis for model checking
techniques is a formal system model, which needs to be extracted from the (software)
system. In the case of robotic systems, it is useful to represent the combination of
software and hardware in the formal model in order to make statements about their correct
interaction. Chapter 5 has dealt with these problems.
7.1. Results and Discussion 131
Formal Modelling: TheUppaal toolbox has been selected as model checker for the work
at hand. Accordingly, a formal model of the behaviour-based control system has been
built as a set of finite-state machines. Every behavioural component is modelled as a
set of five fsm’s, which represent the component’s interface (stimulation, inhibition,
activity, target rating and activation). The individual automata are connected with
each other via sending and receiving edges. An automated process supports the
developer in the creation of the formal model out of a behavioural network.
Hardware and Environment Integration: Safety behaviours have been identified as
the interface between software and hardware. Their task is to evaluate sensor data
and generate the corresponding control data. The automata modelling a behavioural
component have been adapted to model these special characteristics. Furthermore,
the sensor chain including the real sensor component and the corresponding virtual
sensor are modelled as finite-state automata. Failure automata have been introduced
to model possible failures. Additionally, a scenario automaton has been modelled to
define the environmental conditions where the robot is situated.
In order to facilitate the application of model checking, the process has been automated as
far as possible and tools supporting the modelling, generation of queries and backtracking
of negative model checking results have been developed. The generation of safety relevant
queries and the handling with the model checker’s results have been shown on the example
of the autonomous outdoor robot ravon.
The special issue of handling large and complex networks has been addressed in Chap. 6.
Especially for the model checking method, the state-space explosion problem has been
identified as existing for behaviour-based systems as well. Current research targeting
this topic has been investigated and could be divided into two areas, namely methods to
optimise the model checking technique and methods to reduce the formal model. The
latter has shown to be most suitable for the work at hand. Two reduction techniques,
abstraction and slicing, have been adapted to the use with behaviour-based systems. Their
benefit could be proven on the ravon example. Also addressed in this context is the
combination of fault tree analysis and model checking. Several combination possibilities
have been discussed. They do not only target the reduction of the system to analyse but
also determine ways to benefit from the advantages of both methods.
Great importance has been attached to the topic of automating analysis methods and
graphical support. As especially for large and complex networks, the manual analysis is not
feasible, several tools have been presented throughout this work that reduce the analysis
effort and visualise the results. The examples using the autonomous mobile off-road robot
ravon which is controlled by a network with more than 400 behavioural components,
have shown the applicability of the presented concept to a complex real-world system.
7.1 Results and Discussion
The work at hand has provided a number of methods to verify a behaviour-based robot
control system according to safety properties. The application examples have demonstrated
their applicability to complex robotic systems on the example of the autonomous robot
ravon. The analysis techniques of Chap. 4 have provided valuable information about the
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system, either to identify weak points in the system or to determine sources of failure. The
trouble of handling large networks manually has been overcome by the development of
tools that support the analysis process. Nevertheless, the problems which had already been
identified in related research could also be seen here. The results of the analysis process
are strongly dependent on the experience of the executing person. This problem could be
mitigated by automated methods that identify faults in the system according to the system
specification, or by methods that automatically detect faulty system states. Additionally,
the complexity of creating a fault tree out of the behaviour-based control software is faced
with providing a standardised model to represent a behavioural component as fault tree
element.
It has been shown in Chap. 5, that the integration of sensor hardware components into
the model checking process enables not only to determine correct software, but also their
correlation with hardware (and possible hardware failures). The approach to additionally
model environmental conditions, simplifies the transfer of safety requirements used for the
analysis procedure in Chap. 4 to properties that shall be verified formally. The emerging
problem of formulating properties formally to be processed by the model checker has
been overcome by the development of a tool that supports formal query generation. The
developed tool also visualises the results of the model checking process which encounters
the problem of interpreting the abstract results on the real system.
The application on the real robot system has shown the limits of this verification approach,
which become noticeable by the large memory consumption and long verification times.
This topic has been addressed in Chap. 6. The introduced techniques aim at the reduction
of the formal model which have been implemented as reduction of the behavioural network
to be verified before formally modelling it. This approach has the advantage that the
special properties of behaviour-based systems can be exploited to achieve a maximal
reduction without losing relevant information. Furthermore, the reduction techniques are
not only usable for formal verification but can also be applied before the execution of the
other analysis techniques. The application example of Sec. 6.4 has shown the improvements
in the model checking process using reduction techniques.
In summary, the analysis and formal verification techniques presented in the work at hand
all have their strengths and weaknesses. While the analysis methods of Chap. 4 are intuitive
and comprehensible also to non-experts, the lack of completeness and the complexity of the
result representation can lead to the missing of faults. In contrast, the results of the model
checker are easy to interpret due to the developed tool support which allows to easily
identify faults in the system. However, the abstraction level of the formal model forces to
exclude certain system characteristics from verification. A combination of the different
techniques allows for a comprehensive analysis and verification of behaviour-based systems
acting in unstructured environment. The knowledge of relations between system events
allows for the estimation of the criticality of hazards. Understanding the relation of system
components facilitates the identification of failure sources. Finally, formal verification
enables to prove that certain properties hold for the given system.
7.2 Future Work
The presented concept for the analysis and verification of behaviour-based systems can be
extended in several directions. The process of fault tree creation is currently a manual pro-
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cess guided by the developed modelling approach. The automation of the creation process
should be feasible using the results of the structural analysis and the modelling guidelines
and would be a great facilitation for the developer. The interpretation of the results
can be evaluated utilizing the approach presented in [AlTarawneh 14, AlTarawneh 15] as
basis, where a further extension could be to additionally show the minimal cut sets of the
software fault tree analysis in the behaviour-based network structure.
Another task for future work is the handling of the complexity of the resulting fault trees.
The reduction techniques presented in Chap. 6 have already been applied successfully
to reduce the formal model for the model checking process in the context of this thesis.
Their application in combination with fault tree modelling needs to be investigated and
integrated in an automated process.
The formal model of a behaviour-based system is currently limited to boolean values,
which reduces e.g. the description of the activity of a behavioural component to active
or not active. This abstraction is sufficient for many verification tasks, but for example,
the special methods to fuse data coming from several behaviours cannot be covered with
that approach. The extension of the behavioural signals from the set {0, 1} to a more fine-
grained interval would blow up the state space using the Uppaal verifier. A combination
of the presented reduction techniques that reduce the system to the task specific network
parts and an automated choice of the level of detail of behavioural signals could mitigate
this problem. Another possibility of facing problems caused by the high abstraction level
is to integrate a formal definition of the task a behavioural component has to complete.
Such a formal definition could be integrated in the existing formal model and considered
during the model checking process. This would allow for checking more sophisticated
queries.
The different techniques presented in this thesis build the basis for a comprehensive
analysis and formal verification of behaviour-based system. They assist the developer in the
understanding of the relationship of system events and the interaction of hardware/software
components, the identification of failure causes, and the formal verification of safety
requirements. The combination of these methods helps to overcome their weaknesses and
enables to profit from their advantages. In Sec. 6.5 several possibilities to combine fault
tree analysis with model checking have already been described.
The concept of integrating hardware into the formal model of the behaviour-based system
has been shown on the sensor processing chain of a robot. A logical next step is the
integration of actuators in order to have a formal model that covers the complete robot
system. The presented approach facilitates the integration of new components and the
formulation of real-world questions to formal queries.
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